The United States and the Russian Civil War
The Betty Miller Unterberger Collection of Documents

Guide to the Scholarly Resources Microfilm Edition

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About the Editor


She has been President of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, vice president of the Rocky Mountain Slavic Association, and has served on Historical Advisory Committees to the Department of State, the Department of the Army, the Defense Department, the Secretary of the Navy, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and has also been a Commissioner on the National Historical Publication and Records Commission. She has won numerous research awards including the American Philosophical Society, IREX, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, HEW, and the Ford Foundation. She has been awarded six distinguished teaching/research awards from both California State University and Texas A&M University and has taught at East Carolina University, Whittier College, California State University, Fullerton, University of Hawaii, and has been a Woodrow Wilson Fellow at Princeton University, a Visiting Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Irvine, and a Visiting Professor at both the Institute of International Relations, Peking University, Beijing, China, and Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia. She has lectured throughout the United States and in Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, the former Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, India and China. Her television and radio appearances have included NPR-Presidential Series, All Things Considered, Focus, CNN Prime Time–CNN International, and All-India TV.
Introduction

[The United States, the Allies and the Russian Civil War—with Emphasis on the Czech-Bolshevik Conflict, the Break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czech Liberation Movement, and America’s First Effort to Stop Japanese Imperialism in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria.]

In the summer of 1918, in the midst of the carnage of World War I, and nine months after the Bolshevik revolution, thousands of American soldiers landed in Russia to engage in one of the strangest adventures in American diplomatic and military history. While contemporary critics described the enterprise as “Mr. Wilson’s little war with Russia,” most Americans today have long since forgotten it. Not so the Russians! Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev have repeatedly spoken with bitter reproach of the United States’ role as hostile promoter and participant in a military intervention designed to overthrow the Soviet government. Soviet and other Cold War historians have charged that the American expedition to Russia in 1918 provided the pattern for interventions against Communism throughout the Cold War. But the story is a complicated one and cannot be understood outside of its setting in world conflict and coalition diplomacy.

As president, Woodrow Wilson advocated a policy of self-determination not only for the Russian people but also for other oppressed people in Eastern Europe. His view of self-determination grew out of the historical experience of the United States in confronting both revolution and civil war and his attempt to reconcile the ambivalence between the images and policies of the two greatest presidents of the United States. George Washington’s fame rested upon his role in leading a successful revolution against a sovereign state, while Abraham Lincoln’s rested upon his ability to subdue a part of the nation that desired self-determination and its own sovereignty. Wilson sought to reconcile these two conflicting policies as he dealt with a revolutionary Russia, a revolutionary China, the disintegrating multi-national empire of Austria-Hungary and the expanding empire of Japan in the Far East. These documents (within the context of Wilsonian diplomacy) explore the interrelationships of policy decisions and “on the scene” actions during the Allied struggle for victory in the First World War, the international rivalries stimulated by that war, the desperate policies of the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Empire, the revolutionary turmoil of the Bolshevik government and the appalled response of the United States and the Allies to the first Communist revolution. They reveal the desperate efforts of the Allies to reestablish an Eastern Front, the role of Thomas Masaryk and the Czech-Bolshevik conflict in the struggle to create a Czecho-Slovak state, the imperialistic urge to expansion of the military clique in Japan, the weak and fumbling efforts of a revolutionary China to preserve its territorial and administrative integrity while itself in the throes of continuing civil strife, the efforts of Russian counter-revolutionary groups to overthrow the Bolsheviks and win Allied support, the United States and Allied efforts to resolve the Russian problem at the Paris Peace Conference, and after American troops left Russia, the United States’ efforts through the Russian Railway Service Corps to prevent Japan from taking over control of the railways in Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces, and finally, Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to implement the principles for which the United States had entered the war and which he sought to apply universally.

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Americans greeted the Russian revolution of March 1917 with genuine enthusiasm. After the abdication of Nicholas II, a provisional government had been established and steps had been taken toward long awaited political and social reforms. It appeared as though democracy had finally broken through the hard crust of despotism. Within a few days the United States hurriedly recognized the new government—the first among the great powers to do so. Wilson had been reluctant to enter the war on the same side as the blackest autocracy in the world. Now Wilson could call Russia “a fit partner for a League of Honor,” an ally dedicated to a common cause. Americans were inspired by the naive assumption that a democratic Russia would continue the war with renewed zeal. The United States immediately began negotiations to establish credit for Russia in the United States. President Wilson also sent two missions to Russia. The first mission was to aid in the rehabilitation of the Russian railway system. The second was to extend to Russia the friendship and good will of the United States and to find the best means of cooperating with her for a successful presentation of the war. The latter mission, headed by Elihu Root, carried out its formal duties, filed its reports, and then dissolved. Far different was the history of the railway mission headed by John F. Stevens. In effect it became the forerunner of intervention and remained in Russia in expanded form as the Russian Railway Service Corps until 1922, long after the war had ended.

By the fall of 1917, American hopes for a strong ally were diminished as a second revolution rocked Russia. The Bolsheviks led by Nikolai Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and a virtually unknown Stalin seized power. They instituted sweeping changes, some more rapidly than others. The Allies were appalled. Not only did the revolution appear to be a menace to capitalistic society but, more immediately, Bolshevik peace negotiations with the Germans threatened the possible withdrawal of some 40 divisions, or several hundred thousand German veterans from Russia and their deployment on the Western Front. A peace would make available to Germany the vast resources of Russia thereby prolonging the struggle by billions of dollars and millions of lives. If this happened the democracies might be overwhelmed.

The Bolshevik program demanded an immediate general and democratic peace with the Central Powers. On November 29, 1917, Ambassador David R. Francis reported that military operations on the Russian Front had ceased and that preliminary peace negotiations between Russia and Germany would begin on December 2. All the Allies were invited by Russia to participate. None accepted. The Allies were naturally suspicious of a revolutionary government which claimed to rule in the name of the proletariat and advocated class war, world revolution, and the overthrow of capitalism. The Soviet decree of February 3, 1918, which repudiated all foreign state loans, scarcely increased Bolshevik popularity with the Allies. Furthermore, rumors were increasing that the Bolshevik leaders, Lenin and Trotsky were German agents who had returned to Russia with the assistance of the German General Staff for the purpose of inciting civil war and demoralizing the Russian armies. In these circumstances, western statesmen clung to the natural hope that somehow a great Russian leader would arise, around whom the “sane” elements would rally in relief of the stricken nation. The consequences of Russian withdrawal from the conflict were terrifying to contemplate. None of the Allies extended recognition to the new Russian government but continued to recognize the diplomatic representatives of the defunct Provisional Government. There were, however, differences of opinion as to how Bolshevik Russia should be treated. The immediate policy of the Allies was to keep Russia in the war. This objective was sought by two rather antagonistic means. Some Allied representatives encouraged revolutionary groups to overthrow the Bolsheviks and reestablish the Eastern Front, while others conferred with Bolshevik leaders and intimated a promise of Allied support if Russia continued in the war against Germany.
Toward the close of 1917 while the Allies were conducting their unofficial negotiations at Petrograd, the Bolshevism revolution was spreading to Eastern Siberia. There the longest frontier in political history separated China from Siberia. This area soon became the scene of recurrent border disturbances. Thousands of Russians fleeing from the Bolshevists sought a haven in the cities of North China and Manchuria, particularly along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which in fact had, since its initial construction in 1895, become virtually a Russian crown colony. There in relative safety some of them plotted and intrigued against the Bolshevist regime. Within the next few months the railway zone became a center of counter-revolutionary activity against the Bolshevists.

England, France and Japan soon extended financial aid to these anti-Bolshevik groups. Throughout the early months of 1918 agents of the Japanese government offered assistance to General Dmitri L. Horvath the Russian governor-general of the railway zone, in return for commercial concessions and the dismantling of the fortifications at Vladivostok. A rival government headed by Petr Derber established itself in railway cars in Harbin. They sought help from the American government which refused to commit itself toward any of the Harbin movements.

In the meantime, Great Britain, France, and Japan were supporting the independent operations of Captain Grigori Semenov, who was attempting to wrest control of the Trans-Baikal province from the Bolshevists. Initially Semenov succeeded in arousing considerable enthusiasm for his cause among Allied as well as certain American representatives in the Far East. However, later evidence revealed that Semenov was a villain capable of the most infamous crimes.

The British Foreign Office soon decided to open negotiations with the Bolshevists. France and the United States also had personal representatives to serve as go betweens for the French and American governments. At the same time the British and French, desperate to restore an Eastern Front against Germany, turned to America and to Japan for possible sources of manpower and supply. The American response was consistently negative, while, in the case of Japan, the request raised geopolitical issues of major importance.

Wilson stated his position toward Russia in his memorable Fourteen Points address on January 8, 1918. His sixth point represented the official attitude of the American government. It called for the evacuation of all Russian territory and advocated nonintervention, self-determination, and friendly assistance. Wilson was also opposed to the break-up of the Russian empire. His position was reflected in a number of official statements of the United States government in the winter and spring of 1918, all of which had his approval and some of which he drafted personally.

Events of February and March 1918—the Germans' reopening hostilities against Russia as a means of bringing pressure in the peace negotiations, the final signing of the Russian-German peace treaty on March 3, and its ratification on March 16, and the opening of the great German offensive on the Western Front five days later—caused the Allies to exert even heavier pressure on Wilson to change his stand and to sanction an Allied intervention in North Russia and in Siberia by the Japanese. The Japanese themselves were not yet ready to take action independently, and they refused to act as mandatory for the Allies unless the United States joined in making the request. Everything appeared to hang on Wilson's decision. Yet despite these pressures, the President remained unmoved. Throughout the winter and spring of the year, he questioned the wisdom of intervention. If any action were to be taken by the Japanese, he assumed it would be accompanied by a declaration indicating that they were acting as an ally of Russia and in Russia's interests, with the sole view of "holding it safe against Germany. . . ."

The idea of Allied military intervention in Russia was by no means the result of the Bolshevik revolution alone. Throughout 1917, Allied statesmen had considered such a policy in order to shore
up the failing military effort on the Russian Front. The British Foreign Office had even discussed the possibility of using Japanese troops. The British were led to believe that in return for this assistance Japan desired control of the railway to Harbin and the dismantlement of Vladivostok as well as the Russian naval base at that port. Nothing came from these informal feelers. But in the summer of 1917, the Russian ambassador to London suggested to the Russian high command that 200,000 Japanese troops be sent to Russia to fight against the Germans. By the fall when Russian soldiers were abandoning the front in huge numbers, the French suggested to the Provisional Government that Japanese troops be used but Premier Alexandr Kerensky and Foreign Minister Mikhail Ivanovich Tereschenko refused to even consider the idea. Wilson, knowing the earlier negative response to Japanese intervention of both the Russian czarist government and the Provisional Government, believed that such action at this point would generate a hot resentment in Russia itself and that whole action might play into the hands of the Central Powers. Russian authorities seemed to be completely opposed to having their territory traversed by their “old enemy of 1905.” Moreover, Wilson had been convinced, upon America’s entry into the war, of the virtue of a “Western strategy.” But British Prime Minister David Lloyd George disillusioned by the miniscule gains and horrendous casualties on the Western Front, had increasingly begun pushing the idea of exploiting the “eastern” theaters. With British armies in action against the Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and an Allied force facing Bulgaria in Salonika, he felt these fronts might offer opportunities not available on the stalemated Western Front. Now the Russian Front offered yet another possibility.

General Peyton C. March, Army Chief of Staff, and General Tasker H. Bliss, the American military representative on the Supreme War Council, were well aware of the logistical difficulties in connection with intervention and warned that such action might strengthen Germany’s hand in Russia. Indeed, it seems that the American military establishment was united in the belief that intervention in Russia would be militarily impractical and politically dangerous. Moreover, March, who had been an observer in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese war was also adamantly opposed to allowing Japan into Siberia. He believed that Japan’s motive was to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as Russia’s Pacific maritime provinces.

Wilson came to share these views, but his position was influenced even more by the sixth of his Fourteen Points that he had enunciated on January 8, 1918. He had called for the evacuation of all Russian territory and Russia’s unembarrassed and independent determination of her own political development and national policy. That represented the official policy of the United States with regard to Russia—non-intervention, self-determination, and friendly assistance.

Wilson’s views on lone Japanese intervention were strengthened by the chaotic conditions in Manchuria and along the line of the Trans-Siberian railway as well as rumors of lone Japanese intervention. The British were also suspicious of Japanese imperialism in Asia, but believed that if Japan was invited to act as the mandatory of the Allies, they could forestall any possible German-Japanese alliance to divide up Russia.

As early as February 23, 1918, the State Department had become aware of Japanese efforts to negotiate a military agreement with China for cooperation against either the Germans or the Bolsheviks in both Siberia and Manchuria. China had informed the United States and asked for advice on the matter. Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, made clear to the Chinese government that if Japan deemed occupation a necessity that China should guard the Chinese Eastern Railway alone. The Sino-Japanese conversations then proceeded and on March 25, 1918, China and Japan agreed to cooperate against those “hostile influences” in Russian territory which might threaten the peace and security of the Far East. The agreement was to be implemented by further provisions to be determined by
the military and naval authorities of both countries. The United States was able to secure secretly a copy of the March agreement from the British. Although simple in its terms, the agreement could easily lend itself to broad interpretations. It seemed obvious that China was too weak to resist Japanese encroachment, while military authorities in the north of China were inclined to follow Japan's lead. Although Chinese officials were reluctant to commit themselves to the full extent desired by Japan, they did finally consent. But they continued to keep the United States authorities informed of their continuing problems with the Japanese.

The military agreements of May 16 and 19, 1918, signed in Peking by the military authorities of Japan and China, in accordance with the preliminary agreement of March 25, provided for Sino-Japanese military and naval cooperation in the event that their territories or the general peace and tranquility in the extreme Orient should be menaced by the enemy. The agreements provided for the joint defense of the Chinese border and joint dispatch of troops outside Chinese territory as well as the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway. While the Sino-Japanese negotiations were in progress, the Allies continued to press for action in Siberia.

In April-May 1918, confronted with a new German offensive in the west, the French and British military planners conceived a somewhat more elaborate scheme for intervention in Russia with or without the consent of the Bolsheviks. They proposed Allied landings both at Vladivostok and at the northern ports of European Russia. The Japanese were to bear the main burden at Vladivostok; a mixed Allied force, in which it was hoped the Americans would play a prominent part, was to bear the responsibility at Murmansk and Archangel. The expeditions at these widely separated points would combine with local anti-Bolshevik forces loyal to the Allied cause, advance toward each other, and eventually link up, thus creating a solid Allied front from Siberia to the Upper Volga region, forcing the Germans to reconstitute their military position in the east.

It was obvious at the time that Wilson never would have given his approval to such a plan, and when he did learn of it, he was outraged. Nevertheless, the French and British military planners did not wait for American approval before beginning to implement the project to the extent that they were able.

In the northern ports, the British proceeded to take action at once. In May, the British sent to Archangel such few additional soldiers as they were able to spare, commanded by a general who was eventually to command the entire northern expedition. Because this force was wholly inadequate for an extensive expedition, the British requested that an American contingent also be made available for service at the northern Russian ports. They stressed the apparent agreement of the Soviets to their proposals.

In fact, the Soviet government itself had requested American railway aid and Wilson had consented. Wilson had told Arthur Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, that Russian assent to any proposal for intervention was indispensable to American agreement to such a policy. The British hastened to bring this about. When Commissar of War Trotsky authorized acceptance of Allied aid, British marines landed in northern Russia to cooperate with the Red Army in defense of Murmansk and the railroad line. A French force was to follow. Trotsky informed Colonel James Ruggles, American military attaché in Petrograd that although he feared Japanese army control in Siberia and the Siberian railroad he would welcome American railroad men. In response to Trotsky's request for railway assistance, Wilson had authorized Colonel George B. Emerson, head of the Russian Railway Service Corps and three assistants to be sent from Vladivostok to Vologda on May 19 to confer with Ambassador Francis and Trotsky about the best means of aiding in the rehabilitation of the Russian railways in Europe. Stevens had already arrived in northern Manchuria with 100 engineers where he was seeking
to organize and operate the Chinese Eastern Railway in the face of continuous harassment from the Japanese. At that point, Horvath, with Japanese military assistance, had reorganized the Chinese Eastern Railway with the political aim of reconstituting a government for Siberia. With these conditions in mind, Lansing had informed Ambassador Francis of Emerson's impending arrival with the hope of arranging any reasonable and proper suggestions or requests by the Soviet authorities to provide railway assistance in European Russia as well as permission for the Railway Service Corps to extend its activities in Siberia and northern Manchuria.

Lieutenant General Güchi Tanaka, vice-chief of the Japanese General Staff, regarded the Bolsheviks as German tools and urged an Allied army to occupy the railways all the way to Irkutsk. He made it clear that "if German influence continues to spread eastward, Japan might find herself obliged to act independently to safeguard her interests." Ambassador Kikujiro Ishii warned that the Bolsheviks might turn to Germany for assistance against a Japanese intervention, even if that intervention was supported by the Allies and the United States. But Wilson was also troubled by reports from Ambassador Roland Morris in Tokyo that Japan and Germany were in communication through prominent Japanese officials.

By the middle of June, the Supreme War Council had approved of the transportation of some 20,000 Czechs, former prisoners of war or deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army, to the Northwest to defend the Russian Arctic ports, prior to their transfer to France. General Bliss, American military representative on the council, who was absolutely opposed to Japanese intervention in Siberia, had agreed to the proposal only insofar as the forces required would be drawn from Czech units then in Russia and would therefore require the dispatch to northern Russia of no more than two American battalions. The forces were to defend against small enemy operations or, in the event of major enemy operations to ensure the removal or destruction of stores that would be of service to the enemy. The addition of British, French, and Italian, as well as American troops would strengthen the Czech contingent.

Nothing was said to Wilson at this time about the plan for penetrating into the interior and linking up with the Siberian intervention. The plan was put to him as merely an arrangement for the defense of the northern ports, particularly Murmansk, against the Germans and that American troops were needed to protect great quantities of Allied war supplies. Despite these arguments in favor of sending troops to northern Russia, Wilson remained at all times skeptical of the merits of this proposed expedition. But he felt obliged to send troops because the British and French were pressing so hard, and he had refused so many of their requests that they were beginning to feel that he was not a good ally. His opposition was made more difficult by the pro-Allied attitude of the local Soviet at Murmansk and by reports from Allied representatives in Russia that the Soviet government was not really as adverse as it pretended to be to the idea of an Allied landing in the north.

Wilson finally replied to the British government that, while he had no enthusiasm for the scheme, he would abide in this instance by the opinion of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Allied commander-in-chief on the Western Front. If Foch really thought the requested American battalions would be of more use in Murmansk than in France, they would be sent. Foch, at British urging, approved the diversion of this force. Wilson now consented to the British request that an American war ship be dispatched to Murmansk, with the understanding that the Bolsheviks had approved. But he gave strict orders to Captain Bion Bierer, Commander of the USS Olympia, not to be drawn into any further venture without specific instructions by cable from Washington. This was the origin of America's participation in the northern intervention.
Meanwhile, the situation in Siberia had been drastically altered. At the end of May, a conflict broke out between the Czecho-Slovak corps and the Bolsheviks, resulting in Czech control of much of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Czech force was eager to fight on the Allied side in the hope of liberating their country from Austro-Hungarian domination, and securing Allied support for the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia. With the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Czechs found themselves in a desperate situation. If captured by the Germans, they would all be executed as traitors. Their only hope was to go westward via Vladivostok to the Western Front. Though the corps was strung out in trainloads along the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Ukraine to Vladivostok, this force was now the strongest single army in Russia. It was to play a vital role in Wilson's decisions about Russia.

Thomas G. Masaryk, distinguished Czechoslovak leader, had recently arrived in Washington after a journey that had begun in December 1914 and taken him from his homeland to France, the Netherlands, Great Britain and to Russia itself. In each capital he had arranged for support and sympathy for the Czech liberation movement and where possible had sought to organize Czech and Slovak troops to participate with the Allies in the conduct of the war and especially the defeat of the Central Powers. He had succeeded in establishing the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris with the aid of two dedicated supporters, Eduard Beneš and Milan R. Štefánik. This was no easy task, since the Allies although at war with Austria-Hungary regarded the maintenance of the empire as essential to the balance of power in Europe. Moreover, they were engaged in serious efforts to detach Austria-Hungary from its alliance with Germany. The United States had been especially interested in this effort. It had not declared war against Austria-Hungary until December 1917 and during that period and immediately after, the United States had continued its efforts to negotiate a separate peace with the Hapsburg Monarchy. Wilson had made clear in the tenth of his Fourteen Points in January 1918 that he did not seek the break-up of the empire but rather autonomy for the peoples within that empire. Thus Masaryk had no small task in winning the support of the United States and the Allies to the idea of an independent Czechoslovakia, which in effect meant the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Nevertheless, Masaryk had found distinguished supporters in both England and France and later in the United States.

Masaryk had ended up in Russia at a time when the czarist government had been overthrown and the Provisional Government had been established. The attitude of the czarist government toward the formation of an independent Czech unit was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, it welcomed the aid offered and admired the bravery of the Czechs on the battlefield. Russian leaders were naturally interested in weakening the Austrian empire, their most dangerous and immediate competitor in the Balkans. Yet, as a multi-ethnic empire itself they could hardly be sympathetic towards movements that supported the principle of nationality and the “right of the peoples to determine their own fate—principles in the name of which dissolution of the Dual Monarch was called for—because they constituted a precedent which could detach from Russia all of her heterogenous ethnic population.” Nevertheless, the czarist government had agreed to the organization of the John Hus Battalion at the Mikhailov Monastery in Kiev on August 14, 1914. This battalion was an independent unit of the Russian army and became known as the Česká Družina (Czech legion). In the meantime volunteers from Czech prisoners of war were eager to join the regiment of John Hus and later regiments named after Bohemian kings of Czech blood. Propaganda efforts which had gone on in France and in England under Czech and Slovak leadership also took place in Russia. When Masaryk arrived there he had the advantage of knowing Paul N. Miliukov, Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government
whom he had met at the University of Chicago when he followed him as the second lecturer in the first Slavic Studies program established in the United States through the beneficence of the American philanthropist, Charles R. Crane. With Miliukov’s help, he had succeeded in winning support for the use of the Czech legion in the struggle against the Germans.

After the Provisional Government was overthrown, because of Czech bravery in the final battles against the Germans, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, as well as Bolshevik generals in the Ukraine had negotiated an agreement with Masaryk for the Czech legion’s passage through Siberia to the Western Front. Trotsky had urged their immediate and rapid movement because of increasing German domination in Moscow. In return Masaryk had pledged the neutrality of his troops and had come to the United States advocating the de facto recognition of the Bolsheviks. However, once Masaryk had left Russia and the British initiated their efforts to re-route a part of the Czech legion through Archangel, the fears of the Czech legion were magnified by Bolshevik actions apparently instigated by the Germans. The Bolsheviks began to disarm the Czechs, stopping their trains as they reached the various stations along the railway. When Masaryk in Japan learned of the Bolshevik actions, he was not deeply concerned, but rather pointed out that the French and British needed men on the Western Front and not arms. But Masaryk was not aware of Bolshevik success in propagandizing Czech as well as German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners into joining international units of the Bolshevik army. Moreover, Trotsky had tried earlier to persuade the Czechs to join the Soviet forces and aid in the recreation of the Eastern Front. In early May the Bolsheviks arrested some of the Czechoslovak officers and forced them to join the Red Army. Finally, as a result of a clash between the Czech forces and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war two members of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia were arrested and persuaded to sign an order to disarm the Czechs and re-route them through Archangel.

The Czechs were convinced that the Bolsheviks were actually allied with the Germans and had forced their leaders to sign the disarmament order. They refused to give up their weapons. They also suspected that the effort to re-route a portion of their troops through Archangel, actually initiated by the British with Bolshevik consent, was also the work of the Germans. They feared that ultimately they would be turned over to the Germans and executed as traitors. Although they hoped to settle matters without bloodshed, free their leaders in Moscow and negotiate their differences, by May 24, 1918, all trust in the Bolsheviks was gone. Continued Bolshevik harassment and the presence of armed German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Bolshevik ranks (of whom over 1,000,000 had been interned in Siberia) convinced them that the Germans were in league with the Bolsheviks to prevent them from ever reaching the Western Front. At a revolutionary council in Ekaterinburg the Czechs approved a decision to reject the plan to go to the northern ports and to continue their way to Vladivostok, prepared to fight their way out if necessary. That necessity soon became a reality. As the Czechs began their struggle Masaryk was en route to the United States, where his primary objective was to obtain Czech transport to the Western Front and secure the recognition of an independent Czechoslovak state.

There were clear differences between Thomas Masaryk and President Wilson on the independence of Czechoslovakia. Wilson had not declared war against Austria-Hungary until December of 1917. It was his hope that he would be able to negotiate a treaty with the Austro-Hungarian empire to separate them from the Germans. But continuing losses on the Western Front and pressure from his Allies had convinced him that he must declare war against Austria-Hungary particularly after Caporetta. Nevertheless, even after that declaration the British, French, and the United States contin-
ued their efforts to negotiate with the Austro-Hungarian empire to bring an end to the alliance with the Germans. For this reason Wilson refused to support the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian empire and sought rather the creation of a Danubian confederation of states. Where Wilson sought autonomy for Czechoslovakia within such a confederation, Masaryk would consider nothing less than complete Czecho-Slovak independence. Wilson however refused to consider any movement toward Czecho-Slovak independence or indeed the independence of other Eastern European states except Poland until all hope of securing a negotiated peace with Austria-Hungary on the basis of a confederation of states had failed.

Both Wilson, who had resolutely opposed any intervention in Russia, and Masaryk who had committed his troops to neutrality in Russia agreed on economic aid for the Russian people. When Wilson began to consider intervention, it was by devising an economic plan for the Russians, which in almost every respect was the same one that Masaryk had proposed to him as early as April 1918. The plan was never fully implemented. By the end of June 1918 both Wilson and Masaryk persuaded by Czech, British, French, and American diplomatic appeals from Russia and Siberia, believed that the Bolshevists were under the domination and control of the Germans. They believed that the Germans had supported Trotsky and Lenin in their return to Russia and that the Czechs had been attacked and stopped in their efforts to reach Vladivostok by German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who had been released and armed by the Bolshevists.

The outbreak of hostilities was largely a product of the chaotic conditions then existing in Siberia and the frictions and misunderstandings that occurred when the Czechs encountered parties of Austrian or Hungarian war prisoners who were, after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace, due for repatriation and were trying to make their way westward along the railway. The uprising actually came as a setback to Allied military planners, who had just made arrangements with the Soviet authorities to have this portion of the corps routed to the Russian north. The outbreak of the conflict between the Czechs and the Bolshevists made this impossible. Within a few days, the Czechs seized most of the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Volga to Irkutsk. Another body of some 18,000 Czechs had already arrived safely in Vladivostok, but at the time of the uprising there were no Czech trains in the area between Vladivostok and Irkutsk. This territory remained initially in Soviet hands.

So it was that as Colonel Emerson sought to make his way via the Trans-Siberian Railway to European Russia to negotiate with Trotsky for the operation of the Russian railways, the Czechs had seized most of the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Volga to Irkutsk. Although Emerson continued his efforts to reach his destination and even to mediate the conflict, Czech-Bolshevik differences soon made his mediation impossible. The Czechs refused to allow him and his party to pass through Soviet lines. Thus his efforts to cooperate with the Bolshevists ended in failure.

By the end of June 1918, Allied pressure on Wilson for intervention in Siberia was intense. Virtually all the American representatives in Russia, Siberia, and China were united in supporting immediate intervention. The Allies were in the process of inviting Japan to intervene alone, a course of action fraught with hazard for the future of eastern Siberia and Manchuria. To complicate matters further, the threat of independent Japanese action loomed on the horizon. Yet Wilson was still opposed to both Japanese intervention and Allied intervention on the grounds that the latter would be the same thing, since the Japanese would supply the major part of the military force. He was convinced that such a policy would simply throw the Russians into the hands of the Germans. Moreover, just as in the case of northern Russia, he still desired an invitation to enter Russia from the Bolshevists or from somebody who really represented Russian opinion. Wilson's position was fully supported by his own
military advisors who were opposed not only to any diversion of troops from the Western Front, but also to giving the Japanese a "free hand in Siberia." They also fully supported Wilson's policy of self-determination for the Russians.

Yet, in July 1918, Wilson was forced to change his mind. He not only agreed to intervention, but also took the lead in inviting the Japanese to a limited, joint intervention in Siberia. What then were the circumstances that brought about this complete reversal? His first reason was to "rescue" some 70,000 Czecho-Slovaks who had allegedly been attacked in Siberia by German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war. In late June, some 10,000 Czechs, who had arrived safely in Vladivostok seized the city and appealed to the Allied governments, and particularly to the United States and Japan, for military support to return to Irkutsk to help their brethren. For the British Foreign Office, which had exhausted virtually all of its arguments in the effort to win Wilson's agreement to Japanese intervention, the plight of the Czecho-Slovaks provided a new and powerful lever. Foreign Minister Balfour called for "immediate Allied action" as a "matter of urgent necessity." Lansing supported the British argument. The Supreme War Council also cabled Wilson, urging both support to the Czechs and the reestablishment of the Eastern Front.

The plight of the Czecho-Slovaks represented an entirely new development to Wilson. Here was an Allied force, allegedly attacked by German and Austro-Hungarian former prisoners of war in their efforts to remove themselves from Siberia, who were now fighting, it appeared, to keep Siberia out of German hands. Wilson could not resist their appeals for assistance. He had already issued a public declaration of "earnest sympathy" for "Czecho-Slovak nationalistic aspirations" for freedom on May 29 after all hope for negotiating a separate peace with Austria-Hungary had ended. Yet the problem was how to act without associating himself with the political schemes of the Allies or opening the door to full-scale Japanese intervention in eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria.

Wilson arrived at a decision on July 6, 1918, after consultation with his cabinet. He agreed to help the Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok to establish contact with their compatriots farther west and assist them in their efforts to reach the Western Front. At the same time, he rejected emphatically the whole Allied notion of restoring the Eastern Front. He proposed that the United States and Japan each send 7,000 troops to guard the line of communication of the Vladivostok Czechs as they advanced westward along the Trans-Siberian Railway to "rescue" their brethren at Irkutsk. Both governments would issue a public announcement that the purpose of sending troops was specifically to aid the Czecho-Slovaks against German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, that there was "no purpose" to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and that the United States and Japan would guarantee not to impair the political or territorial sovereignty of Russia.

Wilson's initial decision was a unilateral one. It was in no way a part of the general Allied decision for intervention in Siberia. Wilson rejected virtually every proposal that the British and French governments and the Supreme War Council had urged upon him. He did not consider the action that he was authorizing an intervention against the Bolsheviks; and in communicating his decision to the Allied governments, he condemned the whole notion of intervention in the bluntest terms. The British and French were furious. Yet they continued to hope that, with appropriate pressure, Wilson would expand his original plan, particularly after American troops had arrived in Siberia. Ironically, while Wilson was seeking to negotiate an appropriate agreement with the Japanese to rescue the Czechs, both the British and the French had sent instructions to their respective military missions in Russia to embark on the plan for Allied intervention using the Czechs as a nucleus for the intervention force with the purpose of reestablishing the Eastern Front.
Wilson's problem was how to "rescue" the Czechs in cooperation with the Japanese government whose motives he deeply distrusted. He was concerned that, once Japanese forces had arrived in Siberia, it would be difficult to induce them to leave. For the Japanese military leaders, there was little value in intervention unless it resulted in Japanese control of eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria. Wilson negotiated to limit the size of the Japanese expedition, restrict the geographical area in which it would operate, define its specific objectives and provide the conditions for its withdrawal. Simultaneously, he sought to provide for exclusive Chinese control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Throughout the month of July, Wilson tried to win Japanese agreement to the principle of "joint, equal military action." He failed. The Japanese ambassador made clear that, in the event of an emergency, Japan might be forced to send additional troops "without consultation." Deeply disturbed by the Japanese response, Wilson warned that if Japan and the other Allies concluded that a large expedition was a military necessity, then the United States would be compelled to withdraw as "that was not our plan."

Wilson wrote the public announcement of his decision to rescue the Czechs (usually referred to as the aide mémoire) on his personal typewriter and released it to the press on the afternoon of August 3. Once again he made clear that the United States would take no part in military intervention or sanction it in principle. He believed it would "injure [Russia] rather than help her, and ... would be of no advantage in the prosecution or main design to win the war against Germany." Military action was admissible in Russia only to help the Czecho-Slovaks, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance, and to guard military stores, which Russian forces might subsequently need. Wilson also announced his approval of the use of American troops at Murmansk and Archangel for the same objectives.

General William S. Graves, commander of the American expedition, received his orders for the Siberian command directly from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. After handing him a copy of Wilson's aide mémoire of August 3, Baker cautioned him that the Japanese intended to expand on the Asiatic mainland. Graves' instructions forbade any interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people; his army was not to engage in hostile action against anyone. Baker warned him that he would be "walking on eggs loaded with dynamite."

Allied requests for both a military and political expansion of the expeditions soon led Wilson to fear that the other governments were disregarding the American plan and seeking to form a new Eastern Front. Although Wilson was concerned over the plight of the Czechs, he insisted that they be brought out eastward to Vladivostok and conveyed to the Western Front in Europe according to the original agreement made with them, although neither the United States nor the Allies had made arrangements for their transport. Once again Wilson emphasized to the British that American policy was clear, unaltered, and in entire accord with the policy submitted to the Japanese government originally, that is "to rescue the Czechs," after which the Japanese and American forces would retire and both forces would evacuate Russian territory.

The British Foreign Office responded that the American decision to hold its troops in eastern Siberia would not affect the British determination to aid the Czechs in holding their position west of the Urals. They feared that if the Czechs withdrew to the east, the "loyal" Russians would be left to the mercy of their enemies. Moreover, the British government indicated its intention to request the French and Japanese government to follow British policy in standing by the "loyal" Russians against the Bolsheviks.
The divergence of views concerning the purpose of the expedition became apparent once troops landed. The British and French immediately requested additional American forces insisting that the safety of the Czechs was an obligation of honor resting on all the Allies. When Wilson refused, they suggested the Japanese dispatch the necessary additional troops—the French thought 80,000 would suffice. Wilson was “irritated beyond words” and drafted a stiff reply opposing this proposal in clear and unmistakable terms. The British and French also sought the establishment of a unified political control of affairs in Siberia because they believed the Russians were too divided to be able to do so effectively or impartially. Wilson refused. He contemplated no political action of any kind in Russia but as he said only the action of friends who stood at hand to see ways in which they could help.

Wilson was also angry over Allied interference in northern Russia and especially the “high handed attitude” adopted by British General Frederick C. Poole. General March was irritated not only with Allied efforts to change the nature of the expedition but also with some of his own subordinates who seemed to be following British policy rather than the specific American instructions sent to them.

The issue of overall military command in Siberia raised new questions. Apparently in an effort to smooth negotiations with the Japanese government, President Wilson had agreed that the Japanese would have the supreme command when American troops landed in Vladivostok. This view was conveyed to the Japanese ambassador with the suggestion that no formal statement be given out concerning the command but that they send an officer of sufficient rank with their forces and it would be understood that American forces would be under his command. Evidently neither the War Department nor General Graves were informed of this decision. This confusion between the State and War Department placed General Graves in an awkward position at the very outset of his arrival. When General Kikuzo Otani informed him that the State Department had notified him that he, Otani, would be in command of American troops Graves replied that while he desired to cooperate with the Japanese he had no orders to place American troops under Japanese command.

Graves also realized that the American soldiers were confused about their mission in Siberia. Some believed, correctly, that their purpose was to aid the Czechs. Others thought the Americans were to be used to recapture the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who were running loose in Siberia, reportedly gathering arms and moving back towards Germany. Still others thought that they were there to help reestablish the Eastern Front. Lastly, many believed the American army had been sent to Siberia in a crusade against Bolshevism. Graves found this last idea generally accepted among the officers and men. When he learned that a young American officer had arrested a Russian because he was thought to be a Bolshevik, Graves issued a statement that indicated that the United States was not at war with the Bolsheviks or any other faction in Russia and that American soldiers had no orders to arrest Bolsheviks or anybody else unless they disturbed the peace of the community, attacked the people, or the Allied soldiers. He made clear that the United States army was not in Siberia to fight Russia or any group or faction in Russia.

By early September it was clear to Wilson that both the Northern expedition and the one in Siberia were being carried out in utter disregard for American policy. With the approval of the Supreme War Council, General Poole was seeking to use the Czech forces in western Siberia to effect a junction with Allied forces moving down from northern Russia, in the expectation of reestablishing the Eastern Front. Wilson was outraged and exasperated. He feared there was some influence at work to pull absolutely away from the plan which the United States had proposed and to which he believed the other governments had assented, and proceeded to do what the United States said they would not do. He refused to send additional American battalions and forcefully argued that the United States
would not cooperate in any effort to establish lines of operation and defense from Siberia to Archangel.

By this time, Wilson was also clashing head-on with the Japanese. Tokyo informed Washington of its decision to send an independent Japanese force under the terms of the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of May 16, 1918, to protect the Manchurian border from invasion by the Bolsheviks. This action was taken despite the fact that the Chinese government denied repeatedly and emphatically that its borders had been violated either by the Bolsheviks or former German prisoners of war. The Japanese claimed that their expedition into the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway was "entirely different in nature from the present joint intervention in Vladivostok" and that the only nations that had interests involved were Japan and China. "Very much disturbed" by these reports, which had resulted in the transfer of 12,000 Japanese troops along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Wilson sent a strong protest to the Japanese government. At the same time, John F. Stevens reported that Japan was making every effort to control the operation of the railways, and that without quick action American railroad men would be "out of business completely." The State Department urged Stevens to use his best efforts to forward the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks and warned him "to avoid alliance with or support to any political group or faction in Russia." Concurrently, plans were initiated with the Allies for placing the general direction of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways in the hands of Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps.

The Kolchak or Omsk government, established in November 1918 was supreme in western Siberia. Supported by the Czechs, it maintained an army which was engaged in conducting a campaign against the Bolsheviks. Kolchak was strongly supported by the British and French representatives in Siberia who were eager to have the Allied governments recognize his rule. Kolchak, however, was unable to control two independent Cossack leaders, Gregorii Semenov and Ivan Kalmykov, who used the chaotic conditions in Siberia as a means of increasing their own wealth and power. Semenov destroyed railway transportation, interrupted telegraphic communications, and terrorized the eastern regions with his irresponsible actions. There was ample evidence to indicate that his activities were directly encouraged and supported by Japan. Japanese military authorities refused to protect the American representatives of the Russian Railway Technical Board in the performance of their railway duties, despite Semenov's hostile acts against them. They maintained that such actions would be interference in Russian internal affairs. American Ambassador to Japan, Roland S. Morris believed that the Japanese were attempting to use the Kolchak organization as a means of dominating eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria.

While the Omsk authorities were disturbed about the actions of the Japanese and Cossacks, they were equally provoked with the "uneutral" policy of American troops. General Graves held rigidly to a strict interpretation of his instructions and refused to take action for or against either Kolchak or the Bolsheviks, except insofar as each side might benefit from the protection of the railway sectors and military stores assigned to his command. The Omsk government stated flatly that American troops were accomplishing no useful purpose in Siberia but were doing actual harm in tending to prolong disturbed conditions. The British and French governments sustained the objections of the Omsk government.

Because the Allies had accepted Japanese command over the Siberian expedition, Wilson was concerned about turning over military control of the railways to the Japanese—even if under the technical direction of Stevens. Therefore, Wilson began negotiations to secure the consent of Masaryk, the acknowledged political leader of the Czechs, to use the Czech military forces in the implementation of an international railway plan to control both the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railways. At the same time, Wilson, who had absolutely forbidden General Graves to establish himself
at any point along the Trans-Siberian Railway beyond Vladivostok, now agreed to request permission from China to station Graves in northern Manchuria, both in order to expedite the eastward movement of the Czechs and to curb Japanese action along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese government immediately granted the necessary permission and added informally that it “heartily welcomed” the presence of American troops and railway assistance, although the Chinese feared that Japan might resent any expression of that sort.

Japan continued to pour troops into Siberia and northern Manchuria. By the time the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, Japan had sent 72,400 men, all of them under the direct control of the General Staff in Tokyo. The United States continued to protest vigorously against Japanese action. At the same time it sought to place the railways under international military control and to operate them through the Russian Railway Service Corps. After months of patient negotiation and an internal struggle within the government, Japan finally signed the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. Wilson regarded this plan as of “inestimable value” not only for the people of Russia and the United States, but for the world as well. He advised Congress that the matter could be treated entirely apart from the general Russian problem. He believed that irrespective of what American policy might be toward Russia, or further Russian developments, it was essential to maintain the policy of the Open Door with reference to the Siberian and particularly the Chinese Eastern Railway.

President Wilson was obviously troubled about the entire Siberian situation. He presented his problem to the Council of Four in Paris. He pointed out that although the United States did not believe in Kolchak, the British and French military representatives in Siberia were supporting him. Kolchak, who regarded American soldiers as neutral, was quite irritated by their presence on the railway. The Cossacks also were antagonistic toward American soldiers. Wilson suspected that the Japanese would be glad to see a collision between the two groups. In these circumstances, Wilson believed that the United States must either take sides with Kolchak and send a much stronger force to Siberia or withdraw. If the United States aided Kolchak and increased its forces in Siberia, Japan would increase hers still more. If American troops continued merely to guard the railway and maintain a neutral position, Wilson was advised that collisions would occur, which might result in actual war. If American troops were withdrawn, Siberia would be left to the Japanese and Kolchak. The president’s dilemma was quite evident. Although he favored a neutral policy toward Russia and Siberia, at the same time he did not wish to withdraw American soldiers from Siberia and leave Japan in control of the situation. This would mean an end to the cherished Open Door policy. So it was that Wilson loath to leave Japan in virtual control of Northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia, should American troops depart, and unwilling to jeopardize his program at the Peace Conference by independent action followed a policy which appeared to be totally at variance not only with the principles which he had enunciated concerning Russia, but also with the principles of his proposed league. When Wilson found it impossible to keep American troops in Siberia without actively aiding Kolchak, he agreed to support and aid Kolchak despite the fact that Wilson himself admitted that the American people did not believe in Kolchak. Seeking to find some solution to the Russian problem while at the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson considered a number of different proposals. He favored investigating formally the peace proposals which Maxim Litvinov, a Soviet plenipotentiary had sent personally to him on Christmas Eve. Shortly thereafter Wilson sent William H. Buckler, a special assistant to the American ambassador in London to investigate Litvinov’s proposals. There was little unity in the views of the Allied statesman concerning Russia. Marshal Foch immediately urged a quick peace with Germany in order to begin an anti-Bolshevik crusade. He wished to crush Bolshevism with American troops. Wilson strongly opposed the plan. Wilson had already opposed the creation of buffer states out of Bolshevik territory, refused
earlier French suggestions to use American forces in the Ukraine, and declined to intervene against advancing Soviet armies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. He continued to oppose a later more grandiose plan to stop Bolshevism by force, submitted by Foch.

Wilson proposed to negotiate with the Russians. Lloyd George agreed but the French foreign minister was outraged at the idea of negotiating with the Soviets. Wilson had just received a report from Buckler which indicated that the Soviet government was eager for a permanent peace and was willing to compromise on all points. On January 22, 1919, Wilson suggested as a site for the meeting Prinkipo, or Prince’s Island on the Sea of Marmora. Wilson drafted the invitation, reaffirmed the principles which he had enunciated in Point 6, pledged non-interference in Russian affairs and recognized the absolute right of the Russian people to determine their own affairs “without dictation or direction of any kind from outside.” The invitation of a proposed general armistice between the contending forces in Russia set February 15 as the date for the conference. The French and Italians yielded very reluctantly to Wilson’s insistence. From Siberia, Archangel and southern Russia, the invitation to Prinkipo was indignantly rejected. Thus the Prinkipo demarche eventually failed.

On February 15, 1919, the day before Wilson left the Paris Peace Conference for a trip to the United States, Winston S. Churchill, Minister of War, came over from England specifically to get Wilson’s views on the Russian problem. What was to be the policy, peace or war? Surely Wilson would not leave Paris without answering so important a question. Wilson had very clear answers on two points. First, he believed that Allied intervention in Russia was ineffectual and deleterious; he advocated the withdrawal of Allied and American troops from all parts of Russian territory. Second, he was not opposed to an informal meeting between American and Bolshevik representatives for the purpose of securing information. He would meet them alone, if necessary. He pointed to the conflicting sources of information in both official and unofficial reports indicating that it was impossible to obtain a coherent picture of Russian affairs. Churchill averred that the withdrawal of allied troops would place some 500,000 non-Bolshevik troops at the mercy of the Bolsheviks and leave “an undeterminable vista of violence and misery.” Wilson replied that, because none of the Allies could reinforce its armies there, withdrawal seemed the best solution. Moreover, he added, even when the Allies supplied non-Bolsheviks with arms, they “made very little use of them.”

After Wilson had left Paris, Churchill either misinterpreted or distorted Wilson’s concluding remarks to indicate a willingness to participate with the other Allies in anything necessary and practicable to help the non-Bolshevik Russian armies then in the field. Churchill immediately initiated efforts for joint military action to aid the White Russian armies in maintaining themselves against the Bolsheviks; at the same time he sought measures to safeguard Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Poland, and Rumania.

Wilson was outraged by Churchill’s actions, and immediately instructed the American peace commissioners to oppose any policies that did not mean the “earliest practicable withdrawal of military forces.” He instructed Colonel Edward M. House to make it plain to the Allied statesmen that we were not at war with Russia and would in no circumstances take part in military operations there against the Russians. General Bliss immediately explained Wilson’s views to Churchill, and the project was dropped.

The next British and American attempt to deal with the Russian problem was to send a secret diplomatic agent, William C. Bullitt to talk to the Bolshevik leaders. The plan itself was initiated and undertaken without Wilson’s knowledge. The mission itself was unofficial and for informational purposes only. Moreover, it remained secret from all of the Allies except the British. After a week in Russia, Bullitt returned to Paris with a document containing the terms of peace which the Soviet
government pledged itself to accept. Bullitt believed that they constituted a practicable basis for peace between the Soviet government and the Allied powers, and he wrote a moving plea to Colonel House urging their acceptance.

The Bullitt proposal was quietly suppressed for a variety of reasons. In the face of strong anti-Bolshevik opinion at home, Lloyd George felt it politically unwise to support them. More important, Bullitt returned to Paris at the height of one of the most severe crises of the conference. Wilson and Lloyd George felt that they had yielded all they could to inflexible French demands for security, and the conference appeared on the verge of breaking up. Wilson, heavily preoccupied with German issues and deeply concerned as to whether peace in the West could be achieved at all, at that point regarded peace in Russia as a relatively insignificant secondary problem. Moreover, although Wilson agreed to see Bullitt in House’s office he was unable to keep the appointment because of a severe headache. A few days later he became violently ill and the illness lasted for over a week. Thus Wilson did not at any point deal with Bullitt directly. Given the hostile attitudes of virtually all of the Allied statesmen, particularly the French, there was little that Wilson could do to insure a favorable response to the Soviet offer. The Prinkipo proposal had clearly demonstrated that.

By the time of the Armistice, the Czechs had become completely disillusioned with the Kolchak government. They could no longer condone the atrocities and injustices of the Kolchak forces, and they refused to support them. With the Japanese doing everything possible to frustrate their efforts to leave they signed an armistice with the Bolsheviks and Kolchak became the prisoner of the Bolsheviks.

Masaryk had begun his efforts to establish an independent Czecho-Slovak state convinced that recognition of such a state could be achieved only through the creation of an army and its effective participation in the Allied war effort. His success in creating such an army and their successful efforts in Russia were the primary factors in securing the official recognition he sought from the British, the French and the Italians. Yet Czech belligerency meant the breaking of Masaryk’s pledge of neutrality to the Bolsheviks. President Wilson himself although initially committed to the creation of a Danubian confederation of states with autonomy for Czechoslovakia was also convinced by the war efforts of the Czechs in Russia that they deserved independence. The State Department had presented strong arguments for the recognition of Czech independence on the basis of ethnicity, language, and shared historical experience but Wilson would accept none of these. It was only Czech belligerency in Russia against Germany that provided the rationale for his recognition of the de facto independence of Czechoslovakia.

In 1919, when plans were being discussed to evacuate the Czechs, the Allies—under the prodding of Churchill, once again sought to re-route the Czechs back through European Russia to their homeland. The Allied plan was to have them join with the anti-Bolshevik forces to overthrow the Soviet government. Both Wilson and Masaryk opposed the plans, although there were key figures in both administrations who favored it. The Czechs themselves refused to support it.

When it became clear that the Peace Conference could not agree on any policy toward Russia, the United States advised the British of their desire to withdraw American forces from northern Russia at the earliest opportunity. This withdrawal could not take place before the late spring or early summer because of ice in the approaches to Archangel. Moreover, the United States could scarcely pull its troops out so abruptly as to cause military embarrassment to the Allied forces with whom it had been associated.

It would seem to be notable, however, that throughout the intervention the American public was permitted to believe that the United States went into Siberia to combat Bolshevism. It was
difficult for the State Department to refute this belief while the United States was at war. Japan was an ally, and it was not considered diplomatic to question publicly the motives of one’s allies, especially when a fear existed that Japan might possibly join the Central Powers. Indeed, there was evidence to indicate as late as October 1918, that the Japanese were negotiating a secret treaty with the Germans to leave the Allied side and join with the Germans in order to divide Russia between them since the occupation of the Germans in the west was being complemented by the occupation of Japan in eastern Siberia. Nevertheless, even after the war was over the popular feeling persisted that intervention was solely to defeat the Bolsheviks. This sentiment was intensified by the actions of the underlings in the State Department who assumed control of America’s policy in Siberia upon Wilson’s illness and who themselves favored Kolchak and wanted him to receive the greatest aid possible.

Since the attitude of the State Department had long ceased to be neutral why did the United States withdraw its troops in 1920? Why were they not maintained and reinforced? Secretary Lansing answered this question in a simple note. Once the Kolchak government had collapsed, the army of the Bolsheviks had advanced into eastern Siberia where they seemed to be operating with moderation. The people seemed to prefer them to the officers of the Kolchak regime. As the Bolsheviks approached the area where American soldiers were stationed it seemed clear that contact with them would lead to open hostilities and to many complications. In other words, if the United States did not withdraw its troops they would have to wage war against the Bolsheviks.

American troops remained in Vladivostok until a substantial portion of the Czech troops were afloat. The last contingents of Americans left Vladivostok on April 1, 1920. On August 10, 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby issued his note on non-recognition of the Bolshevik regime. At the same time, he made clear American opposition to the dismemberment of Russia and its refusal to recognize the independence of the Baltic States and the republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. While gladly giving recognition to the independence of Armenia, the United States made clear that the final determination or Russia’s boundaries should not be made without Russia’s cooperation and agreement. The American decision to leave Siberia became the signal for widespread rumors of Japanese intentions in Siberia. The State Department learned that there was very good, though not conclusive, evidence available in Warsaw indicating that Germany and Japan were aligning Poland on their side against Great Britain, France, and the United States in an attempt to effect a virtual control of Russia. Stevens reported that the Japanese army was supporting Semenov in every way to delay the movement of the Czechs. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were doing everything possible to aid in the movement. On February 22 the Bolsheviks signed an armistice with the Czechs. They also attempted to come to terms with the Japanese with peace proposals, reminding them of their common interest in the Far East. Their efforts were fruitless. Both Stevens and Ambassador Morris agreed that the Japanese General Staff had carefully laid plans for the permanent occupation of Vladivostok and the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Nikolaevsk massacre in Siberia on March 15, 1920 which resulted in the killing of an alleged 600 Japanese residents and soldiers resulted in a Japanese decision to occupy parts of the island of Sakhalin. On June 9 the Japanese Foreign Office reported that the 100 Japanese residents who had survived the massacre had apparently been slaughtered on May 25. These incidents provided Japan with strong public support for taking over the entire Maritime Province and northern Sakhalin until a recognized government provided reparations for the incident. Nevertheless, there were other elements in Japan that attacked the military with a charge that the whole Nikolaevsk business was a frame up created by the Japanese War Office as an incident to give the military party another opportunity to emerge with honor, prestige, and the renewed confidence of the public.
Throughout the winter of 1920 the State Department received regular reports on the activities of the Japanese military in Siberia. After the Czechs had left, the Japanese continued to support Semenov at Chita who faced competition for the control of eastern Siberia from three other Siberian governments. Ultimately it was the Far Eastern Republic that emerged from this competition and began to protest Japanese activities in Siberia. The United States made clear its opposition to any actions taken by the government of Japan which might impair the existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia. On the eve of the Washington Conference Japan seemed firmly entrenched in the Maritime Province and Sakhalin. The State Department finally determined that instead of sending an independent protest to Japan they would place the Siberian question upon the agenda of the Washington Conference.

The decision to withdraw American troops from Siberia initiated the final phase of the American program to stop Japan from gaining control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. According to the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement of January 15, 1919 the assistance of foreign railway experts in the operation of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways was to cease upon the withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia. The projected withdrawal of American troops and railway experts forced the State Department to reconsider its policy in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese government was considering the possibility of taking over full control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and retaining John F. Stevens and a selected staff to operate it. The Japanese were suspected of seeking to withdraw their troops from the Amur railway and concentrate them along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, establishing as much control over the operation of the railway as could be secured without unduly exciting Russian and Chinese feeling. The Americans believed it would be advantageous for future trade in Manchuria if the Chinese Eastern could be brought under Chinese control and operated by an American. However, this would naturally be opposed by the Japanese. Yet the United States sought to do everything possible to prevent the Japanese from establishing complete control over the Chinese Eastern Railway and thus strengthen their claim to a special or vested interest in northern Manchuria. The Russians under the direction of Horvath the former Director General of the Chinese Eastern had issued a proclamation announcing his assumption of all the governmental powers of the Russian people within the jurisdiction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a proclamation which was immediately protested by the Chinese government. The Japanese also sought to support Horvath by offering the Chinese Eastern Railway a five year loan of 20 million without security—simply receipt of the railway. Stevens, of course advised Horvath to refuse the offer, since he believed that if the loan were consummated it would mean Japanese domination. The Japanese continued to support Semenov in every way to delay the movement of the Czechs. The Japanese justified their continued occupation of the railway by the terms of the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of May 1918. This position was unacceptable to the United States. While the British at times had been uncooperative toward Siberian affairs, they now approached the United States with proposals to prevent the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway passing exclusively into the hands of Japan. They urged that American representatives not be withdrawn. At the same time negotiations for the implementation of the consortium which had begun in June 1918 were once again initiated. Meanwhile, Japan was attempting to precipitate China into a civil war as a pretext for occupying northern Manchuria.

As the year 1920 drew to a close, affairs along the Chinese Eastern did not improve. When on December 14, 1920, the Chinese government requested the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, Japan declined on the grounds that Bolshevik activities rendered it inadvisable to withdraw at that time. Throughout the year 1921 the State Department had been
receiving intercepted secret messages exchanged between various Japanese officials in China, Siberia, and Tokyo. These telegrams revealed that the Japanese military intended to begin hostilities in Manchuria and Siberia and contemplated the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the near future. Although the British government had earlier been cooperative in seeking a plan of international control over the railway, they had come to believe that both Japan and China would be strongly opposed to any plan which tended to increase the international control of the railway. The British were therefore unwilling to take the lead in proposing such a scheme but indicated they would follow the United States lead in proposing such a plan to the other interested powers. The British attitude left the department in an unfortunate position. Any formal action on the part of the United States seemed doomed to failure. The Chinese had become somewhat jealous of the powers of the Technical Board and could therefore not be relied upon to take a strong position in support of the American suggestion. No cooperation could be expected from the French, whose sole concern in the matter was to protect the immediate monetary interest of the French financial group which controlled the Russo-Asiatic bank, which in turn owned the Chinese Eastern Railway. The French attitude had been entirely unsympathetic throughout. Although Stevens went to Japan himself in order to seek direct negotiation with the Japanese, he came to recognize that there was little hope for Japanese cooperation. In the meantime the proposed financial negotiations for the Chinese Eastern had reached what appeared to be a dead end. Strangely enough, largely because the American group of the consortium had refused to participate. By the time that the Washington Conference met, it was clear that China definitely opposed international control and that France, Japan and Great Britain also felt that it was neither admissible nor practicable to exercise anything but a general supervision over the railway. It was plain that neither France nor Japan would ever consent to an extension of technical control. This created a deadlock between Stevens and the powers. In these circumstances the American government was forced to yield its desire for detailed technical control. On February 2, 1922, of the Washington Conference a weak resolution was passed at the thirtieth meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern questions which in effect simply noted that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those interested required that better protection be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use, and advocated a more careful selection of personnel to secure efficiency of service and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of the property.

By this time, organized demonstrations in China were demanding the withdrawal of the Technical Board and leading newspapers in north Manchuria were arguing that the objects for which the board was created no longer existed. It was clear that none of the Allies were prepared to cooperate in support of the Technical Board and they agreed to its dissolution. The final meeting of the Technical Board was held on November 21, 1922 and Stevens filed his final report which he believed read like the "lamentations of Jeremiah." The termination of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement of 1919 marked the end of Allied intervention in Siberia.

By the summer of 1922, Allied censure as well as the increasing disapproval of the Japanese people, was having its effect on the plans of the Japanese military party in Siberia. In June 1922, members of the House of Commons repeatedly requested the British government to ask Japan to evacuate Siberia without further delay. With increasing denunciation of the expedition growing both within Japan and outside on June 24, 1922, Japan announced the intended evacuation of troops from Siberia at the end of October 1922. However, its withdrawal from Siberia did not include withdrawal from Sakhalin Island. Once the last Japanese transport had left Vladivostok, the forces of the Far Eastern Republic entered the city. On November 3, 1922, the Far Eastern Republic conveyed its thanks to the American government for its "friendly interest" in helping to bring about the Japanese evacuation from
the Siberian mainland. On November 17, the Far Eastern Republic voluntarily abolished itself and became an integral and inseparable part of Soviet Russia. Two years later, on January 20, 1925, after Japan had recognized the Soviet government, an agreement was negotiated settling their outstanding difficulties and the Japanese army evacuated the northern Sakhalin.

In 1933, when negotiations were undertaken between the United States and the Soviet Union for the resumption of diplomatic relations, the Soviet negotiator, Maxim Litvinov, arrived in Washington prepared to advance a major claim against the United States government for damages allegedly done by the Americans during the Siberian intervention. However, after being shown certain documents concerning American policy, they agreed to drop all claims against the United States for its part in the Siberian intervention. As Cordell Hull pointed out, “These latter documents made clear to Litvinov that American forces had not been in Siberia to wrest territory from Russia but to insure the withdrawal of the Japanese who had a far larger force in Siberia with the intent to occupy it permanently.” Nevertheless, Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev continued to allege that Woodrow Wilson had taken the lead in promoting hostile action against the Soviet Union in an effort to destroy the Soviet state at birth.
Scope and Content

This collection covers a rich, diverse, and multi-faceted selection of documentary materials covering the period of the First World War and its aftermath, especially relating to the United States, revolutionary Russia, and the Russian Civil War, Allied efforts to reestablish an Eastern Front, United States and Allied policy toward the Bolsheviks and later Admiral Kolchak's government; Allied and United States intervention in Russia, the Czech-Bolshevik conflict, the Czechoslovak liberation movement in Austria-Hungary and abroad, the United States and Japan in Eastern Siberia and China. It includes documents on the collapse and breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the efforts of the United States and the Allies to negotiate a separate peace with that empire, the United States and Allied policy toward Russia at the Paris Peace Conference, Allied rivalries over the Chinese Eastern Railway; and the development and the application of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination not only in relation to empire but also to revolution itself. Documents have been selected from some 200 collections in over 50 repositories throughout the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and the former Soviet Union. This collection will give scholars, researchers, and students insight into the social, political, and economic conditions in war-torn Russia from the American, British, French, Czech, and Japanese perspectives. It is rich in intelligence materials from the United States, the Allies, and the Central Powers relating to activities in Central Europe, the Russian empire, and Eastern Asia as well. It includes correspondence among the leaders of the various nations and their representatives abroad, incoming and outgoing diplomatic, military, naval and consular letters, and reports from various other representatives on the scene of the conflict. There are also personal letters, diary writings, and intelligence accounts by both civilian and military personnel as well as representatives of the American Red Cross, the YMCA, the American Railway Advisory Committee in Russia, and the Russian Railway Service Corps. It includes translated notes and summaries from published foreign-language sources not readily available in the United States, many of them out of print, as well as foreign-language newspapers, journals, magazines, etc. There are handwritten notes taken from the first collection of Woodrow Wilson papers deposited in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress and released only with the approval of Mrs. Woodrow Wilson. It also includes handwritten notes taken from the papers of Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, originally in the custody of Baker, Hostetler, and Patterson, Inc. in Cleveland, Ohio, as well as handwritten notes from the State Department files on Political Conditions in Russia, "the Trans-Siberian and Chinese-Eastern Railways" and "Relations between China and Japan."

The collection contains approximately 10,000 documents averaging about 4.37 pages per document. None of the translations have been included in the page count. The focus of the collection is the control sheet assigned to each document that lists all of the pertinent information. It should be noted that a single control number may appear on several documents if they have been included as enclosures in the original document. Once the proper control sheet has been identified, a simple search for the control number will immediately locate the document in question. The collection is organized chronologically by the date sent variable. Many of the dates may have several documents which are then organized numerically by the control number within the particular date. After studying the records, it was decided that the date sent was the most easily verifiable piece of information resulting in the most academically viable organization pattern.
Approximately 80 percent of the foreign-language documents have either rough translations or English-language abstracts of the contents. Where a full translation has been made, a brief abstract also appears on the control sheet. The translations cover French, German, Czech, Slovak, Russian, and Italian materials. There are also brief summaries of the major foreign-language published documents, and foreign-language newspaper, journal, or magazine articles.

BMU
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