JAPAN AND AMERICA, c1930-1955: THE PACIFIC WAR AND THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Series Two: The O'Ryan Mission to Japan and Occupied China, 1940

Publisher’s Note

This small microfilm project brings together an important cluster of surviving papers collated by Professor Elizabeth Tsunoda, Professor Warren Hunsberger and Mrs Whitney relating to the O’Ryan Mission to Japan and Occupied China in 1940. It covers the Diary of Dr Samuel N Whitney; Correspondence and Papers of Dr Whitney, Professor Hunsberger, General O’Ryan and other members of the Economic and Trade Mission.

“The O’Ryan mission papers include a diary, draft reports, and notes on interviews with Japanese businessmen and government officials conducted by a team of Americans invited to survey conditions in Japan and Japanese-occupied areas of China during the summer of 1940. A private initiative organized by business interests on both sides of the Pacific, the mission sampled a wide spectrum of Japanese opinion at a critical juncture in American-Japanese relations. The papers offer a unique perspective on Japanese and American thinking as each country made the decisions that led inexorably to Pearl Harbor.”

Professor Elizabeth P Tsunoda
Department of History
Washington University in St Louis
and Consultant Editor

In 1940 General John F O’Ryan, backed up by two economists (Dr Simon Whitney and Professor Warren Hunsberger), and a Japanese-American interpreter (Hannah Syroboiarisky), travelled to Japan and Occupied China. Sponsored by the New York investment firm of Eastman Dillon and the Japan Economic Federation, the O’Ryan mission visited the main centres in Japan, Manchuria, North China and Central China, talking to both Japanese and non-Japanese business leaders and residents. This project contains a wealth of fascinating information collected on their trip, which Professor Hunsberger described as “one of the unsung moves in US-Japan relations after the 1940 denunciation of the trade treaty between the two nations”. Material includes:

- The Diary of Dr Simon N Whitney. (196pp. A4 typescript)
- Papers identifying persons met and selected guest and passenger lists relating to the O’Ryan mission
- Publicity concerning the mission
- General O’Ryan’s broadcast speech on Tokyo radio station JOAK, August 1940
- Statements from the Japan Economic Federation
- Materials from Frank S Booth, an American with long residence in Japan and an advisor for Nichiro Fisheries
- Additional notes on conversations and conferences, including hand-written material provided by Professor Warren S Hunsberger, in June 1983, from earlier notes
- Papers relating to China, especially Shanghai and Nanking
- Internal mission papers and memoranda on substantive matters
- Correspondence between Dr Whitney and General O’Ryan in March 1941 concerning General O’Ryan’s report to the Japan Economic Federation
- Mission schedules and itineraries
- Papers relating to Professor Hunsberger’s role
- Correspondence relating to Professor Hunsberger’s 1943 Pacific Affairs article on the O’Ryan mission
- Report of the economists Dr Whitney and Professor Hunsberger to General O’Ryan, dated 11 September 1940

The following is a brief extract from the Whitney Diary:

“Warren and I talked an hour with Alfred Massnet, 69 year old French consulting engineer, who came to Manchuria in 1931. He says Manchuria has vast resources (gold the best, able to produce twice what is coming out now, soda widespread, other metals, iron however very poor) and North China the richest undeveloped resources on earth (vast cheap and excellent coking coal, fine sites for hydroelectric
projects etc.) But he warns vehemently against investing in Manchuria, as the army will undoubtedly squeeze one out (as he was squeezed out of his gold mine in Chosen, although he admits at a good price, and apparently later out of Manchuria) and he thinks it a bad gamble in China, unless by chance they prove to have learned a lesson."

"I applaud your interest in the 1940 O’Ryan mission to Japan, and Japanese-occupied Manchuria, North China, and Central China."

**Warren S Hunsberger**
Professor Emeritus
School of International Service
American University, Washington DC

We are most grateful to the National Archives & Records Administration—and the Franklin D Roosevelt Presidential Library for allowing us to include the small amount of material in the National Archives and at the FDR Library at Hyde Park relating to the O’Ryan mission in this project.

We also wish to acknowledge the help and support of Professor Elizabeth Tsunoda, Professor Warren Hunsberger and Mrs Simon N Whitney in making this project possible.
The summer of 1940 was a critical time in American-Japanese relations. Hitler had overrun continental Europe and was preparing to invade England in the fall. Americans feared they would have to enter the war in Europe or abandon England to its fate, while Japanese military leaders viewed Hitler’s success as an opportunity to invade European colonies in Southeast Asia. By the summer’s end, Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and begun its southward advance. The United States had increased aid to Britain, instituted legal embargoes on exports to Japan, and stepped up planning for a two-ocean war. These decisions put the two countries on a course of collision with one another.

That summer, a group of Americans headed by General John F O’Ryan toured Asia at the invitation of the Japan Economic Federation [Nihon Keizai Renmeikai], a business lobby organized in 1921 to formulate recommendations on a wide variety of economic and foreign-policy issues. Members of the Federation included such elite businessmen as its president, Baron Gô Seinosuke, but also many lesser industrialists and financiers as well as academics, journalists, and an occasional government official acting as liaison between the Federation and the government. Sawada Setsuzô, chief architect of the O’Ryan mission, was a diplomat serving in that capacity at the request of his brother, a vice-minister in the Foreign Ministry. In the United States, the Federation worked through Nishiyama Tsutomu, who headed the Finance Ministry’s New York office and had personal contacts with American businessmen. One of these, Norbert A McKenna of Eastman Dillon Company, organized the mission on the American side. To lead it, he selected O’Ryan, the commander of a New York National Guard Division in World War I and, in 1940, a partner in the law firm Loucks, O’Ryan and Cullen. Two young economists, both recent Yale graduates, offered their services: Simon N Whitney was an advisor to Lionel D Edie and Company, a firm of investment counsellors; Warren S Hunsberger was a specialist on Japan’s economy then teaching at Princeton. While not formally a member of the mission, Mack Kleiman, a New Yorker with business interests in Japan, travelled with the group, contributing his expertise from time to time.

Chaperoned by members of the Japan Economic Federation, the visiting Americans toured Japan and Japanese-occupied areas of Asia, interviewing Japanese business and political leaders, as well as representatives of the foreign community in Asia. Their notes, including a diary kept by Simon Whitney, their reports, and materials prepared for them by their Japanese hosts form the core of this archive. Additional materials include American State Department memoranda relating to the mission in its planning stages and to the reports filed by members of the mission after their return to the United States. These materials afford a unique window on American and Japanese thinking during the summer of 1940, as each country made the decisions that, in retrospect, led to Pearl Harbor.

The O’Ryan mission materials are remarkable, in part, for their breadth. In Asia, the mission had access to such well-known figures as: Matsuoka Yōsuke, foreign minister and architect of the Tripartite Pact; Wang Ching-wel, the president of Japan’s puppet government in Nanking; Ayukawa Gisuke, founder of Nissan and, in 1940, president of the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Corporation, and Ishibashi Tanzan, editor of the Oriental Economic Journal [Tôyô Keizai Shinpô] and a prime minister during the 1950s. On the American side, the mission drew comment from President Franklin D Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Ambassador Joseph C Grew, and Maxwell Hamilton, director of the State Department’s Far Eastern Division. Still more revealing, however, are the views expressed to members of the mission by a wide variety of lesser personalities: businessmen, government officials, and foreign service officers, many of whom are not readily identifiable today.

Taken together, these materials suggest that the summer of 1940 was a turning point in both Japanese and American thinking. While individuals in both countries continued to hope some way might be found to avoid war, by the summer’s end, most were pessimistic. The O’Ryan mission found that their Japanese hosts all but universally supported their government’s expansionist policies in Asia and believed, mistakenly as it turned out, that the Japanese economy could support war in China for as long as necessary. They also sensed, however, that the United States would prove an implacable foe of Japanese expansion and that a clash was, therefore, highly likely. On their return to the United States in September, members of the mission found that a similar hardening had occurred in American thinking. Convinced that Japan was the Germany of Asia, State Department officials took the view that Japan would have to be challenged and defeated sooner or later. On both sides of the Pacific, General O’Ryan and his economists interviewed men who, by September, were prepared to put the matter simply: Japan and the United States were enemies.
Efforts to avoid war did not end, of course, in the fall of 1940, but the sense that war was well-nigh inevitable may have contributed to the failure of those efforts. In this respect, too, the records of the O’Ryan mission are revealing, for the mission was but one of a series of peace initiatives organized by private individuals or agencies with the knowledge, and at least the tacit consent, of high-ranking figures in the Japanese government. The winter of 1940-1941 brought two more such private initiatives, both involving Japanese participants who had also taken part in sponsoring the O’Ryan mission. The first was organized on the American side by the unofficial member of the mission, Mack Kleiman. That was shortly followed by the better known effort termed the “John Doe Associates”. As is clear in the memoranda included in this archive, the American State Department took a dim view of such affairs, declining to treat with private emissaries or to allow private citizens to negotiate on behalf of the United States. It may be that the United States missed some chances to avert war in its adamant refusal to deal with Japan through such channels. Clearly, an influential group of dissidents did exist in Japan in 1940, and it had the surreptitious support of elite government officials, perhaps even Prime Minister Konoe. Yet the impression remains that no real opportunity was lost. The mainstream of Japanese opinion emerges clearly from the records in this archive, all but overwhelming the dissenting views of the men who sponsored the mission. Indeed, General O’Ryan and his economists had the opportunity to confer with several members of Japan’s dissident group and to find a basis for accord if one existed. None of the three came home believing that one did.

Finally, the records of the O’Ryan mission are important because they underscore the economic aspect of relations between Japan and the United States. Organized by business interests in both countries, the mission’s participants were concerned about long-term trade and investment relations as well as the immediate foreign-policy crisis. Japanese businessmen urged the Americans to look beyond present tensions toward future profits. Simon Whitney records that one of Norbert McKenna’s purposes in organizing the mission on the American side was to put his firm, Eastman Dillon, in an advantageous position when Japan and other Asian interests wanted to borrow money. In fact, when Japan was reopened to American investment in 1947, the irrepressible Mack Kleiman was back in Tokyo promoting deals with Sawada Setsuzō and a high-ranking bureaucrat in the pre-war Finance Ministry whom Kleiman had introduced to the O’Ryan mission. In 1940, irreconcilable political differences interrupted such business activities, but only temporarily. Since World War II, mutually advantageous economic relations have been a cornerstone not only of American-Japanese relations, but also of international stability. The records in this archive call attention to this important, but often overlooked continuity in American and Japanese thinking about international relations.

In this respect, the views articulated by General O’Ryan, to the growing distress of his colleagues on the trip to Asia and State Department officials after their return, are especially interesting. A businessman, an opportunist, and a pragmatist, O’Ryan was quite prepared to sacrifice fine points of principle if that would win Japan to the American side in the struggle with Hitler. He urged his fellow Americans to abandon their moralistic attitudes, table the divisive political issues between the two countries, and make whatever “friendly gestures” were needed to draw Japan into a defensive alliance with the United States. That perspective made O’Ryan few friends in the summer of 1940. On his return to the United States that fall, he found himself regarded as a suspicious person: incompetent, hopelessly naive, and guilty of harboring pro-Japanese sentiments. Yet, O’Ryan had his counterparts in the business-oriented policy makers like William H Draper, Jr who, in the late 1940s, redirected the goals of the American occupation toward an American-Japanese alliance and toward Japan’s economic recovery at the apparent sacrifice of democratic social reform. After 1945, in short, the business perspective characteristic of men like O’Ryan, Norbert McKenna, and Mack Kleiman came into its own and, in the context of a reconstructed Japan, bore fruit.

Thus, the records relating to the O’Ryan mission have much to tell us. First, they shed new light on the tragic events of 1940 and 1941. Equally important, however, they also offer insight into the postwar relationship between the United States and Japan and the foundations on which it has been built.
Japan-America Student Conference, 1940: Recollections of Mrs Simon N. Whitney

The O’Ryan Mission and the 7th Japan-America Student Conference happened to coincide in the summer of 1940. I was to be a delegate to the student conference. To qualify for the conference I had written two papers on current political and economic conditions in the United States which I would read at one of the discussion groups. My major at Northwestern University had been in political science with an emphasis on Chinese and Japanese history and government. Most of my courses had been with Professor William M McGovern, an authority on the Far East. He had been a speaker at last year’s student conference held at the University of Southern California. In regard to increasing tension between Japan and America he had said, "The fault of ruthless bureaucrats of both countries is tremendous. It is most desirable to harmonize and recover the US-Japan friendship through personal friendship of citizens of both countries.”

Knowing civilian suffering during World War II it is difficult to remember the hope, and also innocence, of the thirties. Students like me from the Mid-West and California knew that Japan considered all embargoes, especially that of oil, a threat. Would it take advantage of the heightening European war to jump further into South East Asia, a major oil source? Was it too risky a time for Americans to be traveling to the Far East? I hoped the conference would be held even if I had to return early. My passport did have a “warning” that the neutrality act of November 4, 1939 declared it to be illegal for an American citizen to travel to an area declared by the President to be a combat zone. When my mother asked Professor McGovern about the safety of the trip, he replied, “The worst danger is matrimony!”

Tension between Japan and America had inspired the first student conference held in Tokyo in 1934. Four Japanese students anxious for peace and eager for American friends had come to the University of Washington, in Seattle, to ask if anyone would like to travel to Japan in the summer for a joint student conference. They would exchange political, economic, and cultural views and then visit Korea and Manchukuo (as Japan’s puppet state was then called).

It took courage to invite the Americans. When they accepted wholeheartedly, the Japanese students returned to Tokyo torn between success and panic. How would they raise the money and make the arrangements? It had been agreed that the Americans would pay their steamer passage, but they were to be guests in Tokyo and while travelling. The Japanese students appealed to the English Speaking Societies of Tokyo universities. These societies joined together to become the Japan English Association. They raised all the money from educational institutions, civic organizations, and corporations. Some of it came as hospitality at colleges, Rotary luncheons, and even theatre tickets. No government funds were accepted. They were able to entertain ninety-nine Americans at the First Japan-America Student Conference that summer (only fifty had been expected). The opening events were attended by the ministers of foreign affairs and of education. They were endorsed by Ietatsu Tokugawa, descendant of Shoguns, and United States Ambassador Joseph Grew.

The American delegates to the Seventh Conference boarded the Asama Maru in San Francisco on June 20th. I felt as if I had already arrived in Japan! I was assigned to a cabin which seemed impossibly small for six American sized college women. We learned Japanese ways in a hurry. The stewardess first bowed and then gestured to us to leave our shoes outside in the corridor. Cotton slippers were handy. Then she skillfully stowed our unreasonably bulky and heavy luggage. She was efficient and embarrassingly polite. Such politeness made us uncomfortable. We knew it was a Japanese characteristic which would follow us all the way back to San Francisco. I think it must have covered up their true feelings at times. When we were settled, the steward came to make bath appointments. At the set time he would escort us down the corridor to the bathing room where the tub was already full of simmering water.

The second class lounge turned out to be crowded with families. They greeted us with bows and smiles. We tried to join their games and listen to their music whose timbre and intervals were strange to us. Then we went to the top deck. Nine times around was a mile. On the fourth of July we were touched by the efforts made to help us celebrate with American flags and Sousa music.

On July 8th we arrived in Yokohama. We were surprised that the Japanese student delegates who met us wore military style black jackets with high collars and dark trousers. They took us by elevated train and bus to Tsuda College near Tokyo. In my diary I describe the houses as being “almost on top of each other and almost on top of the railroad tracks. They and the people look very dirty.” I’m reminded of the elevated train circling my hometown. A man’s costume interested me. He was wearing a long kimono, clogs, a straw hat, and carried a western style umbrella. Finally we arrived at Tsuda College where the
Japanese women delegates welcomed us. We were surprised that none of them had come to Yokohama to meet us. They were shy but not unfriendly. They were at a disadvantage in the discussion groups because their English was not as good as their male colleagues'. Embarrassingly enough, our Japanese was limited to "Sayonara". For shopping purposes I did learn to count to ten which I still remember.

The next ten days were filled with the serious discussion groups and sightseeing. We were taken to the wall surrounding the Imperial Palace where we were expected to bow to Emperor Hirohito. We inspected schools. A Japanese family invited us to a tea ceremony in their rock garden planted with stunted pine trees. We toured the Shinto Shrine dedicated to the Emperor Meiji, grandfather of Emperor Hirohito. Shinto shrines feature various kinds of wood finely carved. We saw two little girls who were asking people to sew knots in a piece of material. When they had one thousand knots they would give it to a soldier for his protection. On these trips, during informal times at the college, and shopping in Tokyo, our Japanese colleagues were friendly and helpful. They even showed their sense of humor and I grew to like them.

The formal discussion groups were very different. I wasn't aware at the time that the Japanese delegates assumed there were plain clothes military police seated among them. Now I try to guess how uncomfortable the students must have felt. Kiichi Miyazawa, a future prime minister, had been a delegate to the 1939 conference in the US. At that time he had said, "The United States participants had their own opinions, made intense discussions and even criticized their own government. I thought it was an astonishing country."4

I later learned that as the time for the 1940 conference approached, the Japanese government pressed financial aid and other support on the students. The students had refused fearing that interference. The day the conference began military police came to Tsuda College demanding entrance. The student chairman, Yuji Yamuro, had the courage to turn them away. Nonetheless, the Japanese delegates defended their government and did their best to explain fighting in China and occupation of Manchuria. I wondered if they believed that their country was bringing prosperity, even peace and education, to backward peoples! We were depressed by their unwillingness to consider the "facts" we had to contribute.

On July 19th, all the delegates started on our trip through the rest of Japan, Korea, and Manchukuo. After the frustrating discussion groups this was a welcome change. We relaxed and I hoped the planted "students" were no longer with us.

When we reached the city of Kobe most of the Americans were invited to stay in Japanese homes. During the spring friendly families had volunteered to make this contribution to the conference. This may have been one of the earliest examples of bi-national family exchange. Two friends and I went to the home of Mr and Mrs Yabe. According to my diary, our hostess was petite and charming. She wore colorful kimonos and spoke English. Her house was surrounded by a precisely sculptured garden. The living room and the dining room were European but the rest of the house was Japanese. When we arrived she served citron (lemonade, I suppose) and sweet cakes. After Mr Yabe came home, a traditional Japanese tea was served. This tea is dark green and has a very thick consistency. Then it was time to dress for dinner. Mrs Yabe gave us kimonos and slippers and showed us the very large, deep, hot, wooden bath. In the evening we saw Mrs Yabe's collection of dolls who had stylish wigs and brilliant orange-red, plum and gold kimonos. Finally, a neighbor girl came to dance for us. When I lay down on the floor mat for the night, I felt as if I had experienced Japan completely. The warmth and hospitality of Mr and Mrs Yabe were touching.

After this visit we continued travelling through Japan to Shimoseki where we took an overnight steamer to Korea. What a contrast to Japan! Many people lived in mud and stone huts with thatched roofs. We saw a mutilated beggar and naked children. Was this an example of Japan's co-prosperity sphere? In Seoul, which looked more prosperous than the countryside, many of the people wore traditional costumes, maintaining their identity, in contrast to their Japanese occupiers most of whom wore western clothes.

We took the overnight train to Mukden, Manchukuo. Three of us slept on straw seats pulled together copying our Japanese friends. The most famous sight on the way to Mukden is the huge Fushun open pit coal mine. The size of the pit was impressive but I, and other Americans, were appalled by the sight of the emaciated Chinese coolies who staggered up the pit sides harnessed to small carts of coal. They lived and died in paper hovels around the rim of the mine.

When we reached Mukden we saw our first Russians. They were intermediaries between the Chinese workers and the Japanese administrators. We all enjoyed their sweet shops and purchased some of their "antiques". We rode in rickshaws and buggies. In the evening we were invited to a formal Chinese dinner. The birds' nests and sharks' fins had a sweetish, chewy taste, but my diary says, "I couldn't, or wouldn't, eat sea slugs for anything!"
We travelled as far north as the old White Russian city of Harbin. Here I went with a friend to tea at a private home. Our hosts spoke some English and welcomed us enthusiastically. They served a traditional Russian tea which we enjoyed but, of course, worried that they had given us months of their sugar and flour.

From Harbin we turned back to Japan and Yokohama. It was time to leave the Japanese delegates. I still remember some of them as friends, but by mid-August 1940, I felt anxious about the complete military take over of their government. Yushin Yamamuro, the student who was to plan the 1941 trip to the United States called on Ambassador Grew. He was told that there would be no US visas for students the next summer. But the Seventh was not the last student conference. The idea that cultural understanding and close association would lead to lasting and influential friendships was taken up again in 1964 and in 1994 the sixtieth anniversary of the First Japan-American Student Conference was celebrated.

When we boarded the Asama Maru for the return trip we met the members of the O’Ryan Mission. Simon Whitney interviewed many of us. He reported in his diary that the American students were anti-Japanese. They were less impressed by Korea and Manchukuo’s industrial development than by their abject poverty and cultural deprivation.

Adding a personal note, a year later Simon Whitney and I were married. We moved to Washington, D C where he worked for the Board of Economic Warfare. On Sunday, December 7th we saw smoke rising from the chimneys of the Japanese Embassy as they burned their papers.

1 Saburo Shiroyama, tr. Akiki T Clayton, “Friendship Has Its Power” at page 9 (Kodan-sha K K, Tokyo, 1988), referenced as “Friendship has its Power”
2 Ibid at page 21
4 “Friendship Has Its Power” at page 3
5 Ibid at page 23
6 S N Whitney, “Diary of a Far Eastern Trip”
7 The Japan-America Student Conference: Celebrating Sixty Years, Foreward
The stated purpose of General O’Ryan’s mission to Japan and certain Japan-occupied regions on the Asian continent was to evaluate the prospects for American capital there. Norbert McKenna of Eastman Dillon Company in New York, who arranged my participation, seems in retrospect to have expected that the Axis powers would control Europe, and Japan would control much of Asia; Japan’s need for capital consequently made some American role in Japan’s Asia potentially reasonable from American as well as Japanese viewpoints.

My inclusion in the membership of the mission came after the others had been selected. When I learned of the plans, I was eager for such an experience, having started study of Japan’s economy without visiting that country. I was attached to the group as junior economist. Even such limited study of Japan’s economy as mine was rare in the 1930s. I received no stipend, although I understood that General O’Ryan and the two others were to receive fees.

As the group’s Asia visit progressed, the prospects for American capital in Asian areas under Japanese control, never bright, seemed to us ever less realistic. Soon the question Dr Whitney and I found crowding out others was the real motives, hopes, and expectations of those who arranged the elaborate and costly hospitality that was being showered on General O’Ryan, most of which we and Mrs Syroboyarsky shared. Could the Japanese possibly think we might believe their preposterous explanations? Might their thought be that lavish entertainment would buy our judgement? The mystery only grew. At the end I felt wholly unsure why the mission had been arranged and what the different Japanese actors involved might have thought at different stages of our trip.

So now, in 1997, after all these years, after all that has happened to throw light on the pre-Pearl Harbor period and to change Japan, the United States and the world, here is a retrospective speculation. In expressing these thoughts I reflect experience and study, but what I know of pre-Pearl Harbor Japan is still not so complete as to cover all Japanese views, especially those not widely expressed.

There may well have been Japanese who early on seriously thought that some deals might be made to attract American capital, especially in the form of loans rather than equity investments. What we learned about the squeezing out of non-Japanese firms would not reduce the ability of a Japanese debtor to service its debt in local currency, although the ability of the various Japan-sponsored regimes to transfer dollars would have had to be judged for any particular regime, as would other aspects of any deal, including the possibility of simply stopping payments.

Japan’s military surge was gaining momentum, and any arrangements for American capital would have had to assume strong Japanese control. France fell to Hitler’s armies while the O’Ryan Mission was stopping in Hawaii on the way to Asia. The Battle of Britain, which checked German bombers and prevented any attempted invasion of Britain from the sea, was joined when the mission returned to New York in August. Japan was about to sign the Axis Pact with Germany and Italy. Serious business or other concessions to the United States by Japan were not in prospect.

My present estimate is that if any prospects for even a single deal ever existed they disappeared early in July 1940 when the relatively moderate Yonai cabinet gave way to the second Konoye cabinet, with Matsuoka Yosuke as foreign minister. In the interview he gave Whitney and me that day before becoming foreign minister, Matsuoka made clear his uncompromising attitude that Japan would keep control in Asia; Americans and other non-Japanese would participate only at Japanese sufferance.

So why then did the Japan Economic Federation go through with the rest of the mission’s program, as though serious business negotiations might really be even remotely possible? I see two answers. First, complicated arrangements such as those for hosting our mission are even more difficult for Japanese than for Americans to change in mid-course. Second, some of the Japanese involved may have had a broader agenda than what they stated formally. I knew during the mission that Ayusawa was a Quaker and that he would go far to follow any path that might keep the peace. It was only decades later that I learned from Sawada’s son that the leader on the Japanese side, Sawada, also was a Quaker. Perhaps
we were participating in a long-shot effort to avoid war, especially by way of the message the Japanese wanted General O'Ryan to send to President Roosevelt after returning to the United States.

I cannot now say what, if anything, might have prevented Japan-United States war. We know of many efforts to head it off. Perhaps the O'Ryan Mission was such an effort. The American Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C Grew, believed that if Japan’s prime minister could just meet with President Roosevelt, war might be averted. My own judgement is that no Japanese political leader who attempted to change the essential course of Japanese aggression after the Mukden Incident of September 1931 would have long survived Japan’s military assassins.

For me personally and professionally the mission was a very rewarding experience - a first trip to Japan and some of its occupied areas that included economics, finance, industry, politics, international relations, sightseeing, theatre, geisha parties - and some lasting friendships and other contacts. This experience must have influenced US Naval assignment officers in their choices for me during the Pacific War of duty, mainly at headquarters, relating to economics and to Japan, rather than sea duty for which my training and experience in both the Navy and merchant marine had prepared me.

Sadly, in December 1997, shortly before the publication of The O’Ryan Mission to Japan and Occupied China, 1940, Professor Warren Hunsberger died at his home town of Washington D C.

We are very grateful for the help and support of Professor Hunsberger in compiling this collection of material and for the preface Some 1997 Reflections on General John F O’Ryan’s 1940 Economic Mission to Japan and Japanese-Occupied Manchuria, North China and Central China written by the professor only a few weeks before his death.
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THE PACIFIC WAR AND THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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Materials prepared for the mission by the Japan Economic Federation

Professor Hunsberger’s pencil notes

REEL TWO

Text of a radio broadcast speech by General O’Ryan on 15 August, 1940

Professor Hunsberger’s CV and miscellaneous letters concerning the O’Ryan Mission written by Professor Hunsberger

Article entitled ‘The Coming War with Japan’ written by Professor Hunsberger in the autumn of 1940 and submitted to, but rejected by a number of magazines - includes the rejection letters and covering letters

Comments of Dr Whitney and General O’Ryan re: the material listed above

Materials relating to the Joint Committee of Thirty - an American Club in Shanghai that entertained the mission while it was in China, including a newspaper article (source not indicated) to which Whitney makes reference in the Diary.

Press releases and newspaper clippings collected while the group was in Asia

Materials prepared and given to Professor Hunsberger by Frank S Booth, an American the group met in Asia. Includes an article written by Booth in Japanese and clearly published in Japan, but with no indication to where it was published.

Miscellaneous agendas, timetables, etc

Lists of personnel, guests, interviewees, etc. Also business cards identifying some of the Japanese interviewed.

Materials prepared for General O’Ryan by Professor Hunsberger. O’Ryan Mission 1940.

Miscellaneous materials collected by Professor Hunsberger

Photographs collected by Mrs Whitney

Published Materials


National Archives and Records Administration

State Department Documents

RG59 Documents relating to the O’Ryan Mission (photocopies)

Documents relating to the formation of the mission FW 711.94/1529

The Department’s reactions to General O’Ryan’s letter of 13 July sent from Japan to President Roosevelt FW 711.94/2101

Report to the American Consul General in Shanghai concerning the O’Ryan Mission visit to that city FW 711.94/1664

Excerpts from General O’Ryan’s letter of December 1940 to Baron Goh of the Japan Economic Federation and the Department’s reaction to it. FW 711.94/1769

Materials relating to proposals made to the Department by Mack Kleiman FW 711.894.00/998, 894.00/977
General O’Ryan’s letter of July 13 sent from Japan to President Roosevelt FW711.94/1670

National Archives - War Department Documents RG59 G-2/2515-H-125 (photocopies)

Memoranda of Brigadier General Sherman Miles on conversations with General O’Ryan in September 1940.

Documents relating to the Kleiman negotiations listed in the last item above.
Franklin D Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York

Relevant documents from PPF 1948 and PSF Box 59 (photocopies)

Correspondence concerning the mission between General O’Ryan and President Roosevelt and comments on same by Cordell Hull - this includes a typewritten copy of General O’Ryan’s letter of 13 July listed in item two of the State Department documents.
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