A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

World War II Research Collections

Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II

Part 3.
Organization and Administration

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA
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Part 3. Organization and Administration

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INTRODUCTION

Soon after declassification of selected communications intelligence material from World War II was undertaken by the National Security Agency in the late 1970s, many valuable documents were made available to researchers in the National Archives. An early scholar of this material, the late Ronald Lewin, said to the press in Washington, D.C., in 1981, "If I were writing a Ph.D. [dissertation], I'd rush over to Archives this minute." Since then much more material has been declassified; some of the Top Secret Studies in this collection of microfilm were declassified only in the late 1980s.

SRH Case Studies

Special Research Histories (SRHs), a series of studies, monographs, and reports principally concerning cryptographic operations in World War II, were compiled mostly from highly classified contemporary files by wartime participants. Each SRH addresses a specific topic. For example, SRH-090, compiled only in six copies in late August 1945 and classified Top Secret ULTRA, focuses on "Japan's Surrender Maneuvers" (45 pages); SRH-111 is titled "MAGIC Reports for the Attention of the President, 1943–1945" (32 pages); and SRH-142 is a 1980 U.S. Army War College Military Studies Program Paper on "ULTRA and the Campaigns against the U-boats in World War II" (38 pages).

The SRHs were designed as case studies originally for the purpose of promoting understanding within various government agencies of wartime intelligence operations. They sometimes include subtle suggestions and point to possible ways taken by subsequent American intelligence work pertaining first to Soviet-bloc countries in the immediate aftermath of World War II and later to several Third World countries. American success in breaking Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers during the war, for example, yielded unique information that afforded access to the inner chambers of every government with accredited Japanese diplomatic representatives, notably Berlin and Moscow. The insights acquired by communications intelligence were invaluable to victory in 1945, but their legacy extended well into the cold war. Thus, this collection of SRHs, a remarkable product of the most sophisticated intelligence operation before 1945, is a major contribution to the literature of World War II with broader implications beyond 1945.

In the long history of warfare never had so much information about the warring plans and capacity of the enemy been available to the ultimate victor during the conflict as the Anglo-American powers had about the Axis coalition in World War II. Allied traditional intelligence operations—commando forays, the work of resistance groups in enemy-occupied territory, spying activities by secret agents, and aerial reconnaissance, for example—were often remarkably sophisticated and successful during the war. Nevertheless, the crème de la crème of clandestine operations and achievements was in the field of signal communications—the solving of codes and ciphers (cryptography) and thereby "reading the enemy's mail." Never has an adversary had the opportunity to peruse so systematically and thoroughly the most secret communications of an enemy, sometimes before the rival addressee received the message.
Background

The inception of U.S. government cryptographic and cryptanalytic work came in the summer of 1917, and significant work continued after World War I, in spite of budget restrictions and changing political administrations. The U.S. Navy emphasized the training of serving intelligence officers while the U.S. Army relied more heavily on civilian personnel for the difficult and expensive work of cryptography. Cooperation between the two services was intermittent and often difficult, but with signs of the coming of another war in which the United States would possibly be a belligerent, collaboration in communications intelligence overcame, if only partially, many of the suspicions and jealousies between the services. For example, in 1940 and 1941 the army’s Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the navy’s counterpart (OP-20-G) had a special agreement for work on Japanese diplomatic traffic. The army processed all messages of even date and the navy all of odd date, with full exchange of technical data and results. Several months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, the navy became so taxied by the demands for additional study of various Japanese navy cryptographic systems that it relinquished (in agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the army) its involvement with “Purple,” the American name for what the Japanese called “Cipher Machine, Type B.” In personal communication to this author, key wartime cryptanalyst Frank B. Rowlett, who later received U.S. congressional and presidential as well as British awards and declarations for his work, noted that the army felt that the intelligence from the Japanese diplomatic messages, particularly those exchanged between Tokyo and Berlin, Rome, and Moscow, would be of vital importance in the prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the decision was made by the Army to expand its effort on the Japanese diplomatic messages, to insure that all Japanese diplomatic intercepts could be promptly processed and the resulting information provided to U.S. intelligence agencies. This arrangement continued until the Japanese surrendered.

Purple and MAGIC

The army’s SIS broke into Purple, by far the most difficult of Japanese cryptographic systems. Introduced in 1938, Purple remained largely secure until late 1940 when SIS head cryptanalyst William F. Friedman and Rowlett, who worked primarily on the Japanese diplomatic intercepts as one of the earliest members of the SIS staff, were largely responsible for the solution. In the 1930s Friedman often referred to his dedicated staff of cryptanalysts as “magicians,” and it was probably his use of this appellation that later gave rise to the cover name MAGIC. The term MAGIC was used by Americans to denote intelligence obtained from breaking the Japanese high-grade wireless enciphered diplomatic messages. It also came to be a cover name for all intelligence produced by the solution of foreign codes and ciphers. This broader definition is reflected in the change of the name of the chief daily summaries, made from vast numbers of intercepts, from “MAGIC” SUMMARY before July 1944 to “MAGIC”—DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY thereafter. Distinct nomenclature was not always adhered to during the war, however, especially after 1943 when American intelligence specialists were systematically given access to ULTRA, the name the British gave to information obtained from breaking German wireless traffic enciphered on the Enigma machine. In time, the term Japanese ULTRA was commonly used by Americans for information obtained from reading Japanese navy, army, and air systems.

The number of intercepted enemy cipher messages increased dramatically during the war. The enormous flood can be estimated by citing the number of messages in Purple sent personally by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo (excluding many more—some in Purple, some using other cipher systems—sent by the embassy’s attachés and secretaries). In 1941 there were approximately 75 messages, 100 in 1942, 400 in 1943, 600 in 1944, and 300 during the first five months of 1945. Message length varied from the equivalent of one to thirty pages of typed, single-spaced text. Additionally, there were Tokyo’s responses. Moreover, there were hundreds of
thousands of other enemy messages, often containing detailed operational and tactical information, and employing many different cipher systems. U.S. government cryptographic operations struggled to keep pace, but some intercepts were not deciphered and translated until months, sometimes even years, later.

Security

The enormous volume of enemy intercepts increased the risk of leaks. There was great concern at the highest levels of the U.S. wartime government for the safeguarding of the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets. Nevertheless, the British sometimes felt that American security was not stringent enough. Thus, the two Allied governments were unable to "agree to exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by...the Axis powers" until the agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British Government Code and Cipher School (GC & CS) was concluded on 17 May 1943. The problem was how to edit special intelligence and then distribute it speedily to strategic managers of the war.

The War Department was primarily responsible for handling and disseminating special cipher intelligence directly to the president and to the heads of certain other executive departments. Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) compiled daily summaries in which the most important information was gleaned from each day's batch of messages, thus producing finished intelligence from raw information. This was the process of separating the wheat from the chaff, claimed U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as he sought to make the essential information readily available to those, mainly in Washington, D.C., who needed to know. At the same time, however, he sought not to overwhelm them with the tremendous mass of daily intercepts. Marshall himself usually saw only the summaries, although occasionally when pursuing special points he would have SIS send him the originals of particular intercepted messages. The summaries were not intended to offer editorial comment beyond the minimum necessary to identify a person, place, or situation with an appropriate backdrop or reference.

Summaries

Creating the summaries was an involved process. Special Branch was in effect divided into sections concerned with either order of battle or diplomatic and related matters. There were several area desks in each section. Deciphered and translated messages from SIS, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, were screened initially as they arrived in the Pentagon. They were then channeled to the appropriate area desk. A former intelligence officer assigned to the desk concerned with Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and certain East Asian countries, Willis L. M. Reese, wrote recently to this author that each message was accompanied by a notation: either 'write' or 'note.' Messages marked 'note' were read by the desk officer and then were placed in a file. Being aware of the content of these messages was extremely important because frequently the messages could only be understood in the light of previous messages. Messages marked 'write' were written up by the desk officer and then presented to the editors [of the summaries]. The writing could involve a good bit of work because obviously the messages translated in Arlington Hall would not be in the King's English and might well be ununderstandable. Also, of course, there was a problem of what part of the message could properly be omitted. The object was to write a passage that could be quickly read and also would be understandable.

Thus, such a digest was correlated with background information, earlier evaluations, and conclusions that intelligence specialists arrived at through systematic and coordinated study of vast quantities of intercepts.

By 1943 summaries were frequently taken to the White House (although Franklin D. Roosevelt was often given special cipher intelligence earlier on Marshall's initiative) and there handed directly to the president's naval aide. They were soon picked up by an MIS courier and destroyed after Roosevelt had a chance to review them. By the beginning of 1944, Marshall had summaries bound daily in a "Black Book" for convenience of reading and for greater security in handling. Sometimes two or three
Black Books were produced daily by Special Branch, MIS. They always received careful attention by
members of the executive branch of the government, and were included, not surprisingly, in
Marshall's daily morning meetings with his staff. There is no clear evidence that members of the other
two branches of government knew in any appreciable detail about the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets
during the war. Nevertheless, Marshall, on his private initiative, had Governor Thomas E. Dewey
informed about MAGIC during the presidential campaign in September 1944. Marshall, however,
feared revelation of the secret in campaign speeches and political debates. If that happened, it was
likely that the Japanese would change their diplomatic code, still in use at the time, thus denying the
Allies vital information that Marshall regarded as indispensable to the continued successful conduct
of the war. Dewey agreed magnanimously that MAGIC should be kept out of the political campaign.

Knowledge of the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets was restricted to a very limited circle early in the war,
and the extreme security measures required for handling these secrets necessarily kept many theater
and field commanders in the dark at the outset about special cipher intelligence. General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, for example, did not learn about ULTRA until late June 1942, when Winston Churchill,
very privately and with much personal delight (for the prime minister was a devotee of cipher
intelligence and its enormous importance) informed the newly appointed U.S. Army commander of
the European theater of operations. Getting the secrets into the hands of appropriate field command-
ners obviously increased the risk of compromise.

**Dissemination Arrangements**

The need for dissemination of special cipher intelligence to U.S. Army field commands did not
become acute until 1943. In March, SIS made its first entry into the mainline Japanese military
systems. Earlier, however, the U.S. Navy had a direct cipher channel to Pearl Harbor, with an
extension to the commander, Seventh Fleet in Brisbane. Also, General Douglas MacArthur had his
own cryptanalytic organization in Australia, which had special channels of communication to Arlington
Hall Station and to GC & CS at Bletchley Park outside of London. Throughout the North African
campaign, German military ULTRA, produced by Bletchley Park (not by Arlington Hall), was
disseminated by British Special Liaison Units (SLUs) to key American officers in accord with British
security practices. American intelligence officers in Washington did not receive this service until 1943.

The 1943 Anglo-American agreement on special intelligence stipulated that both governments
would disseminate MAGIC and ULTRA secrets to their own operational commands. Thus, in the
summer of 1943 the American Special Security Officer (SSO) system, patterned after the British SLU
organization of 1940, was devised for the dissemination of communications intelligence to the
commanders at the battle fronts.

SSOs—under the operational command of the assistant chief of staff, Intelligence (G-2) in
Washington, D.C.—were carefully recruited. The first group of twenty officers began training in July
and was sent overseas and attached to theater headquarters in September 1943. Each SSO carried
his own set of cryptographic equipment for enciphering and deciphering. A special pouch service was
instituted, and materials such as the MAGIC summaries were always sent in a Top Secret pouch. Both
radio cipher and pouch communications were sent directly and only to the SSO. The SSO did actual
deciphering himself and personally showed the messages to the theater commander and certain staff
officers who were authorized and designated in Washington, D.C., for receipt of special intelligence.
Security regulations did not permit theater commands to keep SSO messages; rather, the SSO was
responsible for custody until the messages were destroyed. Although the SSO system was not
perhaps as masterful as the more highly centralized British SLU organization, the system proved safe
and generally quite effective. (In particular, SSOs often found work with MacArthur's Southwest
Pacific command extremely difficult, but Washington sometimes found it hard to influence MacArthur
in other areas as well.) Much special cipher intelligence would have had little value were it not passed
on safely to commanders who used it in action.

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For the U.S. Navy fleets at sea, the SSO system was hardly practical; however, the navy collaborated with the British a year before the U.S. Army did. Secure communication channels were most often used to transmit operational intelligence directly to the fighting ships, especially from the field processing units at Pearl Harbor and Melbourne. The flow of naval cipher intelligence from these units was coordinated in Washington, D.C. By 1945 naval cipher intelligence centers at Washington and Pearl Harbor were transmitting up to a million words daily.

**Special Intelligence Significance**

The SRHs in this collection effectively abstract and help to focus on the important contributions of MAGIC and ULTRA secrets to the eventual Allied victory. Special intelligence was crucial to Anglo-American success in North Africa, to the defeat of German U-boats in the Atlantic, and to the elimination, particularly by U.S. submarines, of the Japanese merchant fleet in the Pacific. It doomed Axis blockade-running operations between Japan and Europe. It was valuable in the planning of strategic bombing operations and served as a barometer for measuring the effectiveness of strategic bombing, particularly in Europe. It revealed much information about V-2 rocket sites in Germany and German-occupied territory. MAGIC and ULTRA messages frequently addressed economic conditions inside Axis countries, and MAGIC frequently provided Anglo-American strategists with specific exhibits of conditions on the crucial German-Soviet front. Much of the importance of special intelligence also lay in revealing the whole picture of “the other side of the hill.” MAGIC, in particular, often disclosed the state of mind and the attitudes of Axis leadership, some of which was already partially reconstructed from the whole gamut of more traditional intelligence sources. But cipher intelligence tended to provide up-to-date information. For example, on the eve of the landings at Normandy, by far the largest and most complex amphibious operation ever undertaken, one question continued to haunt Eisenhower and his lieutenants: How would Adolph Hitler’s forces react to the invasion? MAGIC revealed that Allied deception operations to disguise the actual site of the forthcoming landings were effective among most members of Hitler’s upper military echelons, including Hitler himself. Thus, Eisenhower learned what attitudes and stubborn beliefs Hitler held about the coming invasion before it was too late to take advantage of the Führer’s errors.

The complete assessment of the importance of special cipher intelligence to the defeat of the Axis powers remains to be made by scholars of World War II. There are many variables to be considered, but there can be no doubt that the Allied “reading of the enemy’s mail” helped to shorten the war, reduce the loss of life, and make inevitable an Allied victory. The ready availability of this vast collection of SRHs holds the promise that new dimensions of the history of World War II will be forthcoming.

Carl Boyd
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SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

During World War II, the separate U.S. communications intelligence establishments cooperated and coordinated their efforts towards a common goal: the defeat of the Axis powers. The various U.S. communications intelligence establishments collated, compiled, and analyzed almost all communications intelligence produced by the various armed forces branches (principally the Military Intelligence Service [MIS] and the Office of Naval Intelligence), the Signal Security Agency, and the diplomatic corps. The Cryptologic Documents Collection consists of the end products produced by the various U.S. Intelligence establishments during the war.

The Cryptologic Documents Collection is subdivided into various series. These series include translations of Japanese and German military, naval, and diplomatic communications; historical reports; historical records originated by various branches of the U.S. armed forces; technical documents; and summaries of German and Japanese intercepts.

At this time, UPA is publishing the historical reports (SRH series) from the Cryptologic Documents Collection. These historical reports highlight the advancement of U.S. communications intelligence. They also provide background information on the lessons learned and utilization of communications intelligence in operational, tactical, and strategic planning. The historical reports also consist of analyses and compilations of such information as enemy order of battle, disposition, losses, and foreign and diplomatic relations.

**Part 3. Organization and Administration**

Part 3 consists of those histories highlighting the advances made by the United States in the administration and organization of communications intelligence during World War II. U.S. communications intelligence exploitation prior to the U.S. entry into the war was in the most elementary stages. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the secretary of war concluded that intercepted communications traffic had not been properly utilized. The secretary of war's decision led to the creation of the Special Branch of the Military Intelligence Service. The Special Branch was charged with the intelligence exploitation of enemy communications. Working with the U.S. Army Signal Corps and G-2, and in coordination with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Services, Special Branch developed personnel policies, methods, and equipment used in the maximum exploitation of communications intelligence: interception, cryptanalysis, evaluation, integration, and dissemination.

This part consists primarily of historical analyses of the various intelligence organizations, particularly communications intelligence organizations, developed during the war. There are histories of the MIS's Intelligence Group, Special Distribution Branch, and Special Branch, Signal Intelligence Service, and the Signal Security Agency. There are a number of histories on U.S. naval intelligence organization, liaison, and collaboration activities. There are also histories on the coordination and handling of policies within the armed services. Activities in this part highlight the U.S. War Department's determination to effectively organize and administer the breaking, reading, and evaluating of enciphered communications.
SOURCE NOTE

The reports included in this micropublication are from the Cryptologic Documents Collection in the Library of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

EDITORIAL NOTE

UPA's *Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II* consists of the Special Research Histories (SRHs) of the Cryptologic Documents Collection. The SRHs have been micropublished in three distinct parts. They are: Part 1. The Pacific Theater; Part 2. The European Theater; and Part 3. Organization and Administration. Documents in each part are arranged by the SRH number.

UPA has microfilmed, in their entirety, all of the SRH documents that have been received by the library as of November 10, 1989. These documents have been released to the library in various forms: declassified, sanitized, or unclassified. The missing document numbers signify items that are still classified and/or have not been received by the library.

Description of the Reel Index

The Reel Index details each microfilmed document in the micropublication. Included below is a sample entry from the Reel Index and a description of each of its elements:

0001 A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service. SRH-029. William F. Friedman. June 29, 1942. 19pp. (NA. Declassified on 4/11/79.) This report presents a historical overview of the SIS from its development in the years following World War I to the beginning of World War II. SIS originally performed cryptanalytic work not only for the War Department, but also for all other government departments, including Navy, State, Justice, and postal and cable censorship. This report covers the duties and functions of the SIS as they developed in the years prior to the Second World War. Also included are some of the troubles that affected the infant cryptographic service including Secretary of State Henry Stimson's opposition to U.S. involvement in espionage and intelligence activities, funding difficulties, the scandal created when an SIS employee published a book disclosing all secret activities ever conducted by the U.S. government, and the reorganization which shook the service in light of these revelations. *Index Items:* SIS; Henry Stimson.
The first line of the entry contains (left) the frame number at which the document begins and (right) the title of the document, plus its identification (SRH) number. The following line contains (1) the author or originating division and/or department of the document, (2) the document's date, (3) its page count, and (4) in parentheses, the original security classification and the date the document was declassified or sanitized. The final lines consist of an abstract of the document and a listing of the major topics under the heading, Index Items. Index items have been used in the compilation of the Subject Index that follows the Reel Index.

Security Classifications

The following key identifies the abbreviated security classifications used in the reel index entries for previously classified documents.

- **R** Restricted
- **C** Confidential
- **S** Secret
- **MS** Most Secret (British)
- **TS** Top Secret

The notation “NA” indicates that a security classification is not available.

Also included in the reel index are the dates on which documents with abbreviated security classifications from above were declassified or sanitized.
### ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used frequently throughout this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the user.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Direction Finder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Intelligence section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFDF</td>
<td>High Frequency Direction Finder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Division</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Monitoring Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP-20-G</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence Organization</td>
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<td>SIS</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRH</td>
<td>Special Research History</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Signal Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>Special Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDGS</td>
<td>War Department General Staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The following index is a guide to the documents in the collection. An explanation of the contents of each entry can be found on page xiii. Individual documents within an SRH are occasionally noted by indented frame numbers and a brief notation of the title, author when available, date of the document, and total page count.

Index Items have been included in the order in which they appear in the abstract. These items refer the researcher to corresponding entries in the Subject Index, where additional references for the same item may (if applicable) be located. Certain index items appear in the following form: “Germany—troop strengths.” This arrangement indicates that the subject following the dash (troop strengths) will be found under the more general entry (Germany).

**Reel 1**

0001  A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service. SRH-029.
This report presents a historical overview of the SIS from its development in the years following World War I to the beginning of World War II. SIS originally performed cryptanalytic work not only for the War Department, but also for all other government departments, including Navy, State, Justice, and postal and cable censorship. This report covers the duties and functions of the SIS as they developed in the years prior to the Second World War. Also included are some of the troubles that affected the infant cryptographic service including Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s opposition to U.S. involvement in espionage and intelligence activities, funding difficulties, the scandal created when an SIS employee published a book disclosing all secret activities ever conducted by the U.S. government, and the reorganization which shook the service in light of these revelations.

Index Items: SIS; Henry Stimson.

Author not available. n.d. 7pp. (NA. Declassified on 5/22/79.)
This history is concerned with the development of the SSO system during the entire period of its operation. The SSO system was organized for the purpose of providing a means of rapid and secure dissemination of ULTRA intelligence to operating commands. Also included is information on the administration of the SSO system.

Index Items: SSOs—system; ULTRA intelligence.

0029  History of the Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department—1942–1944. SRH-035.
Author not available. n.d. 64pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/9/79.)
The unit which became Special Branch, MIS, was established to study the problem of the division of intelligence functions between the Signal Corps and G-2 from the point of view of the War Department and to devise methods for the maximum exploitation of signal intelligence. The history of the Special Branch, MIS, is primarily the record of the
branch’s efforts to carry out its mission, its successes and its failures. It is also a record
of the development of its personnel policies, organization, intelligence methods, and
intelligence operations against the Germans and Japanese.

Index Items: Special Branch, MIS; Signal Corps, U.S.; G-2; Signal intelligence.

0094 Military Intelligence Service Contribution to the War Effort. SRH-041.
MIS, WDGS. December 3, 1945. 27pp. (NA. Declassified on 10/9/79.)
This report is divided into two sections; the first deals with MIS’s contribution to the war
effort and the second with the contribution of the shipping section to the prosecution of
the war. This document shows how the efficient production of intelligence information
by MIS gave immediate and substantial assistance to the War Department agencies,
field commands, and other agencies using this information. MIS brought about a
maximum exploitation of Order of Battle information and developed the use of such
intelligence at all levels throughout the U.S. Army. MIS began assembling intelligence
on the armed forces of enemy nations shortly after the U.S. entry into World War II and
continued to do so throughout the conflict. MIS units also assisted intelligence person-
nel of lower commands in analyzing, interpreting and evaluating Order of Battle infor-
mation for tactical purposes.

Index Items: MIS; Order of Battle information.

0122 War Department Regulations Governing the Dissemination and Security of
Communications Intelligence, 1943–1945. SRH-044.
War Department (various authors). n.d. 106pp. (S. Declassified on 4/20/82.)
This report consists of a series of memoranda and directives issued by the War Depart-
ment dealing with the dissemination and security of Allied communications intelligence
information. The security procedures for various types of intelligence information are
discussed, including radio decryption intelligence, radio intercept intelligence, Rabid
intelligence, ULTRA Dexter intelligence, special intelligence, and “Pearl” and “Thumb”
intelligence. Also included is information on the dissemination of radio intercept intelli-
gence and communications intelligence regarding weather conditions. Material relating
to security and intelligence activities in the Pacific, China-Burma-India, European, North
African, and Middle Eastern theaters of operation are covered by these regulations.

Index Items: War Department, U.S.; Communications intelligence—Allied; Radio
intelligence; Rabid intelligence; ULTRA intelligence—ULTRA Dexter; Special intelli-
gence; “Pearl” intelligence; “Thumb” intelligence; Weather—conditions; Pacific theater;
China-Burma-India theater; European theater; North African theater; Middle Eastern
theater.

0229 “This is Our War” (Lecture Series). SRH-057.
This report contains transcripts of a lecture series on the U.S. war effort presented at
Arlington Hall Station in 1943. The speakers included, among others, such prominent
persons as Arthur S. Fleming, commissioner of the U.S. Civil Service Commission;
Joseph Grew, former U.S. ambassador to Japan; and Hugh H. Clegg, assistant director
of the FBI. Their topics include material on “America at War”; the “Historical Back-
ground of the U.S. Signal Corps”; “The Navy Attacks”; “Manpower in the Federal
Government”; “The Office of Censorship at War”; “The War in Africa”; “The Japanese,
Our Enemy”; “The Enemy in Our Midst”; and “Fighting to Win.”

Index Items: Arlington Hall; Arthur S. Fleming; Joseph Grew; Hugh H. Clegg; Signal
Corps, U.S.; Manpower; Censorship, Office of; Africa.
**Selected Examples of Commendations and Related Correspondence Highlighting the Achievements and Value of U.S. Signals Intelligence During World War II.**
SRH-059.
Carter W. Clarke. n.d. 69pp. (S. Declassified on 7/7/80.)
This report contains documents relating to the achievements and value of signal intelligence, particularly ULTRA, to the Allied cause during World War II. Included are intercepted radio transmissions from Japanese military attachés commenting on German defenses, fortifications, and troop strengths; information on Japanese shipping in the Netherlands East Indies; extracts from intelligence messages from various Allied theaters of operation; and other intelligence information on enemy movements and activities supplied by ULTRA.
*Index Items:* Signal intelligence; ULTRA intelligence; Germany—defenses; Germany—troop strengths; Japan—shipping.

**Allocation of Special Security Officers to Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department—1943–1945.** SRH-061.
Author not available. n.d. 35pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/26/80.)
This report consists of a series of documents relating to the allocation of SSOs. Included is information on special security operations in the European theater, staff studies requesting increases in allocations of SSOs to Special Branch, MID, and a number of memoranda from the Adjutant General's Office regarding the assignment of SSOs to various military posts both in the U.S. and abroad.
*Index Items:* SSOs; European theater; Special Branch, MID; Adjutant General's Office, U.S.

**History of Military Intelligence Service Reports Unit.** SRH-062.
Author not available. n.d. 117pp. (C. Declassified on 9/23/80.)
The Reports Unit of MIS coordinates and directs the preparation and dissemination of all outgoing reports and insures their accuracy, timeliness, and proper security classification. This report deals with the activities and functions of various subunits attached to the Reports Unit including JANUS, the intelligence release desk, the situation room, the political and economic reports branch, and the publications branch. Material is also included on the history of the German and Japanese military reports branch.
*Index Items:* MIS—Reports Unit; JANUS.

**Examples of Intelligence Obtained From Cryptanalysis.** SRH-066.
Author not available. August 1, 1946. 11pp. (NA. Declassified on 10/6/80.)
This report contains examples selected from the files of the Army Security Agency to illustrate the different kinds of information obtained from cryptanalysis of enemy messages and, where possible, the action taken and results achieved. Two of the examples also indicate the importance of protecting this source of information. This intelligence information was gathered from both Japanese and German sources. Material contained in these examples includes information regarding the Japanese attack on Aitape, Japanese descriptions of German "West Wall" defenses, Japanese knowledge of Office of Strategic Services activities in Lisbon, Portugal, information on German secret agents, information on movements and cargoes of Japanese and German shipping, German signal intelligence operations, and Japanese naval systems.
*Index Items:* Army Security Agency; Cryptanalysis; Aitape, New Guinea; "West Wall"; Office of Strategic Services; Germany—secret agents; Japan—shipping; Germany—shipping; Germany—signal intelligence operations; Japan—naval systems.
History of the Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service. SRH-099.
(MID) WDGS. December 7, 1941–September 6, 1945. 167pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/10/80.)
This report on the graphic presentation of intelligence is confined to the methods evolved in the Cartographic Desk of the Military Branch, MIS. It serves as a study of the development and operation of these desks in the fulfillment of their mission: that of adequately, accurately, and quickly transforming “manuscript” intelligence into “picture” or graphic intelligence. It will be shown how this mission is part of the greater one of the Military Branch in furnishing the best intelligence available to the U.S. and Allied chiefs of staff, G-2, other War Department and Government agencies, as well as to the combat troops.
Index Items: MIS—Military Branch; Chiefs of Staff, Allied; War Department, U.S.

Specific Instructions for the Handling and Dissemination of Special Intelligence. SRH-106.
Herman Miles and Jules James. January 25, 1941. 3pp. (C. Declassified on 12/3/80.)
This report consists of a diagram and instructions from the assistant chief of staff, G-2 and the acting director of Naval Intelligence concerning the proper handling and dissemination of certain important secret papers (referred to in the report as special materials) in which the president, secretary of state, secretary of war, secretary of the navy, and the heads of other executive departments had an interest.
Index Item: Special intelligence.

Problems of the SSO System in World War II. SRH-107.
Author not available. n.d. 44pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/13/80.)
The SSO system was organized to provide operating commands with a means for rapid and secure dissemination of communications intelligence of the highest security classification. The system was developed and put into operation by the Special Branch of G-2, War Department. Guidance was given by the assistant chief of staff, G-2, and his deputy. This report deals with the problems encountered by the SSO system in the various Allied theaters of operation.
Index Items: SSOs—system; Communications intelligence; Special Branch, MIS.

Alfred McCormack. n.d. 56pp. (S. Declassified on 2/27/81.)
This report presents an in-depth analysis of the development of Special Branch, MIS, its activities and intelligence gathering operations, and the problems faced by it in the course of fulfilling its mission. Information is included on the responsibilities of the War Department for intelligence derived from cryptanalysis, the handling of intercept intelligence prior to World War II, the decision of the secretary of war concerning the exploitation of the cryptanalytic field, the organization of MIS and the Special Branch, the work of the Special Branch, the increase in volume of Signal Security Division (SSD) material, the basic factors in the problem of cryptanalytic intelligence, Special Branch personnel situation, some suggestions for the future development of the Special Branch, and the problem of Japanese military traffic.
Index Items: Special Branch, MIS; Cryptanalysis; Radio intelligence—intercepts; Japan—military radio traffic.

History of Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service. SRH-117.
Author not available. June 1944–September 1945. 12pp. (TS. Declassified on 3/2/81.)
The directive reorganizing MIS in the spring of 1944 provided for the establishment of a Special Branch to take over certain functions of the former Special Branch, MID, when the latter ceased to exist. Those functions included the maintenance of liaison with the
SSA and with the State and Navy Departments on matters pertaining to signal intelligence. They also included the supervision of MIS special security officers disseminating signal intelligence overseas and the duties of the Cryptographic Control Section of the former Special Branch. This report contains information on the Special Branch's Administrative, Overseas Liaison, and Cryptographic Security Sections, as well as material relating to the Special Branch's local liaison operations with the State and Navy Departments and the Army Security Agency.

Index Items: Special Branch, MIS; Special Branch, MID; SSA; Signal intelligence; Special Branch, MIS—Cryptographic Control Section; Special Branch, MIS—Administrative Section; Special Branch, MIS—Overseas Liaison Section; Special Branch, MIS—Cryptographic Security Section; Army Security Agency.

Reel 2

0001 History of the Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, WDGS, Scientific Branch. SRH-130.

MIS, WDGS. September 14, 1945. 48pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/27/81.)

In the course of World War II technological and scientific developments had a greater effect on the outcome of the war and consequently on military strategy and tactics than in any previous conflict. During World War II it was the function of the Scientific Branch of MIS to produce intelligence on the progress of such developments in enemy countries. The Branch was organized along functional lines and included an electronics section, a chemical and biological warfare section, and a physics section. This report examines MIS intelligence processes relating to the Japanese and goes into the functions and operations of the sections of the Scientific Branch mentioned above.

Index Items: MIS—Intelligence Group; MIS—Scientific Branch.


MIS, WDGS. October 1, 1945. (TS. Declassified on 8/18/81.)

0065 Pacific Order of Battle Section (Part II). 227pp.
0512 Pacific Order of Battle Section cont. (Part IV). 155pp.
0813 Air Industry Section (Part VI). 161pp.

This report covers the activities of the Military Branch, which was formed in June 1944, in the production of intelligence. Because the functions and responsibilities of the sections in the branch were varied the overall report has been divided into six separate sections for the convenience of the researcher. Because of the variety of functions, these sections were directed, to a great extent, to act independently. Intelligence supervision was maintained over the sections by personal liaison of the branch chief with the section chiefs. The mission of the Military Branch was to provide the field forces, WDGS, the War Department, the three major components of the Army, and other authorized government agencies with accurate, timely, and complete intelligence on all phases of the ground and air forces of all enemy nations. The bulk of this report deals with the operations of the Pacific Order of Battle Section which was concerned with analyzing and evaluating intelligence information regarding Japanese military forces.

Index Item: MIS—Military Branch.
The mission of the Special Distribution Branch of MIS was the distribution of material classified as Top Secret. An up-to-date list of approved officers eligible to receive such materials was kept by this branch, which also supplied Joint Security Control with names of officers added to this list. The branch also maintained a register or journal that showed at all times the location or possessor of Top Secret documents. If such documents were not addressed to a particular person or agency, it was the job of the Special Distribution Branch to determine their disposition. The library of this branch was also the final repository for Top Secret materials.

Index Items: MIS—Special Distribution Branch; Joint Security Control; Top Secret materials.

This report presents a concise history of SIS's Second Signal Service Battalion (originally the Second Signal Service Company) from its inception in 1939 through its growth and expansion during World War II. Included is material on personnel, duty stations, commanding officers, organization, problems, and operations. The Second Signal Service Battalion was organized to perform radio intercept missions for the War Department; it also handled all signal intelligence activities of the War Department for which enlisted personnel must be furnished. Personnel from the Second Signal Service Battalion served during the war in Washington, D.C., the Philippines, and in Australia. Many members of the battalion serving in the Philippines were trapped on the Bataan Peninsula and on Corregidor during the Japanese invasion of the islands and captured, although a few members managed to escape into the jungles and make their escape from the Japanese-held islands aboard an improvised raft.

Index Items: Second Signal Service Battalion, SIS; Radio intelligence; Bataan Peninsula; Corregidor.

The Language Liaison Group, consisting of seven military officers and two civilians, operating under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Reischauer, served as special liaison personnel in the Japanese field between MIS and Arlington Hall. Most of the members of this group were originally members of the Special Branch and were later assigned to the Office of the Director of Intelligence. Members of this group also rendered certain services within MIS by answering various types of questions involving linguistic problems and aiding in the processing of certain materials requiring the use of Chinese characters.

Index Items: Language Liaison Group, MIS; Edwin O. Reischauer; Arlington Hall; Special Branch, MIS; Office of the Director of Intelligence.
Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred McCormack. Colonel, AUS [Army of the United States] Special Branch, G-2 Military Intelligence Division, War Department. SRH-141.
Alfred McCormack. n.d. 583pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/9/81.)
The papers collected in this SRH are generally referred to as the McCormack Papers and were taken from the personal files of Colonel Alfred McCormack, who was the director of intelligence, MIS, War Department, during World War II, and special assistant (for Intelligence) to the secretary of state until 1946. Some of these documents were authored by Colonel McCormack and some were authored by other persons. The majority of the papers in Part I of this report were retrieved from McCormack's files in the State Department, while most of those in Part 2 came from another personal collection which he preserved. Apparently, Colonel McCormack personally arranged and organized the material in both of these collections.
*Index Items:* Alfred McCormack; MIS.

MIS, G-2, War Department. n.d. 212pp. (S. Declassified on 2/2/82.)
This compilation of documents represents a portion of MIS, G-2, War Department files (otherwise known as the Carter Clarke File). Although these papers deal with various topics, the correspondence that leads to the eventual transfer in December 1944 of operational command and control of the SSA to the assistant chief of staff, G-2, War Department is of historical value. The rest of these documents relate to the SIS's intercept activities and the dissemination of intelligence information by that organization.
*Index Items:* SIS; Carter Clarke; Signal Intelligence Agency.

Reel 4


Handling of ULTRA within the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), 1941–1945. SRH-146.
Thomas E. Ervin. January 29, 1946. 9pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/22/81.)
A great many of the procedures for the evaluation and dissemination of ULTRA intelligence were developed by the old Special Branch prior to the June 1944 reorganization. Special Branch was a branch of MID directly under G-2. Individual ULTRA items, whether from army, navy, British, or theater sources, were received only in Special Branch. All evaluation and dissemination of ULTRA was controlled by members of the branch. There were three large subdivisions, one that dealt with political and economic matters as reflected by the diplomatic traffic; the second that dealt with German military ULTRA; and the third that dealt with Japanese military ULTRA. Each subdivision turned in a “black book” daily. SSOs were recruited, trained, assigned, and administered by the Special Branch. Liaison was maintained with Arlington Hall, the U.S. Navy, and the State Department. After the 1944 reorganization, the Special Branch as such was abolished and its duties taken over by MIS in order to coordinate ULTRA with all other intelligence sources. The basic system for handling ULTRA intelligence remained unchanged.
*Index Items:* ULTRA intelligence; Special Branch, MIS; Special Branch, MID—“black book”; SSOs; Arlington Hall.
0099  **Historical Review of OP-20-G. SRH-152.**
Author not available. February 17, 1944. 13pp. (S. Declassified on 2/23/82.)
This report covers the development and growth of OP-20-G from its beginnings in January 1941 through the latter stages of World War II. OP-20-G was primarily a radio intelligence organization during the war. The report includes material on administrative problems, personnel, building programs, and the activities of the service and technical sections of this intelligence unit.
*Index Items:* OP-20-G; Radio intelligence.

0113  **Preliminary Historical Report on the Solution of the “B” Machine. SRH-159.**
William F. Friedman. October 14, 1940. 9pp. (TS. Declassified on 3/10/82.)
This report deals with the breaking by U.S. intelligence experts of the Japanese “Purple” diplomatic code as enciphered by the Type “B” cipher machine. The successful solution of the B-machine was the culmination of eighteen months of intensive study by a team of U.S. cryptanalysts and their assistants. Included is material on the team members and their role in the ultimate solution to the “Purple” code. Work on breaking the code began in August 1939 under the general direction of William Friedman.
*Index Items:* “Purple” diplomatic code; Type “B” cipher machine; William Friedman.

0123  **History of the Weather Unit, 1942-1944. SRH-160.**
H. McD. Brown, n.d. 41pp. (S. Declassified on 4/12/82.)
The function of the Weather Unit of the SSA, as its name implies, involved intercept control with regard to coverage of enemy weather. The unit was involved in traffic analysis and research on enemy weather transmissions. The material intercepted by this unit dealt primarily with German meteorological information. This type of weather information was vital in planning campaigns, especially those involving naval and air force units whose ability to function depended on weather conditions. Also included is material on the organization and activities of the Weather Unit during World War II.
*Index Items:* Weather Unit, SSA; Meteorological information.

0163  **Centralized Control of U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Activities. SRH-169.**
Author not available. March-August 1945. 94pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)
This report consists of a number of memoranda regarding the advantages and disadvantages of proposals to centralize control over U.S. Army signal intelligence activities during World War II. The various memoranda discuss the role of intelligence units in the interception and solution of cryptographic systems. Also included is information on various units involved in signal intelligence, their organization and their functions. Some material concerns the postwar implications of centralization of signal intelligence activities. The basic idea of this centralization plan was to bring all the independent and competing signal intelligence units under the control of Arlington Hall. This plan, it was hoped, would bring more coordination to the U.S. Army’s signal intelligence operations and bring it more in line with the systems used by the British and by the U.S. Navy.
*Index Items:* Signal intelligence—activities; Arlington Hall.

0257  **War Experience of Alfred McCormack. SRH-185.**
Alfred McCormack. July 31, 1947. 86pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/7/82.)
These papers contain information relating to the experiences of Colonel Alfred McCormack during World War II. Colonel McCormack served as special assistant to the secretary of war for military intelligence and as chief of the Special Branch of G-2. McCormack’s duties included research and intelligence work and the recruiting and training of intelligence personnel for Special Branch. Colonel McCormack was deeply involved in all activities of the Special Branch and played a major role in that organization’s intelligence gathering activities throughout the war. The report also
includes several attachments relating to intelligence activities; monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts; General George V. Strong, the assistant chief of staff, G-2; intelligence organization and personnel; and a biographical sketch of Colonel McCormack. 

Index Items: Alfred McCormack; Special Branch, MIS; George V. Strong.


OP-20-G. October 8, 1945. 45pp. (S. Declassified on 8/8/82.)
This report contains information on OP-20-G's communication intelligence organization; its liaison activities and collaboration with the U.S. Army, FBI, U.S. government departments and the British; its field activities and intercept facilities; its intercept equipment; the dissemination of communications intelligence; intelligence personnel; and research activities. Most of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence operations were controlled by OP-20-G's headquarters at the Mount Vernon Seminary in Washington, D.C.

Index Items: OP-20-G; Navy, U.S.—communication intelligence operations; Army, U.S.; FBI; Mount Vernon Seminary.


OP-20-G. n.d. 609pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/14/84.)
0737 Part II, June 1, 1944–August 1945. 263pp.
This report consists of a large number of memoranda and documents relating to cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army in the intelligence field both before and during World War II. Included is material on coordination of army and navy intercept and decrypting activities, the handling and dissemination of intelligence information, training of Signal Corps operators, radio monitoring equipment, radio intelligence activities, possible leaks of cryptographic materials, decryption operations on diplomatic traffic, allocation of cryptanalysis, enemy diplomatic and clandestine dispatches, clandestine radio transmitters in Latin America, division of responsibility for radio intelligence work, proposed merger of army and navy radio intelligence activities, ULTRA intelligence, U.S. Navy security regulations for communication intelligence, establishment of Inter-Service Cryptanalytic Intelligence Unit, outline of controversy between the U.S. Navy and the FBI, and research and development in the cryptographic field. Some of these memoranda are signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King.

Index Items: Clandestine dispatches; Decryption activities—Army-Navy collaboration; Signal Corps, U.S.; Radio intelligence—activities; Cryptography; Cryptanalysis; Latin America; FBI; Franklin D. Roosevelt; George C. Marshall; J. Edgar Hoover; Ernest J. King.

Reel 5

0001 Part II, June 2, 1944–August 1945 cont. 32pp.

0033 A Lecture on Communications Intelligence. SRH-264.
This document is a transcript of a lecture given at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, regarding the security of U.S. communications intelligence activities during World War II. The stated purposes of this lecture are to provide insight into the part played by communications intelligence in World War II and to provide a general idea as to the means whereby such intelligence was obtained. Captain Wenger in-
cluded information on the nature, significance, and history of communications intelligence, giving the example of the Battle of the Coral Sea in the Pacific theater as an illustration of the role which communications intelligence played during the war.

Index Items: Communications intelligence; Naval War College; Coral Sea, Battle of the.

0122 Advanced Intelligence Centers in the U.S. Navy. SRH-268.
John R. Redman. June 1942. 11pp. (S. Declassified on 1/6/84.)
This report consists of three memorandum addressed to Admiral F. J. Horne regarding the U.S. Navy's radio intelligence organization and the establishment of Advanced intelligence centers by the U.S. Navy. The object of these advanced intelligence centers was to organize an intelligence service under the commander in chief, Pacific, which would insure the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence. It was planned to establish one of these centers at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and additional centers in the north and south Pacific Ocean Areas.

Index Items: F. J. Horne; Navy, U.S.—radio intelligence organization; Advanced Intelligence Centers; Commander in Chief, Pacific; Pearl Harbor.

Robert L. Benson. n.d. 6pp. (S. Declassified on 1/17/84.)
This report is a postwar article concerning the U.S. Army's communications intelligence policy as it was formulated following the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The article goes into the recommendations made by Colonel Alfred McCormack regarding communications intelligence operations and the reorganization of military intelligence units that occurred in 1942. The article then goes on to provide information on the activities of MIS and SIS during the early stages of the Second World War. The major focus of the material contained in this article regards the organizational structure of these intelligence units as it developed during 1942.

Index Items: Army, U.S.—communications intelligence policy; Pearl Harbor; Alfred McCormack; MIS—activities; SIS—activities.

0141 Army-Navy-FBI COMINT [Communications Intelligence] Agreements of 1942. SRH-270.
Robert L. Benson. n.d. 5pp. (S. Declassified on 1/17/84.)
This report concerns the agreement reached between the U.S. Army's MID, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the FBI concerning their handling of cryptanalytic responsibilities. The agreement set forth guidelines as to which intelligence agencies would deal with what types of intelligence. This agreement also provided for the creation of a standing committee on cryptanalysis to be composed of representatives of the FBI technical laboratory, OP-20-G, and SIS. The final division of responsibilities was as follows: the U.S. Army would handle intelligence information relating to diplomatic intelligence, enemy military operations and army weather information; the U.S. Navy would deal with international clandestine operations, enemy naval operations, and navy weather information; and the FBI was allotted control over domestic criminal operations, voice broadcast information, and cover text communications. It was further agreed that the navy and FBI would share responsibility for domestic clandestine operations and that handling of trade codes would be decided by a committee.

Index Items: Communications intelligence—agreements; MID; Office of Naval Intelligence; FBI; Cryptanalysis—allocation of; OP-20-G; SIS.
Author not available. n.d. 162pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/19/84.)
These documents represent additional information regarding the advantages and disadvantages of centralized control of U.S. Army signal intelligence activities and should be used in conjunction with SRH-169, found on reel 4, frame 0163. The documents include material on the duties of the chief signal officer with regard to preparation of codes and ciphers, the activities of the SIS, the debate over whether the SIS should be under the control of the Signal Corps or MIS, personnel assignments, the organization, personnel, mission, and control of the Signal Security Service, control over radio and radar jamming activities, signal intelligence activities in Washington, D.C., and cooperation between SSA and Special Branch, MID.
Index Items: Army, U.S.—signal intelligence activities; Chief Signal Officer; SIS—activities; Signal Corps, U.S.; MIS; Signal Security Service; Radio—jamming activities; Special Branch, MID.

OP-20-G. n.d. 86pp. (S. Declassified on 4/30/84.)
This report consists of a large number of memoranda regarding the communication intelligence organization and activities of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army Air Force. Also included is information on radio intelligence units in the Pacific theater, the function of U.S. Army units on Guam, and the dissemination of weather information. Some of these memoranda were signed by Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King, Vice Chief of Naval Operations F. J. Horne, and by Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

U.S. Naval Communications Station, Guam—Station B. SRH-291.
U.S. Navy. n.d. 10pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/3/84.)
This report contains a history of U.S. Naval communication intelligence activities on the island of Guam in the Pacific. The first such communication intelligence station had been established as early as 1929. Station B was relocated to the town of Libugon, Guam, in 1934. Covered in this report is information on the organization and operation of Station B from its inception through World War II. Guam was captured by the Japanese in December 1941 and all station personnel on the island at that time were captured.
Index Items: Navy, U.S.—communications intelligence activities; Guam.

U.S. Naval Radio Direction Finder Station, Point St. George, Crescent City, California. SRH-292.
U.S. Navy. 1923—1944. 26pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/2/84.)
The U.S. Naval Radio Direction Finder Station located at Point St. George, Crescent City, California was established sometime after 1923. Included in this report is information on the station’s operations, equipment and personnel. The mission of the radio direction finder station was to plot bearings for navigational targets and engage in strategic tracking in event of war. It also provided navigational service for U.S. aircraft. The station was transferred from U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard jurisdiction in 1944.
Index Items: Naval Radio Direction Finder Station, U.S., Point St. George, Crescent City, California; Coast Guard, U.S.
During World War II, the direction finder stations which played the largest role against German and Japanese units were those of the Atlantic and Pacific Strategic HFDF Nets. The most numerous of these were used to aid in the navigation of U.S. aircraft and ships while others were used in a tactical vice strategic role against enemy targets. The U.S. Naval HFDF Station at Chincoteague Island, Virginia, which was under the command of the commandant, Fifth Naval District, was one of these stations. This station was established around the year 1942. It was considered that this station would be of great value in antisubmarine warfare and in the protection of coastal convoys.

Index Items: Naval HFDF stations, U.S.—Chincoteague Island, Virginia; Atlantic Strategic HFDF Net; Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Antisubmarine warfare; Convoys.

The U.S. Navy established a radio direction finder station at Port Arguello, California, as early as 1919. This station was designated as a Pacific reserve station attached to the Pacific Coast Group with a mission of security and training. The major role of the station was to provide bearings for navigational targets. This report includes information on the station's operations, equipment, and personnel. In general this station's performance was erratic and unreliable due to doubts about the electrical suitability of its location. The U.S. Navy eventually discontinued the Port Arguello Station in 1943 and its facilities were handed over to the U.S. Coast Guard.

Index Items: Naval HFDF stations, U.S.—Port Arguello, California; Pacific Coast Group; Coast Guard, U.S.
U.S. Naval HFDF (High Frequency Direction Finder) Station, Cape Lookout, North Carolina. SRH-298.

U.S. Navy. 1935–1942. 7pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/10/84.)

The U.S. Naval HFDF Station at Cape Lookout, North Carolina, which was part of the Atlantic Tracking Group, was established sometime before 1935. As with other HFDF stations the major mission of the Cape Lookout Station was to provide bearings for navigational targets. This report contains information on this station's operations, equipment, and personnel during the period in which it was operational. No record has been found regarding either its successes or failures during World War II. The station was apparently downgraded to an MFDF (Medium-Frequency Direction Finder) station before being decommissioned by the U.S. Navy and its facilities transferred to U.S. Coast Guard jurisdiction in 1942.

*Index Items:* Naval HFDF stations, U.S.—Cape Lookout, North Carolina; Atlantic Tracking Group; Coast Guard, U.S.

U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Jan Mayen Island, November 1943–December 1945. SRH-299.

U.S. Navy. n.d. 37pp. (NA. Declassified on 8/23/84.)

The U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station on Jan Mayen Island was established in November 1943 for the purpose of obtaining data on German clandestine weather stations operating in northeastern Greenland. Its mission was terminated on V-E Day and, on July 1, 1945, its HFDF equipment was dismantled, basically ending OP-20-G's involvement with Jan Mayen Island, although U.S. Coast Guard personnel remained on the island at least until January 1946. This report goes into the operations, equipment, and personnel of this station.

*Index Items:* Naval supplementary radio stations, U.S.—Jan Mayen Island; Greenland; OP-20-G.

U.S. Naval SUPRAD [Supplementary Radio] Station, Antigua, British West Indies. SRH-300.

U.S. Navy. 1943–1944. 8pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/12/84.)

The U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station (Station "AW") located in Antigua, British West Indies, was established on February 5, 1943. It was assigned the primary mission of obtaining radio direction finder bearings on German naval units and the secondary mission of providing assistance to friendly aircraft within the Caribbean DF Net. This report contains information on the operations, equipment, and personnel of this station. The Antigua Station was decommissioned in December 1944 following the decline of German fortunes in World War II.

*Index Items:* Naval supplementary radio stations, U.S.—Antigua, British West Indies; Germany—naval units; Caribbean DF Net.

U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Port Isabel, Texas. SRH-301.


OP-20-G requested permission to construct the U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station at Port Isabel, Texas, on May 2, 1942. The purpose behind the establishment of this station was to provide bearings on targets which could not be heard by existing stations because they were within the skip zone of the target's radio transmissions. While planned to supplement the East Coast HFDF Net, the new station could also be available to take bearings on Pacific targets. Due to various delays with regard to site selection and the decline in the anticipated need for such a station, construction proceeded slowly and the station did not become fully operational until March 1944, at which time the need for its services was practically nonexistent. The Port Isabel Station continued to provide navigational aid to aircraft until the end of the war in Europe when
it was decommissioned by the U.S. Navy and its facilities turned over to the U.S. Coast
Guard. This report provides information on the station's operations, personnel, and
equipment during its short existence.

Index Items: OP-20-G; Naval supplementary radio stations, U.S.—Port Isabel, Texas;
East Coast HFDF Net; Coast Guard, U.S.

0611  U.S. Naval SUPRADSTA [Supplementary Radio Station], Poyner's Hill, Poplar

U.S. Navy. n.d. 61pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/18/84.)
The Poyner's Hill Station was acquired by the U.S. Navy from the Coast Guard in 1920.
In 1936 the Poyner's Hill Station was included in a proposal by OP-20-G for a system
of radio direction finder stations for strategic tracking (long distance and coastal) in the
Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean. Following the outbreak of World
War II in Europe the station's role was clarified to the effect that its primary mission in
time of war was the location and tracking of enemy vessels and aircraft. A number of
problems were encountered at this station and reception was poor due to the frequent
occurrence of blowing sand conditions and the unpredictability of the weather. The U.S.
Navy discontinued operations at Poyner's Hill Station in July of 1945 and turned the
facilities back over to the Coast Guard. This report covers the operations, equipment,
and personnel of this station during its period of operation by the U.S. Navy.

Index Items: Naval supplementary radio stations, U.S.—Poyner's Hill, North Carolina;
OP-20-G; OP-20-G—radio direction finder stations; Coast Guard, U.S.

0673  Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Otter Point, Umnak Island, Alaska. SRH-303.

U.S. Navy. 1941—1945. 15pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/20/84.)
The Naval Supplementary Radio Station at Otter Point was established as a result of
the recommendation of the commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, in December 1941.
The station's equipment was removed from Dutch Harbor, Alaska, due to deteriorating
conditions brought about by electromagnetic interference. The new station at Otter
Point became operational in July of 1943. This report includes information on the
station's operations, equipment, and personnel. Following the reorganization of the
Pacific Strategic HFDF Net in April 1945 it was proposed that the Otter Point Station be
closed following the rejection by the U.S. Coast Guard of an offer to take over the
facilities. The station was finally decommissioned on August 1, 1945.

Index Items: Naval supplementary radio stations, U.S.—Otter Point, Alaska; Alaska;
Pacific Strategic HFDF Net.

0689  U.S. Navy HFDF Station, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico. SRH-304.

U.S. Navy. March 1941—February 1945. 11pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/20/84.)
The Cabo Rojo Station was established by the U.S. Navy in 1941 to augment the
existing HFDF Station at San Juan which was hampered in its ability to take bearings in
the southern section of Puerto Rico due to the presence of a mountain range. Tests of
the Cabo Rojo site proved that it was a good location for an HFDF station due to its
good receiving conditions, low noise levels, and excellent security. Despite this auspi-
cious start the U.S. Navy recommended the closing of the station in November 1942 for
a number of reasons. This recommendation was acted on and the station was aban-
doned and its equipment shipped to Trinidad. This report contains information relating
to the operations, equipment, and personnel of this station during the period that it was
operational.

U.S. Navy. 1942–1948. 155pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/18/84.)
The first section of this report consists of commendations received by OP-20-G since January 1, 1942. The second section contains miscellaneous correspondence relating to the accomplishments of that organization during the Second World War. Among the commendations received by OP-20-G are those relating to their intelligence work during the Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal and the Okinawa campaign. These commendations have come from such sources as Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King, Congressman Clarence E. Hancock of New York, the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Senator John Chandler Gurney of South Dakota, General George C. Marshall, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, General Douglas MacArthur, and Admirals Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, and Raymond Spruance.

Index Items: Communications Intelligence—organization; OP-20-G; Midway, Battle of; Guadalcanal, Battle of; Okinawa campaign; James V. Forrestal; Ernest J. King; Clarence E. Hancock; Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee; John Chandler Gurney; George C. Marshall; Thomas E. Dewey; Cordell Hull; Douglas MacArthur; Chester W. Nimitz; William Halsey; Raymond Spruance.

Historical Reports of Monitoring Stations MS-2 to MS-10 from Date of Activation to June 1944. SRH-325.
Second Signal Service Battalion. March 6, 1947. 74pp. (S. Declassified on 10/18/84.)
0859
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[Note: Folder on MS-4 is not releasable.]
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This report is divided into eight folders each representing a historical report on one of the monitoring stations mentioned in the title. These monitoring stations were located at Petaluma, California; Miami Beach, Florida; Fort Shafter, Hawaii; Amchitka in the Aleutian Islands; Fairbanks, Alaska; New Delhi, India; Bellmore in Long Island, New York; and Reseda, California. The primary function of these stations was the interception of such foreign radio communications as were desired by the SSA. Additional functions varied with each station but included training and staging activities. Materials in these historical reports include information on commanding officers, personnel and operations.

Index Items: Monitoring stations; SSA.

Army Security Agency. February 20, 1946. 71pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/15/84.)
This report contains a record of the SSA and its operations during World War II. The SSA was established during World War II to protect U.S. communications against examination by the enemy and to intercept and derive as much information as possible from enemy communications. Its responsibilities included the printing, distribution, and accounting for cryptographic publications and the operational responsibility for all
phases of signal intelligence. It also continued existing code production projects and engaged in training both civilian and military personnel in cryptanalysis and signal intelligence operations. Specific examples are given of SSA operations in World War II and their operational results.

Index Items: SSA; Cryptography; Signal intelligence—operational responsibility for; Cryptanalysis—training of civilian and military personnel in.

Reel 6


0047 History of Training in Signal Security Agency and Training Branch, SSA. SRH-358.
SSA. April 15, 1945. 175pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/17/85.)
The Training Branch of the SSA was the last branch to be established under that agency. Its purpose was to prepare a program for training military officers and later enlisted men and civilians, in signal intelligence activities. Chapters of this work deal with activities at various training centers of the SSA including Arlington Hall, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Vint Hill Farms Station in Warrenton, Virginia. The report also contains information on the various sections under the jurisdiction of the Training Branch, including the Communications and Intelligence Training Section, the Radio Intelligence Training Section, the Field Units Sections, the Advanced Radio Communications School, the Civilian Training School, and the Property, Supply, and Film Library Sections.

Index Items: SSA—Training Branch of; Signal intelligence—activities; Arlington Hall; Communications and Intelligence Training Section; Radio Intelligence Training Section; Field Units Sections; Advanced Radio Communications School; Civilian Training School; SSA—Property, Supply, and Film Library Sections.

The mission of the General Cryptanalytic Branch of the SSA was to intercept and decipher Japanese and German diplomatic radio transmissions in an effort to obtain useful military intelligence. Later its responsibilities were extended to include Japanese military attaché systems and army communications as well. This report goes into the organization, personnel, and operations of the General Cryptanalytic Branch of SSA and some of the problems encountered by it during the course of World War II. An extensive subject index prepared by the Army Security Agency is included at the end of this report.

Index Items: SSA; SSA—General Cryptographic Branch of; Radio—transmissions; Japan—military attaché systems; Japan—army communications.

This report represents an account of the work of the SSA upon the Japanese Army cryptanalytic problems, which, at the end of World War II, was the basic assignment of the Military Cryptanalytic Branch of the Intelligence Division although this work had previously been carried out by the various sections of the Cryptanalytic Branch. Though intended primarily as a history of the organization which cryptanalyzed the Japanese
Army systems, this volume also discusses the solutions themselves, for the size, form, and evolution of the Military Cryptanalytic Branch were determined by the solution problems under study. Information on the operations and organization of the Military Cryptanalytic Branch are included in this study.

Index Items: SSA; SSA—Military Cryptanalytic Branch; Japan—army cryptanalytic problems.

Reel 7


0135 Minutes of Signal Security Agency Personnel and Training Division Meetings. SRH-363.
This report contains minutes from meetings of the SSA's Personnel and Training Division during the latter stages of World War II and beyond. Discussion items include material on the standardization of direction finder sensitivity and accuracy, personnel assignments, morale programs, records administration programs; questions regarding work hours, leave, and pay scales, efficiency ratings, security at Arlington Hall Station, the functions of the Cryptographic Training Section of the Training Branch, the functions and courses of the Civilian Training School, physical examinations, personnel files, and numerous other topics relating to personnel and training activities.

Index Items: SSA; SSA—Personnel and Training Division meetings; Direction finders; SSA—morale programs; SSA—records administration programs; Arlington Hall; Cryptographic Training Section; Civilian Training School.


0419 Part I.
This report relates the story of the development of the SSA in World War II. Due to its bulk the report was divided into two parts. Part I, which includes chapters I through V, deals with the background and origin of the SIS and with the expansion of the SIS in the period between the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 and the end of 1942. The second part of this report is not included.

Index Items: SSA; Signal intelligence—activities; SIS.

0660 History of the Signal Intelligence Division of the Signal Office, AFMIDPAC [Army Forces, Middle Pacific], 1941–1945. SRH-365.
Author not available. n.d. 50pp. (S. Declassified on 7/14/86.)
The Signal Intelligence Division was organized in the Hawaiian Department following the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941. Operational control of this unit was vested in the War Department and exercised by the chief signal officer. This unit's mission was to accomplish the necessary radio intelligence functions for the Hawaiian Department. This report presents a historical overview of the Signal Intelligence Division's operations during World War II. Also included is information on the various signal intelligence units attached to the Signal Intelligence Division during the war.

Index Items: Signal Intelligence Division; Hawaiian Department; Chief Signal Officer.
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The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first arabic number refers to the reel, and the four-digit arabic number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular subject begins. Therefore, 7:0660 directs the researcher to the subject that begins at frame 0660 of reel 7.

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