A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

THE SOVIET UNION

Special Studies, 1989–1991

Supplement

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SOVIET UNION

Special Studies
1989–1991

Supplement

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The executive branch of the U.S. government requires a massive amount of information to make policy decisions. The many departments, agencies, and commissions of the government devote much of their energies to gathering and analyzing information. However, even the resources of the U.S. government are not adequate to gather all the information that is needed; therefore, the government contracts universities, colleges, corporations, think tanks, and individuals to provide data and analyses. Because the great majority of these studies are difficult to find and obtain, University Publications of America (UPA) publishes some of the most important ones in its Special Studies series. The Soviet Union Supplement collection consists of studies on the Soviet Union that became available during the period 1989–1991.
ACRONYMS/INITIALISMS

The following acronyms and initialisms are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

ABM   Anti-Ballistic Missile
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ASW   Anti-Submarine Warfare
BMD   Ballistic Missile Defense
BNW   Battlefield Nuclear Weapons
CABs  Close Aboard Bastions
CC    Central Committee of the CPSU
CFE   Conventional Forces Europe
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency
CMEA  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CNSS  Center for National Security Studies
CPSU  Communist Party, Soviet Union
FEZs  Free Economic Zones
FOTL  Follow On To Lance
FRG   Federal Republic of Germany
GDR   German Democratic Republic
GNP   Gross National Product
ID    International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU
IDA Institute for Defense Analysis
IGB Inter-German Bund
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvnnoi Bezopasnosti (Soviet secret police)
MPA Main Political Administration
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration (U.S.)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOs Non-Commissioned Officers
NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
NTC National Training Center
OPFOR Operations Force
PVO Protivovozdushnaya Oborony (Soviet strategic air defense)
R&D Research and Development
Recce-Force Reconnaissance Force
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SED Socialist Unity Party, East Germany
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
SSBN Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
U.N. United Nations
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization
1986

0001 Army and Frontier in Russia.
Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Bruce W. Menning.
October 1986. 29pp.
The study describes how the Imperial Russian Army adapted its tactics and organization to conduct operations in a frontier environment and explains why some changes persisted and others did not.

1987

0030 The Tenth Period of Soviet Third World Policy.
Now that Mikhail Gorbachev has been General Secretary of the CPSU for well over two years, it would be useful to ask whether his policy toward the Third World is distinctive and in what ways it is different from that of his predecessors, particularly Leonid Brezhnev. Gorbachev in his first two years has consistently surprised Western observers by speaking in a very different way about the entire Soviet policy agenda. He has stated on numerous occasions that domestic policy has priority for him over foreign policy, and that to carry out his ambitious economic reform program, he needs peace and the lowering of international tensions. In the realm of foreign policy, he and his lieutenants have proclaimed the need for new political thinking about problems of international security and global order. The new political thinking at this point consists of a few concrete changes in arms control and China policy, and a great deal of rhetoric, some of it utterly utopian, about the mutuality of security, economic and environmental interdependence, the impermissibility of war in the nuclear era, and the like. In view of this new rhetoric, has Soviet Third World policy changed? This is the subject of this report.

This report attempts to illuminate the conflict within the Soviet Union between the Communist Party and the military high command over resource allocation in the early 1980s. It examines the measures of resource growth that the two sides could have used in the debate. It also considers Gorbachev's approach to the same problem in the last half of the 1980s and the connections between the two episodes. The author suggests that, in the future, Gorbachev's ability to maneuver may be limited by the growing harshness of military-party relations. Furthermore, his failure to make good on his promises could aggravate this conflict.

1988


People-to-people and scientific exchanges between the United States and USSR can further the cause of international stability. At the same time, they have the potential to be abused by the Soviets for the sake of propaganda and acquisition of American military significant technology. Consequently, a balanced policy guidance from the administration and Congress is necessary for such exchanges to serve the national interest of the United States.

The Strategic Defense Initiative In Soviet Planning and Policy.

This report analyzes the nature and depth of Moscow's concern about the SDI and its implications for future Soviet responses. The authors consider the political-military and technical issues raised for the Soviets by SDI. The study assesses the Soviet declaratory stance on SDI; reviews the evolution and current state of Soviet attitudes toward homeland defense; summarizes key trends in Soviet antiballistic missile and antisatellite technology; considers the actual concerns that may underlie Moscow's propaganda line on SDI; reviews the range of technical responses the Soviets have said they might undertake; and examines the various political, strategic, institutional, and economic determinants that will shape whatever counter-SDI choices the Soviets ultimately adopt.
Gorbachev and the Soviet Military.
Although Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure can be characterized as an age of restructuring, changes in the military have been relatively subdued. Moderation and continuity are the most appropriate terms to describe the processes that have taken place. Perestroika, which has shaken the ranks of the party and government bureaucracies, has been used much less in the military sphere. In the military press, glasnost has a rather superficial character. Gorbachev gives considerably less time to military affairs than to other subjects of concern, such as economics or cadre policy. But in fact, the importance of the military under Gorbachev has not been reduced; it has grown. The role the military plays in society, however, has changed, as part of the larger changes in the institutional structure of Soviet society under the new leadership—changes that increased the role of the Soviet military affairs. The increased role of these two political institutions does not mean that defense matters have declined in importance. The relationships among institutions in Soviet politics cannot be characterized as a zero-sum game, particularly in matters of national security.

Soviet Agriculture: The Brezhnev Legacy and Gorbachev's Cure.
This report discusses the economics of Soviet agriculture from the mid-1960s to the present. In particular, it examines (1) the reasons why Brezhnev's agricultural policy, designed to correct the deficiencies inherited from his predecessor, proved to be such an expensive failure, and (2) the measures taken by Gorbachev to solve the agricultural problems he inherited.

Marshal Akhromeev's Post-INF World.
The article emphasizes the corporate approach of the Soviet General Staff to changing international security assessments in the late 1980s.

The Deep Strike In Russian and Soviet Military History.
This document surveys changing Russian and Soviet conceptions on the strategic applications of mobile strike and raiding forces from the 18th to the early 20th centuries.
The Soviet Union in the South Pacific.
This article discusses the Soviet image enhancement activities in the South Pacific and the considerable outside as well as indigenous efforts by union elites, church leaders, and educators in pursuing what are, in fact, anti-Western campaigns. What have these various efforts accomplished? It is clear that the Soviet image among the South Pacific elites has greatly improved over the last few years. The Soviet's peaceful approach, expressed desire to trade, offers of aid, and their anti-nuclear and anti-colonial stands have had some effect on the region's leaders, as the acceptance of relations suggests. It is not certain how widespread or deep the effect has been, even among these elites. They have come late to world politics and only recently have become acquainted with Russians, who are on their best behavior. It is equally difficult to assess the effects of the Independent and Nuclear-Free Pacific movement. However, at the very least elites in many institutions have espoused anti-Western views.

The Soviet Union is our main competitor for power and influence in the world. It has the power to destroy our society, as we know it, within hours. To prevent this from happening, we must understand the Soviet's political and military objectives and strategy relating to global conflict. Evidence exists that the Soviets may have made, or may be in the process of making, serious revisions in their global nuclear and conventional strategy and doctrine. This paper briefly traces the history of Soviet military strategy and doctrine since World War II and presents evidence of a crossroad in their strategic thinking. They are currently weighing the economic, political, and military consequences of continuing a confrontational, offensive nuclear war-fighting strategy, doctrine, and force posture and are considering a less threatening and affordable posture. A brief look at their reaction to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and General Secretary Gorbachev's latest arms control initiatives reinforces the argument that a shift in Soviet strategy may take place in the near future if America lets it happen.
This report on the Soviet army in Afghanistan focuses on morale, discipline, motivation, and cohesion. It is based on interviews with Afghan members of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan, interviews with Afghan resistance leaders and former officers, and a literature search. The report examines major factors that negatively affect morale and discipline: indoctrination, personnel relations, drugs and alcohol, quality of life, atrocities and looting, and theft and corruption. Such factors have led to infractions ranging from insubordination to fragging. The author finds their operational significance difficult to assess but believes that the relevance of possible systematic vulnerabilities should be explored. The report concludes that Soviet war-conduct is not motivated by ethical considerations and that the Soviets can be expected to disregard conventions.

This survey of modern Soviet economic growth is based almost exclusively on Western works and does not include direct references to Soviet scholarly work. It is directed to the general public of economists, and therefore contains a section on sources of economic information about the Soviet Union and several subsections that are only indirectly related to the main issue, such as one describing the basics of the operation of the Soviet system. Contents: Introduction; Availability and Reliability of Information; The Growth Record; Structural Changes; The Socialist System and its Growth Strategy; Research and Development and Technological Change; The Research and Development Sector; Why did Growth Rates Decline; Production Function Estimates; Evaluation and Conclusion—or, can The Trend Be Reversed.

The purpose of this study is to advance understanding of the probable intentions of the current Soviet leadership in their initiatives for peace, cooperation, and disarmament. This study concludes that, rather than embodying new political thinking that might evoke well-founded hope in the West for genuine peace and stability, Soviet initiatives reflect a long-term Soviet orientation toward unilateral strategic advantage. The West should therefore respond to these initiatives with caution and vigilance. The primary
methodology of this study is qualitative content analysis of key expressions of Soviet policy by authoritative spokesmen. Two areas of background to contemporary Soviet peace programs, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–75, and Soviet commentary on U.S. nuclear freeze movements in 1980–84, are examined as well.

The Soviet Objective of War Termination: Limits and Constraints.
This abstract discusses the objectives of war termination from the perspective of the Soviet Union. Specifically, considerations relating to the possibility of limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war are analyzed. A possible future war in Europe is the primary example; it is argued that the political and military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military power from the continent might be sufficient Soviet conditions for seeking war termination. The hypothesis that the USSR would prefer to fight a conventional war (and avoid using nuclear weapons) is examined as is the Soviet need to maintain cohesion within the Warsaw Pact. It is concluded that the limits of conventional warfare and the constraints of alliance dynamics could interact in Soviet strategy to limit objectives for terminating a future war in Europe. An appendix supplements and contrasts the thesis text by reviewing Western views on warfare termination.

Reel 2

1988 cont.

Soviet Political Objectives In the Federal Republic of Germany: Instruments and Assessments.
This thesis examines apparent Soviet attempts to use its detente policy to exploit the Federal Republic of Germany's membership in NATO and thereby expand its influence in the FRG and Europe as a whole. It is hypothesized that the Soviet Union chose to exploit the FRG's position in NATO by cultivating a special relationship with it, thereby accessing the U.S. and NATO as a whole, rather than making overt efforts to force a near-term split between West Germany and the U.S. The thesis focuses on the instruments the Soviet Union used to maximize its influence in the FRG and the region. These instruments include West Germany's concerns regarding nuclear war in Europe, Ostpolitik and German-German relations.
Soviet Concepts of Ballistic Missile Defense.
The purpose of this thesis is to characterize the Soviet concept of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in order to better understand and predict future Soviet BMD decision making. The Soviet concept of BMD is fundamentally different from that in the West. Soviet BMD is clearly an integral component of a much larger Soviet strategic defense effort which consists of strategic air defense as well as passive measures, such as mobility, deep underground command and control facilities, and civil defense. As the Soviet military literature demonstrates, Soviet strategic air defense encompasses defense against a continuum of threats—from aircraft to ballistic missiles, from satellites to "space-strike weapons." Soviet strategic air defense weapons therefore appear optimized to counter a wide range of airborne threats. In the Soviet view, surface-to-air missiles may be a primary tactical BMD weapon. Additionally, Soviet strategic BMD weapons may be a primary Soviet anti-satellite weapon. Furthermore, manned space platforms play a particularly significant role in Soviet thinking about the future of BMD and space warfare.

Soviet Naval Operational Art.
The Soviet theory of naval operational art is a body of knowledge which focuses the tactical capabilities of the Soviet Navy on achieving the strategic missions assigned them by the leadership of the Soviet Union. This body of knowledge guides the creation and execution of Soviet naval operations. Soviet military science establishes the theoretical foundation for the conduct of independent naval operations. Soviet troop control creates the planning processes by which Soviet naval commanders prepare for combat operations. Western analysis of the Soviet Navy has long neglected the Soviet theory of naval operational art; several unique characteristics may have been overlooked by Western naval officers. This research has found that the Soviet naval planning process is in many ways identical to that of Soviet ground forces. This work also attempts to explain the role of the independent naval operation in the Soviet view of war. Finally, several analytical tools are suggested that may be employed to explore Soviet views on the conduct of naval operations. The topic of Soviet naval operational art presents many opportunities for future research.
Japan's Role In Gorbachev's Agenda.
This paper assesses the current state of Soviet-Japanese political and economic relations. The impact of Mikhail Gorbachev's new public diplomacy is a key factor to be considered when estimating the likelihood of improved future relations. The Soviets are most interested in expanding economic ventures with Japan, but the controversy over the Northern Territories is a serious impediment to these interests. Finally, the issue of Soviet-Japanese relations is placed into a broader context by examining the role that China plays, both in its own relations with Japan and in terms of the triangular USSR-Japan-China relationship.

A Strategic Planning Framework for Predicting and Evaluating Soviet Interests In Arms Control, Volume I.
This report distinguishes between Soviet interest in (1) making arms control proposals; (2) negotiating arms control agreements; (3) signing arms control treaties; and (4) actually complying with agreements once signed. It suggests that four sets of factors condition each of these levels of Soviet arms control interests: (1) Soviet threat perceptions; (2) Soviet bargaining leverage; (3) Soviet leadership stability; and (4) Soviet foreign policy orientation. Specific reference is made to strategic nuclear arms control issues. Four conditions are identified as prerequisites for Soviet interest in reaching agreement on strategic arms reductions, thus providing a basis for policy forecasting.

This report takes the framework developed in Volume I regarding levels of Soviet interest in arms control, the four factors conditioning that level of interest, and applies them to a specific case study: the START between 1982 and 1983. It concludes that none of the four variables necessary for Soviet interest in signing an agreement were present, and therefore provides a conceptual understanding for Soviet policy toward strategic arms control in the era immediately preceding the emergence of SDI and strategic defenses as major factors in Soviet calculations.
This paper explores the economic contribution of Eastern Europe to the Soviet military effort and the Soviet defense industry. Three areas are examined: the value of East European forces in terms of the ruble cost of equivalent Soviet troops; economies of scale in Soviet arms production made possible by exports of Soviet arms to the region; and transfers of East European technology through CMEA programs. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces would be an essential component in most plausible scenarios for a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. Although Soviet armies would spearhead such an invasion, Soviet military planners appear to have assigned important roles to East German and Polish troops in northern Germany and to the Czechs in the south. In terms of numbers, the NSWP armies would field 859,000 men, of whom 655,000 are members of the forces of the Northern Tier (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland). The Soviets would field 505,000 men in the region. NSWP air defenses are firmly integrated with Soviet operations in the area, and NSWP air forces provide a substantial addition to Soviet forces.

A model was developed and used to evaluate prospects for meeting the Soviet Union's 1986–1990 Five-Year Plan goal for agricultural output. Farm output for 1988, 1989, and 1990 was projected after making assumptions about capital and labor growth and simulating alternative outcomes for weather and government policy. Model simulations indicate that the Soviets would be able to meet their plan only if the following three conditions prevail: At least "average" weather for 1988–1990; continued growth of inputs from other sectors at a rate equal to that of recent years (4 percent in 1986), together with timely deliveries; productivity gains equivalent at least to a 1 percent increase above that required to offset employment losses. If any of these conditions are not met, the goal will be out of reach. Even with good weather, substantial gains in productivity are required to meet the five-year plan.
Assessing the Soviet Naval Build-up in Southeast Asia: Threats to Regional Security.
This report analyzes the stark security challenges confronting ASEAN and China as a result of the substantial and continuous strengthening of Soviet naval capability in the Asia-Pacific. The report discusses the coercive benefits accruing to Moscow from the Soviet Union’s successful geo-strategic leapfrog to naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam. Overall, this analysis concludes that the major objectives of the Soviet naval buildup in the region are to compel Southeast Asian governments to accommodate Soviet foreign policy goals and to raise concerns in the region about the wisdom of close association with the U.S. The report calls for enhanced naval cooperation and defense-sharing between the U.S. and ASEAN in order to provide the requisite regional maritime security to counter Soviet threats.

This thesis describes and analyzes a possible deployment posture for the Soviet ballistic missile submarine force. It examines the proposition that the Soviet Navy will establish a point defense, labeled “Close Aboard Bastions” (CABs), for its ballistic missile submarine fleet within the Soviet-claimed, 12 nautical mile territorial sea. This is a logical derivation of the currently widely held view that the Soviets will establish a “bastion” defense, because the postulated CAB strategy is a viable option for the Soviet Union during a war that begins conventionally.

This thesis examines the continued applicability of the bastion concept as a basic assumption of the maritime strategy with respect to the new Soviet military doctrine. The methodology employed involves an examination of Soviet literature, naval hardware, and exercise/operating patterns to determine if there has been a shift in the Soviet emphasis upon protecting the SSBN
force. The results show that even though the Soviets have made certain changes in the political aspects of their military doctrine, they will most likely continue to emphasize protection of the SSBN as the primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the event of a war. In fact, as the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads are reduced by future arms control proposals, such as START, the Soviets will probably consider the protection of the SSBN force to be more important than in the past.

0227 Soviet Naval Operational Art: The Soviet Approach to Naval War Fighting.
A category of military art called naval operational art exists in the Soviet Union. For the Soviets the art is the scientific skill of planning and conducting the interlinked engagements, strikes, and maneuvers that comprise the modern naval operation. The Soviets exercise naval operational art according to a stiff formalism that can be exploited by the West. This study describes the art and its style and suggests Soviet naval war fighting scenarios based on the application of its principle.

0377 Organizing for Coalition Warfare: The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning.
While the Soviet armed forces are justly regarded as the greatest threat to Western Europe, NATO military planners must consider the strength and the role of the armies of the NSWP nations in any future war. In this study, conclusions regarding the military value, employment, and control of NSWP forces are drawn from the historical record, Soviet doctrine, current published orders of battle, Warsaw Pact military exercises, and the author's experience in the Polish army. The great numerical strength of the NSWP forces is an important factor in Soviet military/strategic planning. The Northern Tier East European forces alone are quantitatively superior, in military terms, to the forces of all the NATO "minor" allies and are even stronger than all the NATO Central Europe forces, excluding the U.S. and French. Being deployed in the Pact's forward area, the NSWP forces assure the preparation of theater infrastructure, constitute a buffer zone for the European territory of the USSR, and guard the important East-West and North-South strategic transit areas. At the same time, the NSWP forces, especially those of the Northern Tier, are an indispensable element for launching a conventional theater surprise attack against Western Europe. Without the participation of these forces, such an attack could not be mounted with a reasonable expectation of early success.
The paper assesses the implications of recent glasnost-inspired critiques of the USSR's official economic statistics by the CIA for estimates of actual Soviet economic performance. The CIA estimates, although predicated on the belief that Moscow's macroeconomic measures are unreliable, are based on a variety of official Soviet data. In particular, the paper focuses on what the recent criticisms have to tell us about the accuracy of CIA's estimates of the growth and structure of Soviet GNP.

Some Problems in Soviet-American War Termination: Cross/Cultural Asymmetries.
The analysis of the process of war termination cannot be understood as a logical one. Cultural preconceptions historically override logic in war. Cultural values manifest themselves as signs and are conveyed through signals. An enormous problem is how to interpret another culture's signals. This paper presents some of the major asymmetries in theories of war and its termination between the U.S. and Soviet Union. It provides a kind of checklist of dangerous misconceptions and their consequences. Applying some of the concepts of political culture to the current state of Soviet military science, it predicts how Soviet military thought will be affected by perestroika. Using the same techniques, the paper proposes for purposes of war termination the creation of a "shadow" American politburo, a trained group to mirror Soviet conceptions of American power. Also, it proposes using strategic culture to game Soviet war termination in advance.

Since the 1970s, the U.S. government, academia, and research organizations have been dissatisfied with attempts to create a model for the economy of the Soviet Union and its embedded defense-industrial sector. In this note, principles drawn from the history of economic thought are contrasted to some of the key features of Russian and Soviet history to define and interpret the functionally distinct character of the Soviet defense sector. The author draws a number of conclusions on which to base modifications to current models of the Soviet economy: (1) Centrally administered economies differ fundamentally...
from market-exchange economies by where the effective decision making is
made and, consequently, in the objectives that characterize the systems and
the control mechanisms employed to realize those objectives; (2) the Soviet
economy may be portrayed as dualistic; (3) the Soviet economic system has
more in common with nonmarket institutions than it has with market-exchange
systems upon which Western societies are based.

**Soviet Use of War Experiences: Tank and Mechanized Corps Exploit the
Penetration.**

*Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. David M. Glantz.
October 1988. 80pp.*

In early 1943 the Red Army published its first major wartime analysis of
operations by large tank and mechanized formations. The analysis focused
on tank and mechanized corps operations from November 1942 to February
1943 when the Soviets undertook their first large-scale strategic offensive in
which they employed large mobile forces to conduct tactical and operational
maneuver. These operations began on 19 November 1942 with the
commencement of the Stalingrad counteroffensive and extended through
several successive front operations until February 1943 when the offensive
was halted by heavy German counterattacks. During this period the Soviets
employed more than ten tank or mechanized corps, separately or in
combination. The entire period represented a test-bed for mobile force
operational concepts and force structures. On the basis of their analysis, by
the summer of 1943 the Soviets were able to create a modern mobile force
structure and sound concepts for its employment.

**Spearhead of the Attack: The Role of the Forward Detachment In
Tactical Maneuver.**

*Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. David M. Glantz.
October 1988. 51pp.*

The Soviets have long understood the prerequisites for achieving combat
success at the operational and tactical levels of war. Among these prerequisites
is the necessity for conducting efficient, rapid maneuver. Long-term Soviet
belief in the utility of operational maneuver is well documented in Soviet
military works and, to an increasing degree, in Western analyses of Soviet
operational techniques. Western appreciation of Soviet concern for tactical
maneuver, however, is less mature. Most Western analyses portray Soviet
tactical combat measures collectively as steamroller tactics, characterized by
use of overwhelming, deeply echeloned concentrations of forces committed
to combat in conjunction with massive amounts of fire support. Once this
massive force has disrupted or destroyed enemy tactical defenses, Soviet
operational maneuver forces go into action, using mobility to project forces deep into the enemy rear. This Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde characterization of Soviet offensive techniques postulates early reliance on concentrated forces attacking in basically linear fashion followed by wholesale conversion to artful, flexible operational maneuver. Centralized control, inflexibility, and commensurate de-emphasization of initiative characterize the early penetration phase. Understandably, most Westerners question whether the Soviet Army can adjust to meet the requirements of the exploitation phase.

Soviet Weapons Acquisition In a Period of New Economic Policies. 

This report considers the future performance of the Soviet weapons acquisition sector under the conditions of Gorbachev's policies as they have been revealed thus far and as they may develop in the future. It focuses on technological change in the Soviet weapons research and development (R&D) sector, and on the systemic influences operating throughout the weapons acquisition process. This approach reviews the main impediments to Soviet innovation in general, the means by which the military sector has avoided or mitigated the effects of many of these impediments, and finally the ways that present and possible future policies may change civilian and defense industries' relative capabilities in promoting technical change. The chief elements that influence innovative behavior in the Soviet Union (and elsewhere) include values, policies, and the four properties of any economic system described by Berliner: prices, decision rules, incentives, and organizational arrangements. Berliner focused on the four economic properties, but since it is their differences in the civil and military sectors that generate the sharply divergent outcomes that we have seen in the past fifty years, this report looks to the sources of these differences: values and policies.


This report addresses U.S. strategy for defending U.S. interest in the security of nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union. It lays out some possible consequences of changing military postures and technology on nuclear doctrine.
Soviet Labor Requirements for the Information Era.

This paper examines the skill and educational requirements that will be needed as the USSR moves into its own version of the "Information Era." While the paper focuses on the demands on the labor force made by information technologies, other factors influencing the skill composition of the work force, such as intersectoral redistribution of employment and the economic policies and goals of the leadership, are briefly examined. This paper draws heavily on recently completed research on the changing manpower requirements in Western nations, particularly the United States, as information technologies have become more pervasive. Because of the many variables that will affect how technological change will influence the labor force, this study has not attempted to make quantitative estimates nor set a particular time frame other than early next century. Rather, it has concentrated on describing expected trends and qualitative changes that are likely to occur. This study broadly defines information technologies as including all applications of microelectronics and advanced telecommunications (such as digital switching and transmission, coaxial cable, and fiber optics). The focus will be on the implications of Soviet applications of information technologies in general rather than the impact of specific technologies. More emphasis is given to industrial applications since that is where Soviet efforts are concentrated. The terms "Information Era" and "information society" are used to characterize a level of development at which activities involving the collection, manipulation, and/or use of information dominate over direct production and service activities. While the changes wrought by information technologies are evolutionary, the sum total of their impact on production and society over time will be revolutionary. Furthermore, the rates at which these changes are occurring in the West are considerably faster than during previous periods of economic and social transformation.
Soviet Economic Policy towards Eastern Europe.
65pp.

The Soviet Union faces several dilemmas in choosing policy goals for its relations with its East European allies. It wishes to retain political control over Eastern Europe, yet foster popular support for local regimes. It would like to use Eastern Europe as a security buffer and for military support, as an example pointing to the superiority of its ideology and politico-economic system, and for political support in international forums, while simultaneously wishing to maintain tight control. It also faces the economic dilemma of wishing to increase its gains from trade with Eastern Europe, yet prevent further deterioration of the region’s economic situation. Present Soviet economic problems, its desire to reduce expenditures on Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev’s own reform program are providing a great deal of leeway in economic policymaking for East European leaders. The Soviets’ own supply problems will prevent them from increasing exports to Eastern Europe and the West. As long as they remain wedded to integration through plans, rather than markets, the increase in trade of intermediate goods needed to foster greater gains from trade in the CMEA are unlikely to be forthcoming, and the East Europeans will need to emphasize trade with the West if they wish to exploit these gains. Moreover, Gorbachev’s efforts at reform imply the Soviets are no longer likely to reimpose their model on Eastern Europe. Thus, the East European leadership have some freedom to maneuver. Whether they take advantage of it is an open question.

The Directory of Soviet Officials identifies individuals who hold positions in selected party, government, and public organizations in the USSR. It may be used to find the incumbents of the given positions within an organization or the positions of given individuals. For some organizations, it serves as a guide to the internal structure of the organization.
Soviet Troop Control: The True Target on the Air/Land Battlefield.
The challenge to an American battalion commander is clear: how to stop a Soviet regiment moving at high speed and still live to fight another day. This monograph argues that the disruption of troop control is the key for defeating a Soviet regiment. The Soviet concept of troop control and its critical role in Soviet operations is detailed. The Soviets are currently attempting to reform their approach to troop control by injecting new standards for accountability and initiative. The author argues that troop control is vulnerable to disruption due to overreliance on accurate intelligence, discouragement of commanders from acting outside of approved norms, excessive rigidity in battalion-level planning and execution, and a fragile chain-of-command. The monograph concludes with proposals for several actions within current U.S. capabilities that may successfully disrupt Soviet troop control at the regimental level and below. In particular, the author develops a detailed and innovative scheme for the use of Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to attack the excessive rigidity of Soviet command and control procedures.

SDI and the Soviet Defense Burden.
The Soviets' response to the SDI must be understood within the context of their deteriorating economic situation and need to modernize their economy. This note evaluates the defense burden to the Soviets of both an offsetting and an emulation response to the U.S. SDI effort. The analysis is conducted within the context of General Secretary Gorbachev's modernization program, which is designed to increase the productivity of economic resources. The analysis suggests that the Soviets can partially offset a U.S. SDI effort with a ruble expenditure that is a small percentage of current defense spending. Although the Soviets may regard such a response as unsatisfactory, it is important to consider the striking contrast compared with the burden of an emulation response. The author hypothesizes, therefore, that the Soviets will choose not to directly emulate the U.S. SDI activities, at least until they have modernized their technical-economic base.
The Red Army learned and practiced the art of deception at all levels of warfare during World War II. By cloaking various force groupings and activities, Soviet military leadership, particularly in the latter stages of the war, created operational-level deceptions that surprised German intelligence and commanders. Through their empirically structured military science, Soviet researchers and doctrine writers have applied deception to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. While operational-level deception promotes the achievement of operational surprise, its practice provides a number of collateral effects, such as masking force ratios, delaying enemy decisions, and misdirecting the enemy’s attention and commitment of forces. In 1943–45, Soviet operations were consistently successful and offer historical lessons concerning operational-level deception. A review of these lessons and a close look at the Red Army’s improved capability to produce battlefield illusions, during an operation in the summer of 1944, is instructive and may prove useful to current U.S. Army initiatives exploring battlefield deception.

This note analyzes characteristics of the Soviet economy that are underemphasized in existing macroeconomic models of the Soviet Union. The characteristics include the existence of clear priority and nonpriority sectors, the nonmarginalist nature of decision making, the distinct advantages of priority sectors during both planning and plan implementation, and the rigidities of administrative allocations in the face of random shocks to both needs and capabilities. The analysis is carried out in a series of simple two-sector macromodels of plan implementation in a priority-driven command economy. The structure of the models reflects, albeit in highly simplified form, the planned dual nature of the Soviet economy in terms of priority and nonpriority sectors, allocational and technological rigidities, and the effect of priority in determining the response to shocks during plan implementation. A number of empirically verifiable implications stem from this analysis that do not arise naturally in standard macroeconomic models. In particular, the analysis shows that the variance of output (plan fulfillment) is greater in nonpriority than in priority sectors; there is more excess capacity in priority sectors; priority factor/input use proportions are unrelated to economy-wide tradeoffs; inputs into priority sectors are protected from fluctuations in economic activity; and factor productivity is lower in priority sectors, perhaps because of flexibility considerations.
Interpretations: Understanding Soviet Arms Control Motivations and Verification Attitudes.
The root motivation at the heart of present Soviet arms control motivations and verification attitudes is grounded within the broad historical perspective of the Russian and Soviet mobilization struggle. Our understanding of this root motivation is essential to identifying opportunities to enhance U.S.-Soviet relations and in turn U.S. national security.

Soviet Actions In Afghanistan and Initiative at the Tactical Level: Are There Implications for the U.S. Army?
This monograph examines the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan (1979–1988) in terms of Soviet Army tactics and organization for combat. Throughout the decade of the 1970s, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics stressed a general lack of initiative and flexibility in their military doctrine. In the 1980s a re-evaluation of Soviet thinking occurred that saw greater flexibility at the operational and strategic levels. If the experience in Afghanistan has shown that set-piece tactics will not work in all types of warfare, and the Soviets are able to incorporate higher levels of initiative and flexibility into their tactical doctrine, then the U.S. may be required to refocus its training away from the stylized Soviet Army. This study begins with a background discussion of Soviet historical involvement in Afghanistan to include counter-insurgency experience in their southwestern border area. It then covers the actual invasion and units employed with emphasis on their predeployment status and subsequent performance. The following section divides the war into four phases to ease understanding. The monograph subsequently looks at lessons learned and principles reaffirmed from both the Soviet and U.S. perspectives. A key feature is the need the Soviets apparently feel for Western style initiative and flexibility at lower command levels (battalion, company, and platoon), and how this is inconsistent with their culture and system of command and control. The monograph concludes that the Soviet experience in the war must be seen on two levels. On one level they have demonstrated an ability to modify unit organization and unit employment in response to lessons learned. This has resulted in the increased use of helicopters and elite units for deep raids. For the U.S. this should mean an increased awareness of the importance of rear battle. On another level the Soviets may realize the need for Western style creativity in junior commanders,
but inherent cultural tendencies preclude this creativity's successful adoption into their training system and personnel. The implication is that the Soviet Army of today is vastly different from the victorious, conquering army of 1945. While remaining wary of drawing the wrong lessons from the war in Afghanistan, Mujahidin tactical successes over nine years of war question the ability of the Soviet Army to wage successful operations against a skilled and determined enemy fighting on ground of his choosing.

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0538 Current Debate Over Soviet Defense Policy.
Gorbachev's new political thinking on national security issues poses a profound challenge to the Soviet military. He has encouraged civilian intellectuals to actively participate in the formulation of Soviet defense policy, and, in so doing, has threatened the professional military's monopoly on setting the defense agenda. It is still too early to predict which of these two groups will take the lead in formulation of Soviet defense policy. Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral troop reductions reflects the views put forth by many civilian defense analysts. If, however, rumors are true, this may signal the strengthening of the military's role in setting the defense agenda. The implications of Gorbachev's new political thinking on foreign policy and national security issues hold profound implications for the West, too. Over the last three years, the Soviet Union's actions, especially in the arms control arena, have proven that political thinking offers the West an unprecedented opportunity to address many of the most important issues facing mankind, including arms control and the arms race, human rights, and environmental issues. As Gorbachev's speech to the U.N. General Assembly demonstrated, the Soviet Union is ready and willing to seize the initiative on many of these issues.

0568 Fundamentals of Soviet "Razvedka" (Intelligence/Reconnaissance).
Intelligence, simply defined as knowledge of the enemy and his intentions, is seldom a decisive factor in war. It does not alter the strength of contending armies or the overall war aims of contending states, and it may have little effect on the planning and conduct of operations. A force that lacks good intelligence may still succeed because of its strength, sound planning, and military efficiency. The converse is also true. Sound intelligence, however,
can affect a nation's decision to go to war in the first place; and, once at war, it can reveal enemy intentions and dispositions. While providing a foundation for sound planning, it also forms a basis for conducting and verifying the effects of deception. Consequently, intelligence provides leverage with which to accentuate the positive effects of offensive or defensive military actions.

Managing U.S.–Soviet Relations in the 1990s.

A surprising feature of the 1988 presidential election campaign was the absence of any debate on U.S.–Soviet relations. Perhaps this may be explained by the shift in American policy in recent years, evoked by and paralleling the unfolding of new policies in the Soviet Union. The American Center and Left seem to have been largely disarmed by the policy changes in the second Reagan administration, and much of the Right seems disoriented by developments in the USSR, uneasy with the Reagan administration's rapprochement with Moscow, but unable yet to formulate a viable alternative course. In the meantime, the Soviet Union continues to surprise the world (and its own citizens as well) by changes in policies, expressed views, and, to some extent, even institutions. The reinvigoration of Kremlin policy with Gorbachev's arrival on the Soviet scene challenges the West to rethink its own attitudes and policies. Unfortunately, the West has responded to Soviet initiatives in ad hoc fashion, without re-examining either its objectives or its strategy. The result has been some confusion and disarray. New American administrations coming into office have the opportunity and the obligation to review the U.S. perspective and to help develop an alliance-wide dialogue that should lead to a reformulation of Western strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the last decade of this century.


This monograph discusses selected aspects of Soviet offensive doctrine with emphasis on trends discussed in unclassified literature. Relevant U.S. heavy task force doctrine is then reviewed in light of what the Soviets are doing, and the implications for defense are highlighted. Subjects addressed in this paper include Soviet use of surprise, tempo, mobile groups, fire support and helicopters, and sophisticated combined arms tactics to deal with U.S. defenses. Soviet concerns over "nuclear-like" weapons are discussed along with relative views of a future high-intensity battlefield. Possible areas of concern for U.S. doctrine developers are identified and discussed along with
some ideas for adapting U.S. training to reflect current Soviet doctrine. The paper concludes that tactical surprise is likely to be achieved by the Soviets, and that training and doctrine should reflect this situation. The paper also questions the validity of the assertion that a task force can defeat a regiment, not because of deficiencies in U.S. doctrine or equipment, but as a function of high-intensity mobile warfare. In addition, the monograph suggests changing the composition of the OPFOR at the NTC from a rifle regiment to a tank regiment, in order to more closely model emerging Soviet doctrine.

**Soviet Concepts and Capabilities for Limited Nuclear War: What We Know and How We Know It.**


This note analyzes the evolution of Soviet concepts of and capabilities for limited nuclear war, Western assessments of these concepts and capabilities, and the basis on which the assessments were made. It covers the period from 1954, when the Soviets first began to adapt their military strategy to the nuclear age, to the present. Soviet doctrinal commentary indicates an interest in limiting nuclear use for various military and political reasons; yet the Soviets reject the idea that nuclear war could be fought in a highly limited manner. In addition, their operational doctrine retains a strong preemptive predisposition, particularly with regard to war in Europe, where they are determined to be the first to use nuclear weapons with a potentially decisive military effect. However, given their nuclear strike capabilities and command-and-control arrangements, that provide tight control over initial nuclear release, the Soviets could employ their nuclear attack forces with a wide range of self-imposed restraints.

**KGB in Kremlin Politics.**


Despite numerous claims to the contrary, the Soviet secret police were not politically neutralized or brought under nonpartisan party control after the death of Stalin. Although hard data are difficult to come by, the available evidence leaves little doubt that the KGB has been an instrument and arena of internecine conflict among Soviet leaders from the moment it was founded in April 1954. Thanks to their control of an immense arsenal of politically potent weapons, KGB cadres appear to have played important and sometimes decisive roles in the allocation of power and authority in the Kremlin under all of Stalin's successors.
0889 Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations. A Reference Aid. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. February 1989. 191pp. The report is a reference guide to individuals who hold positions in selected party, government, and public organizations of the USSR. It may be used to find the incumbents of given positions within an organization or the positions of given individuals.


In its broadest sense, technology transfer encompasses the collection, documentation, and dissemination of scientific and technical information, including data on the performance and costs of using the technology; the transformation of research and technology into processes, products, and services that can be applied to public or private needs; and the secondary application of research or technology developed for a particular mission that fills a need in another environment. The above perspective of technology transfer is a benign one; one that takes place among and between amicable and cooperating sociopolitical, cultural and/or national friends. The following paper examines the more notorious side of the technology transfer issue, with special emphasis on the Soviet Union, who, through copying, espionage, and blatant thievery, sooner or later acquires Western technology for itself and Warsaw Pact nations. Forms of technology transfer are scrutinized through the use of several case studies, and the efforts used by the U.S. at deterring this leaching away of one of the bulwarks of western national security are surveyed.

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Almost all of the wars currently occurring in the world are low-intensity conflicts. Much of the available literature on low-intensity conflict either openly or implicitly renounces U.S. ability to participate in such wars, presumably even where vital interests are threatened, and decries the seemingly inherent conceptual and institutional incapability of the U.S. to
prepare for such wars. The superpowers' shared "learned incapacity" in low-intensity wars, and their failure to ponder their mutual experiences, is a great source of danger. Any really sound grasp of the military and political dimensions of contemporary insurgencies or counterinsurgence can derive only from such a comparative perspective. Thus we must ask what we can learn from the extensive experience of Soviet conduct in such wars. These analyses should also pertain to Soviet military doctrine, force structures, and foreign policies. It seems short-sighted to ignore these experiences. To the extent that both sides heed the importance of being indigenous and are not so eager to increase the stakes in a vain quest for influence, prestige, and power, they may facilitate peaceful solutions at the lowest levels rather than the highest ones. Failure to consider both U.S. and Soviet histories of such conflicts not only means repeating the past; by precipitating direct conflicts, such failure can also foreshorten our future.

0047 The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements. 
Labor has become a serious constraint on further growth of the Soviet economy. Since 1970, the manpower demands of the Soviet military has increased. This report considers both the degree to which current military staffing levels can be maintained and the costs of doing so. It also discusses the reliability of estimates of Soviet force size. The author suggests that, if the Soviet leadership faces a choice between maintaining present forces but endangering the current program of reform and restructuring, or reducing military expenditures to relieve pressure on the economy, the military may be asked to make substantial sacrifices in the interest of the prospects of both itself and the nation.

0125 Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform. 
Today the Soviets are confronted by changing conditions which impel them to alter their force structure. Purely military considerations, in particular the accelerating pace of technological change and the evolving battlefield environment, necessitate fundamental changes. For a decade the Soviets have gradually adjusted their force structure to accommodate these new realities, but today the existing force structure has evolved as far as it can. Clearly, new forms of forces are required which will permit further accommodation. The more flexible corps, brigade, and battalion structure can provide the vehicle for further change. The new defensiveness in Soviet
military doctrine provides yet another motive for force structure changes. The current structure is inexorably linked with the former, more offensive posture. The enunciation of new defensive precepts requires the creation of a less offensive-looking force structure (or at least a force structure which Western observers are unfamiliar with). Although the Soviets have long-standing experience with the employment of corps and brigades, most Westerners are ignorant of it. The key issue in the future will be what form this new force structure will take and what its capabilities will be.

Historically Soviet ground forces have focused on the enemy's force rather than on terrain. The author finds that the changing nature of the battlefield is causing the Soviets to alter the manner in which missions and objective depths are assigned to tactical and operational formations. Recent Soviet writings indicate that the changing landscape in Central Europe and increased battlefield lethality suggest an increased emphasis on terrain.

0229 Logistics: The Soviet's Nemesis to Conventional War in Central Europe?
During recent years, the Soviet Union's military writers have increasingly expressed the view that conventional war, as opposed to nuclear war, is now possible in Central Europe. This analysis draws on historical examples and evolving logistical support infrastructures and principles of Soviet operations from World War II and Afghanistan. The study focuses on the structure, doctrine, and procedure at the national, front, army, division, regiment, battalion, and company levels by determining existing methodology for sustainment, and provides conclusions as to strengths and weaknesses of Soviet logistical capabilities to sustain maneuver warfare.

This paper compares demographic data on the conscription and manpower management institutions of the Soviet military to estimates of Soviet military manpower levels. The paper examines the apparent paradox of increasing force size at a time of declining draft-age cohorts. Three estimates of Soviet force size are examined. The lowest of these three series is used in an exercise to fit the estimates to the other information presented. As a general
principle, when alternative assumptions are available, those that are most conservative, in the sense of being the least restrictive to Soviet interests, are used. Even so, the demographic and other data suggests the current estimates of Soviet force size may be subject to overestimation.

**General of the Army Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov: One of Gorbachev's Genshtabisty.**


Since the summer of 1986 there have been major changes in the senior officials of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the military districts and groups of forces. The post-war generation of Soviet officers has asserted its leadership. One of the officers who has emerged as an important figure in the new military leadership is General of the Army Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov. On February 25, 1986 Lobov was appointed Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This post has placed him in a crucial position of overseeing the implementation of Gorbachev's recently announced force reductions in the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe. Lobov's interest in military deception makes him an especially appropriate appointee to manage Gorbachev's unilateral force reductions in Central Europe. General Lobov is a very competent General Staff officer who has made his reputation as a military thinker of some originality. He is a modest supporter of military *perestroika* but sees the Soviet military as threatened by some of the criticisms engendered by *glasnost*. His expertise in military deception will make it crucial to explore the role of deception in peace and war, in theory and practice, and in military doctrine and military art.

**Soviet Operational Art: Will There Be a Shift In the Focus of Soviet Operational Art?**


This monograph examines the issue of recent Soviet initiatives in the military arena and the impact on Soviet Operational Art. The paper begins with a historical overview of Soviet Operational Art and a discussion of current structure and capabilities. Soviet initiatives to reduce forces are analyzed using the term "defensive arms control" and the Soviet economy as the basis of the analysis. From this analysis a projection is made concerning the future capabilities at the operational level of Soviet forces. The monograph concludes that the Soviets will retain an offensive capability.
German Reunification, A Soviet Opportunity.


The IGB has been the focus of consistent NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation, and the question of German reunification has been at the root of East/West relations in Europe since the end of World War II. There is a consensus that no solution to the challenge of East/West confrontation exists that does not include resolution of the German question. This study uses the medium of a fictional state memorandum from General Secretary Gorbachev to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze laying out a scenario in which resolution of the problem of the separate Germanys is proposed by the Soviets and exploited to their advantage. This study considers how such a scenario might be orchestrated to meet current and future needs in the Soviet Union for economic development assistance, access to western technology and most importantly, as a guarantee for the nation's security. Finally, it explores the lack of preparedness on the part of the United States to deal with such a Soviet initiative. The scenario details a series of events that, if they occurred, could result in major changes in the world balance of power.

Soviet Reactions to Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL).


One of the most controversial areas of U.S. military planning for the 1990s is BNW modernization. The current dilemma has been created in part by Soviet "public relations" activities in the area of troop reduction and arms control at a time when NATO must decide whether to modernize nuclear weapons systems currently deployed in Western Europe. This paper focuses on the Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL), which will modernize the soon-to-be-obsolete Lance system. It identifies why NATO needs the new system, why the Soviets want to prevent its deployment, and how the political environment in Western Europe and the U.S. will impact the decision for or against development. The paper also discusses the Soviet frame of reference for reacting to U.S./NATO initiative—ideology, insecurity, and the correlation of forces. It describes past Soviet reactions to nuclear weapons modernizations (Pershing IIs, ground launched cruise missiles, and enhanced radiation weapons), and postulates how the Soviets may respond politically and militarily to a FOTL deployment.
Glasnost and Perestroika: Campaign or Deception?
What are the strategic implications of glasnost and perestroika? Is Mikhail Gorbachev embarked on a campaign of strategic deception, or on a crusade to lead the USSR into the age of modern technology? Must the answer be one or the other, or is it possible he is doing both? What kind of support does he need both at home and abroad? How much time does he have to succeed? And, if he does, what will be the impact on world order? These questions represent a significant challenge. Gorbachev himself probably cannot provide accurate answers. He may personally be on a crusade; however, the "System" may be executing the greatest strategic deception the West has ever seen.

The Soviet Threat: Is It Declining?
Soviet General Secretary and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev has captivated world attention with proposals for world peace and for sweeping systemic changes within the Soviet Union. It is the purpose of this paper to first examine what is occurring within the Soviet Union today in the context of past Soviet behavior. This analysis shows the striking similarities between the problems and proposed solutions existing today and those found in previous periods of Soviet history. The Soviets have a continuing pattern of peaceful coexistence, friendship, and detente-like policies which relax the tensions in interstate relations and allow the Soviet Union to regain the initiative and emerge from these periods with renewed strength and aggressiveness. The second part of this paper examines several areas where the United States and its European allies must remain alert as to the true intentions of the Soviet Union. This paper concludes that it is far too early to believe the Soviet Union has made a break with its past and, therefore, too early for the West to begin to back down from its vigilance and determination to meet the Soviet challenge from a position of military strength.

Downgrading the Military in Soviet Foreign Policy.
A series of recent events indicate that the correlation of domestic forces has been turning against the Soviet military. This has been reflected in an unprecedented, wide-scale press assault on the Soviet military. Linked with the criticism are signs that the economic aspects of national security are being pushed to the forefront.
Soviet Advanced Technologies in the Era of Restructuring.
This report assesses the capability and prospects for Soviet development of advanced technologies within the framework of the restructuring drive currently under way in the Soviet Union. The author analyzes recent Soviet technical literature, providing an overview of the restructuring process, its objectives for advanced technology development, the pace and extent of the realization, and the fundamental problems involved in the transition from leading-edge R&D to industrial production. He suggests that Soviet problems with R&D arise largely from the revolutionary nature of advanced technology, the successful development of which requires an economic and industrial environment that is incompatible with the rigidly applied principles of a planned economy. The Soviet systemic aversion to risk and uncertainty has the greatest negative influence on the development of advanced technologies. Because Soviet failure to keep pace with the West in technological development is ultimately political in origin, it cannot be reversed without profound political changes of the system.

Soviet military strategy—concerned with organizing, structuring, training, and equipping the Armed Forces, and the planning, preparation, and conduct of military operations in future wars—is in the process of fundamental change. A new Soviet military posture and associated concepts for the conduct of theater-scale, combined arms operations, and shaped by a host of complex political, economic, and military considerations, is now beginning to take form. Clearly, a number of the political-military initiatives now underway were begun, or gained impetus, under the leadership of General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev. The catalysts for other recent developments in Soviet military strategy, however, particularly those of a purely military character, occurred as early as the last decade. These need to be considered as well in assessments of a developing Soviet military posture for theater war—the most critical component of Soviet military strategy today and the focus of this assessment. By the mid-1970s, the theater-strategic operation had become one of the most important areas of study and development for Soviet military strategy. In 1975, the Voroshilov General Staff Academy of the Soviet Armed Forces issued a revised version of its classified textbook on military strategy.
Recently a flood of new terms entered the Soviet lexicon: "new thinking," "defensiveness," "sufficiency," and others. Likewise there is a proliferation of explanations of these terms both in the West and, surprisingly, in the Soviet Union as well. The Soviet debate on these terms is far from over, however, and this makes defining their content difficult until the Soviets themselves finally close any of these issues. One of these terms, "reasonable sufficiency" (razumnaia dostatochnost), provides material for a wide-ranging civil-military and intra-military conflict on Soviet national security policy. Rather than attempt to define the content of reasonable sufficiency, this study looks at the concept in its domestic context as one of the tools used by the leadership to undermine and divide the Soviet military so it cannot function as an interest group against changes in doctrine and defense spending.

USSR: Estimates of Personal Incomes and Savings.
Using Soviet data, estimates of Soviet personal disposable money income in rubles are constructed from the ground up and nominal income is deflated with a price index that better captures Soviet inflation than does the official measure. The estimate, although an improvement on the Soviet series, has some shortcomings. For example, information gaps do not allow the inclusion of a small amount of earnings in the state sector and more substantial incomes earned in the illegal or "second" economy. The estimates suggest Soviet real per capita disposable income has grown much more slowly than indicated by the official index, particularly since 1976. The Soviets did succeed in reducing the expansion of money incomes in the first half of the 1980s to better match the slowdown in growth of consumer goods and supplies. Nonetheless, growth of money incomes still exceeded growth of supply, and excess demand has remained a chronic problem. Annual personal savings are also calculated.

Perestroika and Glasnost: Where Will They Lead?
The implementation of perestroika and glasnost by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 initiated a series of events which has been affecting governments and people throughout much of the world. People have been watching the Soviet Union with renewed interest, and the scope and speed of actions taken by Mr.
Gorbachev have generated questions such as: where will *perestroika* and *glasnost* lead?; what impact will there be and on whom?; what will be the results of these initiatives?; should the United States' military strategy be changed? This study reviews current U.S. military strategy, briefly describes the development and intended purposes of the Soviet programs, identifies achievements and impacts that have resulted, attempts to predict and analyze possible outcomes, determines effects on U.S. military strategy, and postulates required changes to U.S. military strategy.

**0958 Soviet Strategic Nuclear Doctrine Under Gorbachev.**

This paper examines Soviet offensive strategic nuclear doctrine under General Secretary and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. The development of Soviet nuclear doctrine starting with the Stalin era is reviewed. A close look at those pieces of Gorbachev's "new thinking" that pertain to nuclear weapons doctrine are presented. Implications for U.S. strategy are offered.

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**0001 Soviet Policy Issues.**

This document represents an edited compilation of five presentations and commentaries at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Each analyst has examined a key aspect of Soviet foreign or domestic policy, placing particular emphasis on events since Mikhail Gorbachev has come to power. A more detailed abstract precedes each of the papers within the text, which is arranged in chronological order by the date of presentation. The commentaries are also preceded by an abstract and are arranged in chronological order in the appendix.

**0191 The Evolving Soviet Threat: A Historical Perspective.**

This paper examines the evolving military, economic, and political threat to U.S. national security from a Soviet historical perspective. It compares the development of Marxist/Communist ideology with current Soviet initiatives,
providing rationale for recent and dramatic shifts in Soviet domestic and international policy objectives. The paper also defines and characterizes the threat facing the United States as a result of these policy changes and suggests initiatives to neutralize Soviet successes while sustaining a strong NATO alliance and world leadership role for the United States.

A center of gravity is something held precious by a nation or a power; something that either flows throughout the entity as a cohesive force or is so central to beliefs and values that its loss could result in disassociation or collapse of the power. One popular concept of the Soviet Union is that Communist party control of the government is a vital interest and thus forms a center of gravity. With the appearance of relatively extensive changes in Soviet political culture initiated by President Mikhail Gorbachev, is the new center of gravity the same? Is it in transition?, and if it's changing, what are the possible new "centers?" On a strategy basis a significant change could directly impact what, how, and when we target areas for cooperation, competition or potential conflict. Additionally, the center of gravity as an analytical frame of reference may help us understand how threats to the Soviet center of gravity can impact their likely course of action in force structure and strategy, and produce interactive, changing challenges for U.S. strategy. This study focuses on how the changes being made in the Soviet Union today could influence the way the U.S. needs to plan future relationships.

0306 An Analysis of Soviet Doctrine Using Principles of War.
The principles of war as enumerated in Army Field Manuel 100-5 are used to analyze current Soviet military doctrine. Strengths and weaknesses are examined in each area. The assessment covers the doctrinal treatment of what the Soviets claim to intend to achieve, the organization and structure designed to execute that doctrine, and the method's precepts. While the Soviets do not acknowledge per se the validity of the principles as set forth in FM 100-5, their military doctrine and practices largely conform to them. The strengths and weaknesses revealed with regard to individual principles of war fall into a pattern. This pattern is the challenge and the opportunity faced by the United States and NATO.
Assessment of Politico-Military Lessons Learned from the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan.
This report assesses the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and nearly 10-year occupation for lessons learned. It examines the historical Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and illustrates the importance of focused international relationships. It also shows how U.S. diplomatic failure in Afghanistan created a void that opened the door to the Russians. Afghanistan demonstrates that superpower military intervention in the Third World may only offer temporary solutions and cannot ensure the achievement of political objectives. Five critical lessons learned are enumerated. Afghanistan serves as an example that the United States must clearly define regional foreign policy objectives for the protection of its long-term interests.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission: Current Membership.
The listing updates the reference aid “CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission: Members Elected at the 27th Party Congress.” Personnel changes made since the Congress, including those announced at the 25 April 1989 plenum, have been incorporated. The Central Committee now consists of 251 full and 109 candidate members. The Central Auditing Commission has 70 members.

Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World.
This report, part of a study of the types of threats that Army planners might encounter in the Third World, evaluates the impact that Mikhail Gorbachev has had thus far on Soviet Third World policy, as well as prospects for future evolution. The study evaluates new Soviet thinking on foreign policy and measures the changes in rhetoric against actual Soviet behavior. It analyzes the new Soviet emphasis on the large states of the Third World. As an example of this new Soviet diplomacy, it presents a detailed case study of Soviet policy toward the Persian Gulf in 1986–1987.
A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Strategic Defensive Doctrines.  

This thesis examines the strategic defensive doctrines of both the Soviet Union and the United States and further explores the concrete manifestation of the disparities in those doctrines. The evolution of the defensive components of national strategies is traced from the end of World War II to the present, and specific defensive systems are described. The focus is on the impact of strategy on deployment antiballistic missile systems, antiaircraft defenses, and civil defense programs. A comparison of current strategic defensive deployments highlights the differences in the doctrines adopted by the two nations. While the Soviet Union has deployed substantial defensive systems, the United States has chosen to forgo all but minimal antiaircraft defenses. This basic difference in strategic thought may be, in itself, destabilizing.


The publication provides a record of the known appearances of selected Soviet public figures during 1988. Coverage includes members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU, leading officials of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security, and the Minister of Internal Affairs. The publication contains a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in its preparation; a list of the individuals covered; an alphabetical list of the known appearances of the individuals during the period covered, including the date, nature, and location of each appearance, and the source of information; and a chronological list of appearances with names arranged alphabetically for a given date and location.

Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa: What Are They Worth In the United Nations?  

This study is an analysis of Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa during the period 1974–1983. Using a focused comparison methodology, ten sub-Saharan nations are examined in light of two objectives. The first is to describe the range of military assistance relationships that existed between the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan nations during the review period. The second seeks evidence of the ability of arms transfers to assist the Soviets in achieving political influence over client states. The degree of similarity
between the United Nations General Assembly voting records of the Soviet Union and recipients of Soviet military assistance is used as an indicator of political influence. The principal research hypothesis states that if the Soviet Union represents the sole or predominant supplier of military arms and equipment to a recipient country, that country will "mirror image" the Soviet Union's UN voting record. This study concludes that the Soviet Union gains political influence as a result of arms transfers when recipient states are confronted with active or imminent military threats. Recipients of Soviet military assistance are unwilling to restructure military forces to align with new sources of supply for military hardware while regime survival is challenged. Therefore, African states, to include Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, find themselves obligated to meet the expectations of their Soviet patrons to ensure the continued flow of arms and military equipment. The author states his belief that an understanding of this finding has implications for American foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than a willingness to provide sophisticated weapons to the African continent in an attempt to counterbalance Soviet transfers, the study proposes that the interests of the United States would be better served by finding means to reduce the African need for arms.

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Soviet Perspectives on Weapons Costs. 
This study examines the techniques used by the Soviets to project weapons costs at three stages: research and development; series production; and during use. Projections of research and development costs are based on the labor required; this estimate then serves as the basis for estimating other factors such as overhead and materials. Projections for series production are based on the costs for similar or related weapons already in production. Similarly, projections for operations and maintenance are based on those associated with equipment already in the arsenal. By understanding the techniques used by the Soviets in their weapons procurement process, it should be easier to explain Soviet decisions and to predict future decisions.
Recent Soviet press statements reflect a growing conviction that the emerging "Pacific Century" has important implications for the USSR. While seemingly downgrading the military component of Soviet Far East presence, Soviet leaders are contemplating various unprecedented measures. Among them are the creation of FEZs and the opening of several ports, including Vladivostok. This research memorandum assesses the status of these developments, discusses some of their implications, and examines the possible nature of economic activity in the zones and potential sites for them. Also briefly noted are new trends in Soviet economic thinking.

This bulletin contains 110 tables with data on land use, farm structures, population, farm machinery, fertilizer deliveries, crop production, livestock inventories and production, and per capita consumption of selected foods from 1965 to 1985. Countries covered are the USSR and the seven Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Explanatory notes define the terminology and describe the statistical concepts applied to the data for each country.

This note offers a synoptic review of the defense policy of the Soviet Union, including discussions of the organizational framework and pattern of Soviet defense decision-making, key elements of Soviet military doctrine and strategy for intercontinental and theater warfare, recent developments in Soviet and conventional forces, and the Soviet approach to arms control. Sources include reports and analyses by U.S. and Soviet scholars and the author's own research and observations made during recent visits to the Soviet Union. Owing to profound domestic economic and political crises, the strength of the Soviet Union is being questioned at home and abroad. Although the military continues to exert important influence and expertise in defense matters, even under the current restructuring (perestroika), the senior party leadership makes the final decisions.
Gorbachev's Eurasian Strategy: The Dangers of Success and Failure. 

"There is great disorder under heaven, and the situation is excellent," goes the Chinese version of dialectic. Four years and countless surprises after his ascendance to power, there is now little doubt that Mikhail Gorbachev aims to modernize Soviet society and to de-ideologize Moscow's foreign relations. Clearly, the world has been dazzled by the brutal candor with which the Soviets have exposed the systemic crisis of communism and the stunning scope and pace of Gorbachev's "new thinking." Too dazzled, perhaps. Glaringly absent from the normative debate about perestroika is a sober assessment of how "new thinking" contributes to the attainment of Soviet strategic objectives or whether the path of Soviet foreign policy will, as widely assumed, lead to a more stable world.

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. August 1989. 70pp.

In response to legislation passed in 1985, the Department of State on July 30, 1986, submitted to Congress a document titled "Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns." The current report, the third in a series, focuses on events and changes that occurred between June 1987 and November 1988. Active measures, the focus of the report, cannot be discussed without also addressing propaganda. The themes in propaganda are often reinforced by and are the raison d'être of active measures. Thus, while the main purpose of the report is to reveal and describe Soviet influence activities that are deceptive and illegitimate, they are discussed in the overall context of Soviet propaganda.

Soviet Countertrade. 

Western observers have noted the Soviet Union's use of countertrade over the past several years. This type of international trade involves a seller's agreement to make some form of reciprocal purchase from or investment in the buyer's country before the buyer agrees to make the initial purchase. After defining the terms often used in relation to countertrade, this paper develops a theory that would explain a government's use of this type of trade. The paper concludes with an application of the theory to the Soviet Union—an analysis of the motives behind the Soviet Union's use of countertrade-type transactions.

Soviet strategic air defense (PVO) has usually surfaced into Western view only with outrages against civilian aircraft or debacles dealing with boy aviators. Such occasions have prompted rounds of condemnation and ridicule of both the operational prowess and the technological accomplishments of PVO, together with mass firings of senior leaders. The most widely recognized challenge to PVO is U.S. introduction of a new generation of cruise missile and the stealth B-2 bomber. In addition, the PVO faces challenges at home in the form of the Soviet debate on military doctrine and restructuring. Even if a doctrinal commitment to strategic aerodynamic defense is reaffirmed, PVO faces the organizational challenge of winning the manpower allocations and re-equipment programs necessary to maintain the force. Failures on any of these fronts could result in the reduction of PVO.

International Department of the CCCPSU (Central Committee Communist Party of the Soviet Union) under Dobrynin.

The proceedings of a two-day conference on the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contain eight scholarly reports on various aspects of the ID's history and activities. They include: the role of the International Department in the Soviet foreign policy process; the new role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet foreign relations and arms control; Gorbachev and the Communist Parties of Western Europe; from the ID to the International Affairs Commission; Karen Brutent's role in the USSR's pragmatic approach to the Third World; Anatoly F. Dobrynin: March 1986–September 1988; history of the ID; the CPSU's international affairs commission and the Third World in the Gorbachev era; and personnel and structure of the CPSU International Department.

The Degradation of Natural Resources In the Soviet Union.

The cost of natural resources in the USSR is increasing. The authors attribute the increased costs to excessive exploitation of natural resources and the serious degradation of resource quality.
This note attempts to provide the means for evaluating the frequent comparison made between the Soviet Union and ancient Sparta as states where politics takes precedence over economics. It marshals and explicates both the ancient evidence and modern scholarship on the issues that a student of the contemporary Soviet economy must understand in order to judge to what extent ancient Spartan society illuminates the way the Soviet Union does business today. The author describes the origins, developments, and ultimate failure of Sparta’s political economy, and analyzes that economy’s strengths and vulnerabilities. He points out that the striking similarities that many scholars have noted between the two societies come principally from the fact that they are both militaristic states. He also cautions that the Spartan analogy may be useful for acquiring insights into the Soviet economy, but it has no productive value.

Modernizing the Soviet Textile Industry: Implications for Perestroika.
This report presents a case study of the investment program to modernize the Soviet textile industry. The work was undertaken as part of a continuing research program in international economic policy, the principal focus of which is to explore the connection between international economics and national security issues, within RAND’s National Security Research Division. The present report is designed to assist analysts in understanding the actual practice of Soviet industrial modernization under Gorbachev’s drive for perestroika by examining the experience in one sector of the economy. In the course of doing so, issues are identified that may be determinants of the likelihood of success in modernizing more crucial sectors of the economy, particularly machine building.

Cost as a Factor In Soviet Weapons Decision making.
Intuitively, one believes that cost ought to be a significant decision-making factor in the Soviet weapons acquisition process. If that is indeed true, the Department of Defense decision makers should be quite interested in when, how, and to what extent cost shapes the outcome of the Soviet weapons acquisition process. However, interest alone is not enough. There must also
be sufficient data available about the role that cost plays in the process. With these perspectives in mind, the authors undertook this project, under the Institute for Defense Analyses' Independent Research Program, aimed at: (1) ascertaining whether Department of Defense officials were in fact interested in the impact of cost in shaping Soviet weapons choices, and, if so, where this concern might play in the U.S. decision-making process; as well as (2) identifying potential data to address Department of Defense concerns. The project was limited to about six man-weeks of effort (split between two analysts). Hence, the results are necessarily modest. Nevertheless, this preliminary investigation revealed that there is interest in the topic and that data is available to address several significant issues.

**0874 Conflict and Consensus In the Soviet Armed Forces.**

This report analyzes the evolution of conflicts over modernization within the Soviet military, and efforts to develop a consensus needed to resolve these conflicts during 1978 to 1988. Thus, the analysis covers a period of enormous upheaval that originated in the reorganization of the Soviet armed forces and subsequently involved the restructuring initiated by Gorbachev’s reforms. The efforts of ground forces, strategic rocket forces, and the navy to cope with and to avoid changes initiated by the General Staff are examined against a backdrop of the consequences of strategic nuclear parity, the high-technology revolution, and constraints on the Soviet military budget.

**0921 The September 1989 Central Committee Nationalities Plenum: A Victory for Ryzhkov and Vorotnikov.**

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Ryzhkov and Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Vitalii Vorotnikov, a majority of Politburo members seem to articulate views that run counter to Gorbachev's intended reforms of the party apparatus. The fact that many Politburo members seem to centralize and reinstitute party bodies such as the Secretariat testifies to Gorbachev's weakness in controlling some aspects of the September 1989 Nationalities Plenum. It is possible that the return of the Secretariat and the assignment to that body of four new secretaries suggests a retreat for reformers in the party leadership.
All militaries face the problem of training in peace to prepare for war. Peacetime desires for safety, comfort, and the accommodation of inertia frequently permit a certain “formalism” to creep into peacetime training. “Formalism” or “pencil-whipping” the training schedule comes into focus when the shams of peacetime operations are stripped away by real wars or war-like incidents. The Soviet Air Defense Force, hereafter PVO, has been especially unlucky in the variety of incidents that have highlighted training deficiencies. In the Brezhnev period, incidents of incompetence could be resolved by simple punishment of the people involved with no wider implications. In a period of glasnost and political debate, wider implications are always drawn. PVO is working hard to overcome the widespread impression of incompetence, highlighted when Matthias Rust landed in Red Square. PVO must demonstrate its day-to-day competence and prudent expenditure of resources in order to assure its access to continued support for new systems, and a good share of the best conscripts and officer cadets.

This paper tries to identify significant current trends that shape Soviet military strategy and that may continue into the twenty-first century. An arms control trend, stemming from the Soviet concept of “reasonable sufficiency,” seems slated to severely handicap the USSR in options for fighting and winning large-scale conventional and theater-nuclear wars. Moscow evidently feels the strategic nuclear sphere will be the key arena of military competition in the future. First, the USSR now shows a greater commitment to offensive counterforce than was true of the period before “reasonable sufficiency.” Second, Moscow’s interest in the strategic nuclear sphere will be reinforced in the future by a long-term trend toward space warfare. However, it may be possible to soften the competition in this sphere through arms control. Prominent Soviets have already begun to suggest that if the U.S. will limit its SDI ambitions to a “thin” defense, Moscow might actually prefer mutual comprehensive ABM deployments to continued adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty.
1989 cont.


This note examines the evolution of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship over the past decade in three contexts: (1) Soviet behavior in supporting the Vietnamese troops during the invasion of Cambodia in late 1978 and in defending them during the Chinese incursion into Vietnam in early 1979, (2) the level of Soviet economic and military aid, and (3) the impact of General Secretary Gorbachev's "new thinking" on Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The record shows a Soviet disinclination to take risks in this region of the world even in the late 1970s during the height of Brezhnev's interventionism chiefly because of the proximity to China. Under Gorbachev, not only does interventionism appear remote, but tangible results in reducing tensions in Southeast Asia already have been achieved. Specifically, by September of 1989, thousands of Vietnamese troops left Cambodia, thus fulfilling the third "precondition" set by China on the path to improved Sino-Soviet relations.


This report examines the relationship between the Soviet force posture toward Western Europe and the political struggle that is being waged in the Soviet Union for control over the priorities of military deployment policy and military-industrial decision making. It presents an overview of the numerous, intertwined issues that have been the key battleground in this contest: how to define the Soviet military budget, how far and how fast to cut it, how far to reduce Soviet conventional forward deployments in Europe, how much asymmetry to accept in such reductions, how to reorganize forces for "defensive" purposes, and whether to move away from the traditional Soviet mass conscripted army in the direction of a professional army. Finally, the study considers prospects for the future.
0125  **Handbook of Climate of the USSR. Humidity of Air, Atmospheric Precipitations, Snow Cover.**

*Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. December 7, 1989. 289pp.*

Partial Contents: short characteristic of the regime of humidification; explanations to the tables, humidity of air; atmospheric precipitation and snow cover; alphabetical index of stations.

0414  **Handbook on Climate of the USSR.**

*Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. December 20, 1989. 269pp.*

Partial Contents: A brief description of the conditions of cloud cover and atmospheric phenomena; explanation to the tables; cloudiness, fog, snow storms, thunderstorms, and hail.

**1990**

0683  **Texts of Treaties and Protocols. Treaty between the U.S. and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.**


Contents: Treaty between the U.S. and USSR on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests (and protocol thereto); treaty between the U.S. and USSR on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (and protocol thereto).

0784  **The Debate about Soviet Military Doctrine and Forces.**


This paper describes the principal sources available to researchers of security issues in the Soviet literature. It identifies seven elements of military affairs that are currently the subject of debate within the Soviet Union. These topics are: Soviet grand strategy; strategic nuclear policy; theater conventional policy; preferred organizational principle for the Soviet military; reform within the military and factors influencing this reform; economic considerations in defense policy, especially defense conversion efforts; and the ability of glasnost to penetrate military affairs. It is clear that the Soviet security debate is designed not merely for Western consumption, and for the purposes of influencing the West, but rather is integrally interconnected with the process of reform in the Soviet Union itself.
The Prospects for Modernizing Soviet Industry.
This report assesses the Soviet effort to improve economic performance by improving the quality of machine-building products. The author contends that the modernization program addresses only the symptoms of economic inefficiency, not the root cause. The senior Soviet leadership does not yet have an understanding that the goals set for the modernization program depend on fundamental reform of Soviet economic institutions. Soviet enterprises are not the equivalent of Western firms—the Soviet enterprise manager is subject to more uncertainty, retains less control, and faces less specified criteria. Emphasis on the adoption of new machinery may impose a net cost on the economy rather than a benefit, and with disappointing results. The success of an effort to modernize Soviet industry depends upon efficient use of information, and this requires more substantial reform of the economic system. True modernization is possible, but only with an adequate system for setting prices, sufficient competition, removal of ministerial authority, and reform of the way the average Soviet enterprise is organized.

The Soviets have conducted submarine operations in Swedish waters continuously since World War II. Although the evidence of these violations of Sweden's territorial waters is incomplete, Swedish authorities indicate that "foreign" submarine operations were carried out infrequently and at irregular intervals during the 1960s and into the late 1970s. The scope and character of Soviet operations in Sweden changed in or around 1980, however, becoming much more frequent, penetrating the heart of Sweden's coastal defense zones, and involving the use of multiple submarines, mini-submarines, and combat swimmers operating in a coordinated manner. This report examines the strange cases of Soviet submarine operations in Swedish waters since 1980. It discusses the nature of these operations, as well as related activities being carried out on Swedish soil; the political and strategic context within which these operations have evolved; the objectives that apparently underlie these activities; and the continuity in Soviet civil-military decision making on the submarine question.
The Soviet Union: Political and Military Trends.
On July 20, 1989, the CNSS of the Los Alamos National Laboratory held a workshop on "The Soviet Union: Political and Military Trends." The morning session was devoted to a discussion of the magnitude of the problems confronting the Soviet Union, the political and economic reforms designed to address these problems, and the repercussions of these reforms on Soviet foreign policy and defense spending. In the afternoon session, the Soviet view of the changing character of warfare, the technologies and force structures that the Soviets might develop and deploy to anticipate the battlefield of the future, and the role that conventional arms control might play in Soviet political and military strategy were examined.

Soviet Carriers In Turkish Straits.
The deployment of the new Soviet aircraft carrier from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea will resurrect historical policy issues in a new international security environment. The regime governing the Turkish Straits, the Montreux Convention, was conceived in haste during the inter-war years. It has not been revised to keep pace with either technological or political changes. Entire classes of ships and weapons moving about on the world's oceans today were unheard of in 1936 and thus are unaccounted for in the Straits regime. Developments in the "Law of the Sea" have also passed the Montreux Convention by. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have supplanted the alliances of pre-World War II Europe and both meet at the Turkish Straits. This paper reviews the principal issues associated with warship transits of the Turkish Straits and examines policy options for the U.S. and NATO regarding the transit of the new Soviet aircraft carrier. It concludes that the best course is for both NATO and the U.S. to be guided in their actions chiefly by the Turkish position, which will likely call for tacit acceptance of the transit.

Defending Forward: Soviet Activities In Front of the Main Line of Defense.
The Soviet army has a comprehensive methodology for security and defense. The security battle is designed to strip away enemy reconnaissance, prevent surprise attack, force enemy forces to deploy prematurely, and create the optimum conditions for targeting. The security battle is fought within a security zone or covering zone or by forward positions and combat outposts. Maneuver is a key component of the security battle.
The Human Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Leadership, Cohesion, and Effectiveness.

Strategy is based in part on assessment of the threat. The U.S. tends to emphasize objective indicators of capability in making assessments of threats, in part because these are more tangible and are often even quantifiable. Subjective factors such as the threat’s strategic culture and the willingness and ability of soldiers to fight under the stress of combat are often underestimated, if not omitted entirely from considerations of the threat. This study is an evaluation of the potential combat effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces based upon evaluation of variables that affect the human dimension of combat. Cohesion, leadership, and stress training are the variables that are considered. The Soviets use an approach to combat motivation that is not based on cohesion but rather on ideology. Small-unit leadership is weak among both officers and NCO’s. Stress training is not adaptive with respect to modern high-intensity combat. The important determinants of cohesion and leadership are weakened by systemic factors that make change difficult and unlikely for the foreseeable future. The human factor is a significant weakness in the Soviet military and should be taken into account in assessing the threat that the USSR represents today and tomorrow.

The Soviet Withdrawal from Eastern Europe: A Move in Crisis.

Following the 1989–1990 political events in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is hastening to remove its armed forces from that region. The force of thirty-nine divisions, with all of its associated organizations and equipment, is currently the object of an enormous withdrawal that will be mostly complete in 1994. Throughout 1990, the Soviet withdrawal was chronicled in the Communist Bloc with unprecedented candor, and those reports reveal alarming details about the difficulties being experienced by the Soviet military. Within the Soviet Union and the Soviet military a variety of problems adversely impact on the returning troops. A lack of adequate housing, catastrophic economic conditions, unfavorable attitudes about military service, and political struggles within the government are all studied in order to place the Soviet military withdrawal in proper perspective. There are both similarities and unique aspects in how the Soviet Union is ending its military involvement in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Accounts of the Soviet military withdrawal need to be studied in order to assess how United States’ foreign policy should be conducted in the post–cold war environment.
The Soviet Union’s “New Defensive Doctrine” and the Changing Face of Soviet Strategic Culture.


Among the dramatic changes underway within the Soviet Union is the announcement that the Soviets have adopted a new defensive doctrine. This new defensive doctrine radically alters the way that the Soviets have structured, trained, and prepared their military for years. Soviet strategic culture remains a useful tool to examine the effects of these changes and to help predict possible outcomes. This study reviews the construct of Soviet strategic culture and examines the development of the new defensive doctrine. It compares the various schools of thought involved in the ongoing debate in the Soviet Union and assesses probable results from these radical shifts in doctrine.

Gorbachev’s Relationship with the Soviet Military: Consensus or Conflict?


Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985. Almost immediately he began restructuring the Soviet economy. His perestroika program, to include the twin pillars of glasnost and demokratizatsiya, was necessary to ensure that the Soviet Union remained competitive with the West. The restructuring has unleashed unforeseen turmoil in the republics of the USSR and in Eastern Europe. The Soviet General Staff has reacted warily to these developments and to the force structure and budget reductions that are a part of perestroika. Initially, there was resigned acceptance to the cuts and need to divert military resources to the civilian sector of the economy. After five years of sacrifices, however, perestroika has failed to achieve measurable improvements. As a result, the General Staff is now resisting calls for additional sacrifices by the armed forces. They desire a more cautious, controlled approach as regards internal changes in relations with Eastern Europe. Such a course seems particularly prudent at this juncture as the perceived NATO threat has not appreciably decreased. Given the increasing opposition to his policies from both the left and the right, Gorbachev will need the military’s support to stay in power and to effectively implement perestroika. Such support, however, is unlikely. The military will increasingly resist restructuring, glasnost, and democratization and will seek allies in the conservative wing of the CPSU, who share similar views. Such an alliance will further undermine and jeopardize Gorbachev’s already tenuous political position.
One Germany: A New Soviet Strategy?
The course of post-World War II history has marched us toward the dramatic, perhaps traumatic series of events that unfold almost daily before our disbelieving eyes. Seemingly hardline Communist countries, even the Soviet Union itself, showed the signs of strain-cracks in the thin veneer of totalitarianism. Such tremendous and unanticipated change cannot help but resurrect a whole host of unsettled issues, many of which have lain buried in the political rubble created by the Second World War. To the surprise of no one, the German question is the pièce de resistance of all these issues, for Germany divided sits at the very core of modern East-West confrontation. In this time of awakening from the oppression of traditional Sovietism, the FRG and the GDR will capitalize on their renewed commonalties and reunite into one, single sovereign state, as indeed they have done. It was in the interest of the Soviet Union and the Western powers to let it happen. This paper examines the issue before reunification from the Soviet strategic culture aspect and provides a vector for the American and NATO response.

The Challenges of Glasnost for Western Intelligence.
This paper assesses the challenges that glasnost poses for Western intelligence communities, and the implications these challenges hold within the broader political context. This paper establishes the actual meaning and the political and historical context of glasnost to set a proper framework for assessing its impact in the West. Historical lessons are drawn from the British attempt to assess Germany as a threat in the 1930s, as a model for how democracies can fail in properly assessing an alien political culture. Problems inherent in formulating assessments of the Soviets by the West in the earlier post war environment are also addressed. The lessons and legacies respectively of these experiences are then applied to the presently evolving situation. The bottom line is that glasnost is adding yet another layer of confusion for Western intelligence agencies and political leaders in assessing the nature and direction of developments in the Soviet Union. Glasnost does indeed provide some promise of progress in arms control verification, tantalizing glimpses of Soviet realities, and access to interesting debates on defense policy. But all of this could help to foster greater controversy within and among Western intelligence communities and the political elites which
they serve. At the same time, it could further engender a public complacency in the West that bodes ill for continued defense and intelligence efforts and could undermine Western solidarity. This is occurring at the very time that the paradigms of the past forty years lie shattered and the Allies face a world of heightened uncertainty and ambiguity.

0513

Maintaining Heavy Force Training Focus in the Age of “New Soviet Thinking.”


The changes that the Soviet Union has initiated have challenged even the most hard-hearted cold war warrior to believe that there is some substance to Gorbachev, and for the possibility of long lasting changes within the Soviet Union. This study examines reasons for maintaining the U.S. Army’s heavy force focus on both Soviet tactics and forces in the face of the decreased threat being portrayed by the Soviets today. The history of U.S.–Soviet relations since 1945 is used as a backdrop to show that crises develop in unexpected places, over unanticipated events, and at inopportune times. The Korean War is used as a historical example of what lack of focus can do to an Army. The consequences of breakthrough technological advances are shown through a look at the Soviet nuclear developments and Sputnik. The changes that Gorbachev has proposed in Soviet defense policy and doctrine are discussed to show the direction of “new thinking” in that area, and to depict possible long term Soviet policies if Gorbachev’s changes succeed. A look at past Soviet and Russian reform efforts is offered to assess the likelihood of successful reform. Finally, future threats are discussed that lead to the conclusion that the U.S. heavy forces must remain prepared to fight against Soviet tactics, if not Soviet forces, for the foreseeable future.

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Men and Technology in Today’s Soviet Navy.


Demographic, economic, and ethnic problems have reduced the quality of Soviet Naval personnel. Frictions between the Soviet Navy and defense industry have contributed to increasingly poor reliability of naval platform and weapons. The logical solution is to reduce the size of the Soviet Navy.
At a special closed session of the Central Committee convened immediately after the official end of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and ushered in a new era in Soviet politics. The underlying motivations behind Khrushchev's landmark speech were no doubt varied and complex, but it is not difficult to discern that one of the fundamental goals was to set the stage for launching the Soviet Union on a radical program of social and economic reform. Within a year, Khrushchev has managed to oust or weaken his main political rivals, and he moved forward briskly, outlining his ambitious objectives with bold aplomb. While praising the "spectacular achievements of the Soviet people" in "greatly overfilling" the 1956 goals for the sixth five-year plan, he advocated a complete break with the Stalinist past and brazenly declared that the nation's primary mission was catching up with and surpassing the most developed countries in per capita production.

The pursuit of greater stability through arms reductions is an important component of perestroika. Assuming strategic weapons reductions, the SIOP, the general nuclear war plan, will change to employ fewer nuclear arms. If stability and threat reduction are authentic goals, the composition of nuclear offensive forces and the SIOP alert force will evolve accordingly. Greater reliance will likely be placed on bombers. The United States and the Soviet Union can use the opportunity provided by perestroika to agree that the only legitimate role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons by threatening nuclear reprisal or punishment. Both sides can then share a strategic catechism that would allow them to move toward small reprisal forces.

The objective of this study is to analyze: (1) how the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe impacts on the Soviet military presence in the region and on Soviet security interests; (2) how political changes in Eastern Europe and Soviet troop reductions affect the military forces and security
interests of individual countries and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO); and (3) how Soviet troop reductions reflect on political and economic relations between the affected countries and the USSR. This study is one of a series of planned reports dealing with the causes and effects of a military force reduction in Europe.

USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Republics.
Between 1979 and 1989 population growth and internal migration trends led to changes in the balance between ethnic Russians and the titular nationalities, the ethnic groups for which the Soviet republics are named, in all of the 14 non-Russian republics. These republics, in all of which ethnic Russians are a minority, contain nearly half of the total Soviet population. Shifts in the ethnic composition of the Central Asian and Baltic republics were among the largest. In Central Asia (including the Kazakh SSR), the proportion of Russians declined by some 2.5 to 4.4 percentage points between 1979 and 1989. In the Baltics, the ethnic Russian proportions grew by between 0.5 and 2.4 percentage points. As a result, Latvians are in jeopardy of losing their majority status in the Latvian SSR; their proportion fell from 54 percent in 1979 to 52 percent in 1989. The other two Baltic groups, Estonians and Lithuanians, are not in danger of losing their majority standing.

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1990 cont.

Reserve Forces in the Soviet Military.
When the Soviet military complex is examined in depth in light of the current transformations that are taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a question is sometimes asked: “Is there really an effective reserve force structure in the Soviet military?” This study seeks to examine some of the areas that currently affect the Soviet military and its reserve system and then concludes by highlighting a few of the problems that the Soviets will encounter in the years to come.
As peace continues to break out all over Europe and force reductions rapidly follow, the need to change military thinking and paradigms becomes an imperative. To date, Soviet forces have been asked to leave Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. CFE talks should further reduce the number of U.S./Soviet forces facing each other over the East-West borders. Force projection will become an even bigger issue for the USSR when their troops are not forward deployed and a crisis develops internationally. The purpose of this paper is to show that even with restructuring and "new thinking," the Soviets have a very real and credible combat force projection capability. With their modernized military transports and large airborne forces, they have formidable potential to influence events far from their borders, a fact the West cannot ignore.

This report examines economic perestroika and the consequence of a successful Soviet economic transformation on U.S. security interests. This study is organized into three major sections: (1) the domestic criteria for the success of economic reforms in the Soviet Union, including an assessment of the major obstacles to success; (2) the international criteria for success, including an assessment of Gorbachev's national strategy, which has dramatically transformed the international system to create conditions necessary for the success of an economic revolution at home; and (3) the consequence of success in the short and long term. The authors conclude that in the short term, Soviet interests dictate the preservation of a cooperative, economically integrated international order that supports economic perestroika. These same interests could prevail over the long term, but two undesirable outcomes are also possible—a reconstituted technological base and assertive military or, at the other extreme, total failure and systemic collapse accompanied by accelerating violence and divisive tendencies within the USSR.

Soviet Military Thinking and Nuclear Weapons Issues.
This paper addresses the Soviet Union's changing outlook on nuclear weapons and the role they play. To assess these changes, this paper first surveys and analyzes the Soviet open-source literature dedicated to security issues, paying particular attention to the treatment of nuclear weapons
issues. The notions of changing military doctrine, strategic parity and stability, sufficiency, arms control, and the use of nuclear weapons are all addressed. The second half of the paper makes a speculative assessment of what today's changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union might mean for future thinking about nuclear weapons issues. Finally, the impact of future Soviet defense spending and the Soviet political leadership are examined as factors that will also influence Soviet security policy.

The USSR is the world's largest energy producer and ranks second in total energy consumption behind the United States. It has the largest oil reserves of any country outside the Middle East, leads the world in gas reserves, and contains enormous, albeit relatively low quality, coal resources. The USSR currently stands in third place after the United States and France in installed nuclear generating capacity, and only Canada and the United States produce more electricity than the USSR from hydropower plants. Natural gas is the leading source of energy for the domestic economy, followed closely by oil. Energy exports are the principal source of foreign exchange earnings for the USSR. The 1990s will be a difficult period for the Soviet energy industries. Oil production is declining, growth in gas output has slowed, coal production, in terms of energy content, has been stagnant for years, and the nuclear power program has been retarded by growing antinuclear sentiment. Moreover, the costs of energy development are rising rapidly.

Selected Readings in the History of Soviet Operational Art.
This study consists of a number of essays by Soviet sources regarding the history of Soviet operational art. Titles include: Strategy in an Academic Formulation; Formation and Development of the Theory of Operational Art (1918–1938); Tactics and Operational Art of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army at a New Stage; The Development of the Theory of Soviet Operational Art in the 1930s; Was Our Military Theory in the 1920s Turned to the Past?; Problems of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Works (1917–1940); Some Issues on the Development of the Theory of Strategy in the 1920s; On the Theory of Deep Operation; On the Issue of the Origin and Development of the Operation; On the Issue of the Origin and Development of Successive Offensive Operations (1921–1929); Deep Operation (Battle); and The Development of the Theory of Deep Offensive Battle in the Prewar Years.
Soviet Policy toward East Germany under Brezhnev and Gorbachev: Consistent Goals, Different Methods.
Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
This study chronicles significant events in Soviet-GDR relations under Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev. By comparing the Soviet motives and actions in these relations, the paper demonstrates that Soviet policy toward the GDR has consistently adhered to the following principle: although the GDR depended totally upon the USSR for its very survival, the GDR was merely a tool to be used to further Soviet national interests. The Soviets will manipulate the pending unification of Germany, this study felt, to maximize Soviet benefits. Under both Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Soviet security and economic interests led the Soviets to alternately support and then override stated East German policy. Both Soviet leaders facilitated the removal of SED leaders who placed their own policies before that of the Soviets. Finally, under both of the Soviet leaders, the GDR was allowed a period of relative independence of action, during which the GDR moved to satisfy its own desires, sometimes in ways contrary to Soviet policy.

Soviet Counterinsurgency.
The aim of this thesis is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in Soviet military thought and compares the Soviet counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan. The thesis concludes that a pattern of Soviet counterinsurgency evolved in spite of the absence of official doctrine but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan may inspire changes in the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency.

RECCE-Strike Complexes In Soviet Theory and Practice.
The principal objective of this paper is to explore both theoretical and practical aspects of possible Soviet recce-strike complexes. Note that despite the use of the term "complex" by the Soviets, a recce-strike complex is not a permanent system, but a collection of various subsystems assembled and directed to accomplish a specific task. Subsystems of a particular recce-strike complex can belong at the same time to another recce-strike complex. Thus, the best way to describe the Soviet concept of recce-strike is to describe and analyze the various subsystems or elements which comprise a recce-strike
complex. Therefore, the essentials of recce-strike complexes are analyzed, that is, reconnaissance, fire concept, and lastly, but perhaps most important, the C3 subsystems. The C3 subsystems are described and analyzed in some detail.

Soviet Front Special Purpose Troops: An Historical Perspective.
There is much interest in the U.S. Army over the composition and mission of Soviet special purpose troops at the front and army levels. This paper seeks to answer a part of that question by examining Soviet combat experience in World War II with front or army level special purpose troops. The Red Army in World War II employed front and army level special purpose troops extensively against the Germans in the west and on a more limited scale against the Japanese in the Far East. These Soviet special purpose troops were essentially of two types: engineer-based units subordinated to the front chief of engineer troops, and reconnaissance units subordinated to the front chief of intelligence. To provide a broad experience base for analysis, this paper looks at four case studies, two each from the engineer and intelligence category of special purpose troops, one in a defensive role and the other in an offensive role. The first case is that of the employment of intelligence special purpose troops during the defense of Moscow in the fall and winter of 1941. The second case studies the use of engineer special purpose troops, in conjunction with naval infantry, defending near Rostov-on-the-Don in the winter of 1941-42. The third case examines engineer special purpose troops supporting the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation in October 1944. The last case is a look at intelligence special purpose troops supporting the East Prussian offensive in January 1945.

Perestroika and Change In Soviet Weapons Acquisition.
Focusing on two major issues, the "conversion" of defense industry resources to civilian uses and the influence of contemporary weapons technology and complexity on the Soviet Union's ability to meet military requirements, this report identifies and explains the major elements of continuity and change in Soviet military organization, concepts, and goals since the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev and his "new political thinking." Soviet military research, development, and production evolved from the 1930s to the 1980s in a manner that was consistent with the political-military doctrine and economic base that supported it. Now, with the dramatic changes in Soviet political choices, doctrine, economics, and technology, the Soviet Union's defense
production complex is engaged in adapting to a conversion to civilian production as it tries to meet military demands for higher performance, increased reliability, lower costs, and the application of new technologies. Analysts must now shift from dealing with established and familiar elements to grappling with the uncertainties of evolving Soviet politics and policies.

The Validity of Soviet Military Power.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
This study provides a brief review of the role of the Department of Defense publication, Soviet Military Power, and a detailed analysis of Tom Gervasi's book, Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. Gervasi reprinted the entire text of Soviet Military Power with the inclusion of more than 700 annotations in the margins. In his book, Gervasi charged that the Defense Department lied and distorted the truth about the true nature and extent of Soviet military strength. A comparative analysis is made of Gervasi's statements with his own stated references and other reliable sources to demonstrate the validity of the information in Soviet Military Power. Gervasi makes three basic errors in analysis. First he incorrectly perceives that Soviet Military Power is attempting to prove an overall Soviet superiority over U.S. military strength. Second, the many numbers and facts in Soviet Military Power disputed by Gervasi can largely be corroborated by the very sources Gervasi endorses. Third, his accusations of deception in Soviet Military Power are often illogical or trivial. Additionally, he makes numerous comments that editorialize about related subjects but do not directly contradict information in Soviet Military Power. This study concludes with the recommendation that the Department of Defense continue to publish information for the general public regarding the threat to our security from Soviet or other sources. This study also encourages that books such as Gervasi's be adequately refuted.

Reel 11

1990 cont.

Soviet Interests in Afghanistan and Implications upon Withdrawal.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
This study discusses the geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan in the context of overall Soviet strategy in Southwest Asia. Considered a Soviet
"backyard" in the past, Afghanistan sprang to limelight in 1979 following the Soviet invasion. After nearly a decade of occupation, the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from Afghanistan in a bold and unexpected move. This action not only stunned but confounded the world with regards to the motive behind the withdrawal. Though, undoubtedly, the Soviet policy in Afghanistan had received a setback, it cannot be termed as fatal. Indeed, in the long run, the Soviets tended to gain rather than lose in Afghanistan and in the Southwest Asian region as a whole. The thesis, therefore, sought to determine the course of future Soviet strategy in Afghanistan in the wake of changed circumstances following the withdrawal. Additionally, the impact of the withdrawal on Pakistan and Iran, the two frontline states, is also examined. The study concludes that the Soviets have not abandoned their interests in Afghanistan but will, in the future, pursue the same goals and objectives through a more discreet, cost effective, and indirect approach. Soviet hostility towards Pakistan could assume dangerous proportions for the latter, while Soviet influence in Iran is expected to grow.


The texts of joint U.S.–USSR statements following the summit meeting in Washington, D.C., May 31–June 3, 1990 are reproduced. One is a joint statement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, missile and missile technology, and chemical weapons: another is a joint statement on the international thermonuclear experimental reactor: and the last is a joint statement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

0170 Selected Countries' Trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe: A Reference Aid.

This publication provides the most recent, detailed statistics on commodity trade with the Soviet Union and East European countries. The reference aid shows a reporting aggregate, selected countries (the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Columbia, Chile, and Egypt), and seven major countries therein that have reported the most recent data. The aggregate, historically, accounts for about two-thirds of world trade.
The agreed provisions of the START treaty are expected to place well-defined limits on the accountable warheads, missile launchers, and bombers that can be deployed by the superpowers. This paper discusses typical U.S. force structure options that would be permissible within the proposed treaty limits. It shows the likely effects on force totals of the complex counting rules permitted for penetrating bombers, and uses each side's total expected inventory of warheads as a basis for assessing the possibility and implications of a Soviet breakout. The results indicate that while a Soviet breakout with "nondeployed" missiles remains a present concern, that action may be counterproductive because such a move would not necessarily enhance their counterforce capability.

Surveys contend that Soviet views on the nature of future war are a major ingredient in the formulation of future Soviet military strategy.

This paper assesses the military, political, economic, and social bases and context for Soviet military strategy in the future.

In light of Soviet strategic priorities, this report assesses the likely strategic force posture of the Soviet Union, including force strength, force disposition, and mobilization capabilities.

Since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, aspiring players from outside the military have sought to influence the Soviet defense decision-making process. As a result, there has been a significant erosion of the monopoly held by the Defense Ministry and the General Staff in formulating Soviet military programs and policy. This report examines the changing structure and context of Soviet defense decision making, emphasizing the
growing role of civilians in shaping Soviet national security policy. If these defense intellectuals and other civilians succeed, it may or may not mean an end to the historic competition between the Soviet Union and the West. It will, however, guarantee that any relationship that eventually emerges will entail a more cosmopolitan Soviet adversary and a major alteration in the geopolitical challenge it represents.

0485  
*Perestroika: The End Game.*  
This report considers the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a part of a larger plan for fundamental restructuring (*perestroika*) of the Soviet Union and posits the view that there may be more to Gorbachev's statements that socialism is not dead than just rhetoric. The author explores not only the Marxist-Leninist foundation, or lack thereof, for Gorbachev's plan, but he also examines the published works associated with *perestroika* and analyzes the operational policy, or actions, of the Soviet Union searching for consistency among ideology, words, and deeds.

0545  
*Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s.*  
Soviet artillery planning for tactical defense is a comprehensive, logical process that employs Soviet artillery to its best advantage. The study provides a detailed view of current battalion and regimental fire planning and projects future artillery trends and developments. It concludes with a detailed example of Soviet artillery battalion troop-leading procedures.

0582  
*Gorbachev's Allocative Choices: Constraints, Dilemmas, and Policy Directions.*  
This report formulates estimates of competing resource claims facing the Soviet leadership and develops alternative combinations of allocations to these competing sectors. The aim is to highlight (1) the conflicting allocative choices and policy options confronting the Soviet leaders and (2) the severity of the resource constraints they face in approaching these choices. The report evaluates the implications of these choices with respect to reductions in Soviet military spending, arms control, foreign capital inflows, the production of consumer goods by the defense industry, subventions to the external Soviet empire, and prospects for fundamental economic reform.
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. September 1990. 98pp.*
The relationship between U.S. and USSR arms transfers to Third World nations and its effects on the maintenance of regime stability is examined in this study. The study uses the focused comparison approach to examine three U.S. cases (Vietnam 1960–1975, the Philippines 1950–1989, and El Salvador 1960–1989) and three USSR cases (Afghanistan 1950–1989, Vietnam 1976–1989, and Nicaragua 1979–1989). The U.S. and Soviet cases were chosen due to the intuitive similarities found in the supplier nation's involvement with the recipient Third World nation. The trend in the amounts of arms transfers was determined in each of the cases and compared to the resulting levels of internal threat, external threat, and the overall level of regime stability.

0724 Student Reports in Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy. 
Thirty-three synopses of major Soviet works on military strategy, doctrine, and the Soviet Navy are presented. Each entry was prepared by students enrolled in NS 3450, Soviet Military Strategy, at the Naval Postgraduate School in the winter of 1989. Each entry is in chronological order within sections dealing with doctrine and strategy, specialized military subjects, the Soviet Navy, and comparative works. Comparative works analyze similar short monographs, such as *Whence the Threat to Peace*, over its revision of four issues. Reports are useful in understanding how Soviet military/naval thought changed over the years.

Reel 12

1990 cont.

The report summarizes a conference sponsored by CIA's Office of Soviet Analyses on the problems of estimating Soviet GNP and presents the texts of the papers delivered at the conference. The papers have been lightly edited to standardize their formats. They include: alternative methods of valuing Soviet GNP; estimating the impact of foreign trade on Soviet GNP; on
improving the measurement of health and education services; Soviet residential housing in the GNP accounts; inflation in Soviet investment and capital stock data; and official Soviet GNP accounting.


The recent, radical movement toward democratization of the political system in the USSR has generated important changes in its legislative organs. This study examines the ongoing restructuring of these bodies, with particular emphasis on the Supreme Soviet and its evolving role in national security decision making. A totally new state body, the Congress of People's Deputies, also is analyzed as to its structure, tasks, and responsibilities. From its membership was elected the new Supreme Soviet, which is contrasted with the "old" Supreme Soviet; its history, organization, power, and responsibilities. The shifting sources of legislative power and the changing role of the new and strengthened legislative bodies are discussed.

0273 Changing Soviet Views of Nuclear Weapons.


The purpose of this report is to summarize current Soviet views about nuclear weapons, and to assess the implications of these views for U.S. policies and programs. The author focuses particularly on implications of interest to the nuclear laboratories. The task is complicated by the fact that Soviet views about nuclear weapons are not straightforward. There are certain benefits from glasnost in that there now is more open debate about a range of issues in the Soviet Union, including defense issues. Thus, we now have a great deal of published material to draw upon in assessing Soviet views, and experts in the West can talk much more freely to Soviet experts. However, this information explosion makes it more difficult to discriminate signal from noise, particularly as there continues to be both propaganda and deception in Soviet statements about defense issues. Clearly, some Soviet statements about nuclear weapons are designed to influence attitudes and actions in the West. The author cites some examples in this paper.
USSR Space Life Sciences Digest—Issue 28.


This issue contains abstracts of 60 journal papers or book chapters published in Russian and of one Soviet monograph. Selected abstracts are illustrated with figures and tables from the original. An article on the hatching of quail in space and one on psychological incompatibility are translated in full, and an international conference on High Altitude Medicine is reviewed. The materials in this issue have been identified as relevant to 20 areas of space biology and medicine. These areas are: adaptation, aviation medicine, botany, cardiovascular and respiratory systems, developmental biology, endocrinology, enzymology, equipment and instrumentation, hematology, human performance, immunology, life support systems, mathematical modeling, musculoskeletal system, neurophysiology, personnel selection, psychology, radiobiology, reproductive system, and space medicine.


The document is a compendium of reports on 1990 parliamentary elections held in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldavia, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. It covers political background, election laws, campaigning, balloting, results, and political implications for each state.

Glasnost and Secrecy in the Soviet Military.


Implementation of new arms control agreements with the USSR requires reduction of Soviet secrecy. Important steps toward greater openness have been made by the Soviets. These steps, however, might be reversed by political instability in the USSR.

Impact of Gorbachev’s Politics on Soviet Navy Missions.


Priorities of Soviet Navy missions are changing. The role of power projection is likely to decline. The mission of nuclear strikes against enemy territory continues to have top priority. Strategic ASW may be somewhat deemphasized. SLOC interdiction faces an uncertain future, and direct support of ground operations is becoming more important.
Reel 13

1991

0001 The Fate of Party Apparatus under Gorbachev.
This report examines the impact of the changes Gorbachev is seeking to make in the USSR on the correlation of forces within the Soviet elite and within Soviet society at large, plus resultant implications for U.S. security interests. The study should be of interest to policymakers and policy planners concerned with Soviet affairs.

0037 Final Resource Use for Consumption In the Soviet Union through 2000.
This note estimates the range of potential resource claims that may be exerted in the next decade for consumption in the Soviet Union. The study separates consumption into five sectors: health, housing, education, food supply, and non-food consumer goods and services. Because this work was completed sector by sector, some sectors contain more up-to-date histories and data than others. The note should be of interest to members of the U.S. defense and foreign policy communities concerned with evolving Soviet economic policy and reform.

0076 Emerging Civil-Military Relations: The Role of the Main Political Administration In the New Soviet Union.
Political tensions in the Soviet Union and the control of key centers of power have once again raised serious questions over the nature of political-military relations in the Soviet Union. One key to understanding this relationship is the role of the main political administration, which serves the Communist Party as its direct link to all Soviet military commands and units. Along with broad efforts to "depoliticize" the Soviet Union within the last years, the MPA has come under significant pressure on several fronts to modify its basic structure and role. This study identifies the nature of this internal and external pressure and discusses the impact on the MPA thus far.

The outlook for Soviet military intervention abroad this decade is analyzed in view of changing Soviet vital interests. These interests are increasingly domestic; foreign vital interests have shrunk to those which will foster Soviet economic survival and ensure continued diplomatic influence in the world. A poor economy, recognition of new means to effect international change, the Soviet nationalities crisis, force reductions, and legislative restrictions may make the use of military power less appealing to Soviet leaders in pursuit of foreign vital interests. This will likely cause the Soviet Union to break historic ties with "client" states, and show less willingness to defend them militarily. These fundamental changes in Soviet national security policy will likely remain even if President Mikhail Gorbachev is removed from office. The historic military rival of the United States will be less likely to risk any foreign confrontation during this decade, especially with the United States.

The Sino-Soviet Military Rapprochement.

This paper traces the development of the Sino-Soviet military rapprochement from its beginnings in December 1988 to the present. A brief survey of the turbulent relationship between the two countries is presented as background, followed by the strategic and economic rationale behind endeavors to normalize relations. Visits by senior officers, potential arms sales, troop reductions, and efforts to institute confidence building measures along the border are cited as evidence of growing military ties. The paper closes by highlighting implications for the United States and concludes that the military rapprochement will continue.

USSR Space Life Sciences Digest—Index to Issues 26–29.

This document provides an index to issues 26–29 of the USSR Space Life Sciences Digest. There are two sections. The first lists bibliographic citations and key words for abstracts published in these issues, grouped by topic area categories. The second provides a key word index for the same abstracts.
In August of 1990, the Soviet economy was in such bad shape that Mikhail Gorbachev sequestered his leading reform-minded economists to study and recommend a solution. Led by Stanislav Shatalin, these economists drafted the “500 Day Plan” detailing the necessary steps to transform the Soviet economy from being centrally planned to a market economy. Gorbachev initially endorsed this plan and the world-wide expectation and wonder was not whether the Soviet Union would transform to a market economy, but when and how fast such a transformation should or could take place. This study first presents what the author believes to be the key components of a successful transformation to a market economy. Next, the study examines the “500 Day Plan” or “Shatalin Plan” and compare and contrast it to the Council of Ministers’ alternative reform proposal known as the “Ryzhkov Plan,” recommended by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov. The study then explores Mikhail Gorbachev’s decisions as well as offer possible motives for those decisions. This study concludes with some predictions about the future of the Soviet economy.

This paper explores the sources of Soviet military opposition to Baltic independence, trying to show that military support for the continuation of central authority in the Baltic States is based, at least in part, on the fact that the Baltic independence drives are direct challenges to Soviet military institutional interests. The paper attempts to answer these questions: Why does the Soviet military view Baltic independence as strategically dangerous and unacceptable? Why does the military establishment view the separatist demands of the Baltic peoples as an attack on its prestige, its role in Soviet society, and even its very existence? and Which military perogatives and material interests are put at risk by the achievement of independence by the Baltic republics? Finally, this paper attempts to suggest how the Soviet military’s perceptions of its interest in the Baltics might affect the possibility of future independence for the Baltic states.

In 1991, separatist forces seeking independence became active across the USSR. In one of the most important regions, the Soviet Far East, such a trend is visible, although it has received scant attention compared to movements in the Baltic states, Moldavia, and other areas. The struggle for change in the Soviet Far East pits conservative forces, consisting of mid-level Communist Party personnel, senior military, and some members of the defense industrial and intelligence communities against virtually everyone else. The encroachments that this powerful coalition hopes to block include opening Vladivostok, the creation of FEZs with participation of foreigners, the conversion of the defense industry, and the emergence of non-Communist political figures and ideas (including a plan to create an independent Far Eastern Republic). This research memorandum examines recent trends in the region, political, military, and economic, and looks ahead to possible outcomes.


Mikhail Gorbachev’s March 17, 1991 referendum on maintaining the USSR as a renewed federation was the first in Soviet, or Russian, history. As the report makes clear, the referendum was not merely an exercise in public opinion polling or a guide to policymakers. It was intended to give Gorbachev a popular mandate for pressuring the newly elected legislatures of the Baltic States and Soviet republics seeking independence or greater sovereignty. In this light, the referendum amounted to an attempt to use democratic methods to undermine the results of democracy. The report contains the Helsinki Commission’s on-site observations, supplemented by subsequent published reportage about the referendum, as well as an analysis of the referendum’s implications. Perhaps the most striking thing about the referendum is how little notice the Soviet and international media now pay to an event depicted as historic. But the lack of attention also reflects the referendum’s minimal impact. The failure of the March referendum to deliver what its initiators sought was its greatest contribution to Soviet politics, since it helped produce the April Pact between Gorbachev and leaders of nine republics.
Soviet Logistics in the Afghanistan War.


On December 27, 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. What the Soviets envisioned as a short-term operation evolved into nine years of conflict. For the Soviets, the end came with their withdrawal in 1989. Their poor performance in this low-intensity conflict has received much attention recently, and offers much for study by military tacticians. However, the material available for study is not as prolific. This paper attempts to correct this shortcoming by condensing articles and books addressing Soviet logistics in the Afghanistan War into one document, and then presenting some conclusions about Soviet logistics doctrine and performance. The approach taken in this paper is to present the reader with the logistics infrastructure and environment that the Soviets faced in Afghanistan, moving then to the logistics doctrine of the Soviet Army, and contrasting this with how logistics actually worked during the course of the conflict. The paper ends with some conclusions about Soviet logistics in light of this experience. The logistics operations of supply, transportation, and maintenance are the cornerstones of this paper.

The Gorbachev Revolution: Will Its Economic Reforms Succeed?


This study is an assessment of Mikhail Gorbachev's domestic economic reform program—perestroika. He inherited an economically sick country when he assumed the post of General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985. In an effort to "jump-start" the Soviet economy, he has implemented comprehensive internal-domestic and external-foreign policy changes under the framework of perestroika and glasnost. However, because of the years of Soviet government centralization, hyperbureaucracy, and inflexibility, Gorbachev's reform programs have not met expectations. To what extent can Gorbachev's policies gain acceptance and succeed? What are the fundamental factors influencing his economic programs? To what degree might his reforms be reversible? The answers to these questions will shape the future of the Soviet Union and determine how the West formulates its foreign policy strategy in the future.
The Role of Women in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Most Sovietologists agree that the Soviet Union is in a state of confusion and transition. Today's predictions will most certainly change tomorrow. Differences in philosophy can be seen in viewing the role of women in Soviet society, and more specifically, the role of women in the Soviet military. There are those who believe that the role of women was a planned, ideologically based decision. However, there are others who believe that the role of women in the Soviet Union and Soviet military is totally a practical matter, directed by the exigencies of Soviet history. This paper discusses the role of women in the Soviet armed forces and projects this role into the future. The review is accomplished by first looking at women in the Soviet military from a historical perspective, followed by their role in Soviet society. These areas, coupled with the current involvement of women in the Soviet military, provide the basis from which to project the future role of women in the Soviet armed forces.

Restructuring Superpowers: The Role of the Military.

A critical part of the emerging new world order will in fact be the political, social, and economic structures and viabilities of the old superpowers: the Soviet Union and the U.S. Currently, it appears that the United States is perhaps handling its problems of restructuring better than its old cold war rival. While the Soviets are struggling to maintain some control over and positive relationships with the various parts of their declining empire, the U.S. seems to have gained some increased world prestige from its military successes in the Persian Gulf. The current U.S. well-being—precarious though it may be—owes much to the performance of U.S. armed forces in the recent Gulf War. This military performance itself offers dramatic evidence of the U.S. armed forces' successful rebuilding following the Vietnam War. The author believes that his Russian military counterparts currently face an extraordinary opportunity to restructure the Soviet military in such a way that their restructuring could significantly improve their national well-being and lead to global stability. In this sense, the Soviet military is perhaps the greatest hope for the realization of Gorbachev's dream of a new, reformed Russia.
This thesis examines some of the most important policies encompassed within Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." The author explores economic incentives and shifting Soviet views of international relations which led Gorbachev to introduce his groundbreaking reforms. Primary emphasis is given to an in-depth analysis of the "defensive doctrine" and how the issues surrounding that doctrine will impact upon the future U.S.—Soviet security relationship. Special topics include: increasing evidence of changes under way in the structure of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe; possible future Soviet force deployments inside the USSR, including the construction of "fortified regions"; and the evolving U.S.—Soviet relationship in the most important theater of relations between the two countries—Europe. It is the author's contention that the central driving force behind all of Gorbachev's reforms was, and remains, a resuscitation of the Soviet economy. The author concludes that ultimate Soviet objectives under "new thinking" will remain uncertain, and that the only prudent U.S. policy is to bargain in a vigorous but businesslike manner with Gorbachev to further reduce the Soviet threat, while retaining defenses sufficient to react to possible future Kremlin backtracking.

The certainties of the cold war world are fast eroding, and there is uncertainty regarding what structures will replace them. In the past, similar periods of profound changes have often produced instability and conflict. This reality impels us to understand more thoroughly the nature and scope of the changes we confront. The Soviet Union rests at the focal point of these global changes. Revolutionary currents have swept across the nation which have severely shaken its internal political structure. At present it is unclear whether revolution or renewed authoritarianism will result. What is clear is that the strategic posture of the Soviet Union has been irrevocably altered, and what will replace it in the future has yet to emerge. The United States will have to accommodate to these changes. How well it does so depends directly on how well it understands what is occurring in the Soviet Union and what the consequences of those profound changes will be. This study of future Soviet strategic options is a modest beginning in the process of understanding what is occurring, why, and what the implications may be.
SUBJECT INDEX

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