A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

World War II Research Collections

Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II

Part 2.
The European Theater

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA
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Part 2. The European Theater

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INTRODUCTION

Soon after declassification of selected communications intelligence material from World War II was undertaken by the National Security Agency in the late 1970s, many valuable documents were made available to researchers in the National Archives. An early scholar of this material, the late Ronald Lewin, said to the press in Washington, D.C., in 1981, “If I were writing a Ph.D. [dissertation], I’d rush over to Archives this minute.” Since then much more material has been declassified; some of the Top Secret Studies in this collection of microfilm were declassified only in the late 1980s.

SRH Case Studies

Special Research Histories (SRHs), a series of studies, monographs, and reports principally concerning cryptographic operations in World War II, were compiled mostly from highly classified contemporary files by wartime participants. Each SRH addresses a specific topic. For example, SRH-090, compiled only in six copies in late August 1945 and classified Top Secret ULTRA, focuses on “Japan’s Surrender Maneuvers” (45 pages); SRH-111 is titled “MAGIC Reports for the Attention of the President, 1943–1945” (32 pages); and SRH-142 is a 1980 U.S. Army War College Military Studies Program Paper on “ULTRA and the Campaigns against the U-boats in World War II” (38 pages).

The SRHs were designed as case studies originally for the purpose of promoting understanding within various government agencies of wartime intelligence operations. They sometimes include subtle suggestions and point to possible ways taken by subsequent American intelligence work pertaining first to Soviet-bloc countries in the immediate aftermath of World War II and later to several Third World countries. American success in breaking Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers during the war, for example, yielded unique information that afforded access to the inner chambers of every government with accredited Japanese diplomatic representatives, notably Berlin and Moscow. The insights acquired by communications intelligence were invaluable to victory in 1945, but their legacy extended well into the cold war. Thus, this collection of SRHs, a remarkable product of the most sophisticated intelligence operation before 1945, is a major contribution to the literature of World War II with broader implications beyond 1945.

In the long history of warfare never had so much information about the warring plans and capacity of the enemy been available to the ultimate victor during the conflict as the Anglo-American powers had about the Axis coalition in World War II. Allied traditional intelligence operations—commando forays, the work of resistance groups in enemy-occupied territory, spying activities by secret agents, and aerial reconnaissance, for example—were often remarkably sophisticated and successful during the war. Nevertheless, the crème de la crème of clandestine operations and achievements was in the field of signal communications—the solving of codes and ciphers (cryptography) and thereby “reading the enemy’s mail.” Never has an adversary had the opportunity to peruse so systematically and thoroughly the most secret communications of an enemy, sometimes before the rival addressee received the message.
Background

The inception of U.S. government cryptographic and cryptanalytic work came in the summer of 1917, and significant work continued after World War I, in spite of budget restrictions and changing political administrations. The U.S. Navy emphasized the training of serving intelligence officers while the U.S. Army relied more heavily on civilian personnel for the difficult and expensive work of cryptography. Cooperation between the two services was intermittent and often difficult, but with signs of the coming of another war in which the United States would possibly be a belligerent, collaboration in communications intelligence overcame, if only partially, many of the suspicions and jealousies between the services. For example, in 1940 and 1941 the army’s Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the navy’s counterpart (OP-20-G) had a special agreement for work on Japanese diplomatic traffic. The army processed all messages of even date and the navy all of odd date, with full exchange of technical data and results. Several months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, the navy became so taxed by the demands for additional study of various Japanese navy cryptographic systems that it relinquished (in agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the army) its involvement with “Purple,” the American name for what the Japanese called “Cipher Machine, Type B.” In personal communication to this author, key wartime cryptanalyst Frank B. Rowlett, who later received U.S. congressional and presidential as well as British awards and declarations for his work, noted that the army

felt that the intelligence from the Japanese diplomatic messages, particularly those exchanged between Tokyo and Berlin, Rome, and Moscow, would be of vital importance in the prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the decision was made by the Army to expand its effort on the Japanese diplomatic messages, to insure that all Japanese diplomatic intercepts could be promptly processed and the resulting information provided to U.S. intelligence agencies. This arrangement continued until the Japanese surrendered.

Purple and MAGIC

The army’s SIS broke into Purple, by far the most difficult of Japanese cryptographic systems. Introduced in 1938, Purple remained largely secure until late 1940 when SIS head cryptanalyst William F. Friedman and Rowlett, who worked primarily on the Japanese diplomatic intercepts as one of the earliest members of the SIS staff, were largely responsible for the solution. In the 1930s Friedman often referred to his dedicated staff of cryptanalysts as “magicians,” and it was probably his use of this appellation that later gave rise to the cover name MAGIC.

The term MAGIC was used by Americans to denote intelligence obtained from breaking the Japanese high-grade wireless enciphered diplomatic messages. It also came to be a cover name for all intelligence produced by the solution of foreign codes and ciphers. This broader definition is reflected in the change of the name of the chief daily summaries, made from vast numbers of intercepts, from “MAGIC SUMMARY” before July 1944 to “MAGIC”—DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY thereafter. Distinct nomenclature was not always adhered to during the war, however, especially after 1943 when American intelligence specialists were systematically given access to ULTRA, the name the British gave to information obtained from breaking German wireless traffic enciphered on the Enigma machine. In time, the term Japanese ULTRA was commonly used by Americans for information obtained from reading Japanese navy, army, and air systems.

The number of intercepted enemy cipher messages increased dramatically during the war. The enormous flood can be estimated by citing the number of messages in Purple sent personally by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo (excluding many more—some in Purple, some using other cipher systems—sent by the embassy’s attachés and secretaries). In 1941 there were approximately 75 messages, 100 in 1942, 400 in 1943, 600 in 1944, and 300 during the first five months of 1945. Message length varied from the equivalent of one to thirty pages of typed, single-spaced text. Additionally, there were Tokyo’s responses. Moreover, there were hundreds of
thousands of other enemy messages, often containing detailed operational and tactical information, and employing many different cipher systems. U.S. government cryptographic operations struggled to keep pace, but some intercepts were not deciphered and translated until months, sometimes even years, later.

Security

The enormous volume of enemy intercepts increased the risk of leaks. There was great concern at the highest levels of the U.S. wartime government for the safeguarding of the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets. Nevertheless, the British sometimes felt that American security was not stringent enough. Thus, the two Allied governments were unable to "agree to exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by...the Axis powers" until the agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British Government Code and Cipher School (GC & CS) was concluded on 17 May 1943. The problem was how to edit special intelligence and then distribute it speedily to strategic managers of the war.

The War Department was primarily responsible for handling and disseminating special cipher intelligence directly to the president and to the heads of certain other executive departments. Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) compiled daily summaries in which the most important information was gleaned from each day's batch of messages, thus producing finished intelligence from raw information. This was the process of separating the wheat from the chaff, claimed U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as he sought to make the essential information readily available to those, mainly in Washington, D.C., who needed to know. At the same time, however, he sought not to overwhelm them with the tremendous mass of daily intercepts. Marshall himself usually saw only the summaries, although occasionally when pursuing special points he would have SIS send him the originals of particular intercepted messages. The summaries were not intended to offer editorial comment beyond the minimum necessary to identify a person, place, or situation with an appropriate backdrop or reference.

Summaries

Creating the summaries was an involved process. Special Branch was in effect divided into sections concerned with either order of battle or diplomatic and related matters. There were several area desks in each section. Deciphered and translated messages from SIS, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, were screened initially as they arrived in the Pentagon. They were then channeled to the appropriate area desk. A former intelligence officer assigned to the desk concerned with Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and certain East Asian countries, Willis L. M. Reese, wrote recently to this author that each message was accompanied by a notation: either 'write' or 'note.' Messages marked 'note' were read by the desk officer and then were placed in a file. Being aware of the content of these messages was extremely important because frequently the messages could only be understood in the light of previous messages. Messages marked 'write' were written up by the desk officer and then presented to the editors [of the summaries]. The writing could involve a good bit of work because obviously the messages translated in Arlington Hall would not be in the King's English and might well be ununderstandable. Also, of course, there was a problem of what part of the message could properly be omitted. The object was to write a passage that could be quickly read and also would be understandable.

Thus, such a digest was correlated with background information, earlier evaluations, and conclusions that intelligence specialists arrived at through systematic and coordinated study of vast quantities of intercepts.

By 1943 summaries were frequently taken to the White House (although Franklin D. Roosevelt was often given special cipher intelligence earlier on Marshall's initiative) and there handed directly to the president's naval aide. They were then picked up by an MIS courier and destroyed after Roosevelt had a chance to review them. By the beginning of 1944, Marshall had summaries bound daily in a "Black Book" for convenience of reading and for greater security in handling. Sometimes two or three
Black Books were produced daily by Special Branch, MIS. They always received careful attention by members of the executive branch of the government, and were included, not surprisingly, in Marshall’s daily morning meetings with his staff. There is no clear evidence that members of the other two branches of government knew in any appreciable detail about the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets during the war. Nevertheless, Marshall, on his private initiative, had Governor Thomas E. Dewey informed about MAGIC during the presidential campaign in September 1944. Marshall, however, feared revelation of the secret in campaign speeches and political debates. If that happened, it was likely that the Japanese would change their diplomatic code, still in use at the time, thus denying the Allies vital information that Marshall regarded as indispensable to the continued successful conduct of the war. Dewey agreed magnanimously that MAGIC should be kept out of the political campaign.

Knowledge of the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets was restricted to a very limited circle early in the war, and the extreme security measures required for handling these secrets necessarily kept many theater and field commanders in the dark at the outset about special cipher intelligence. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, did not learn about ULTRA until late June 1942, when Winston Churchill, very privately and with much personal delight (for the prime minister was a devotee of cipher intelligence and its enormous importance) informed the newly appointed U.S. Army commander of the European theater of operations. Getting the secrets into the hands of appropriate field commanders obviously increased the risk of compromise.

**Dissemination Arrangements**

The need for dissemination of special cipher intelligence to U.S. Army field commands did not become acute until 1943. In March, SIS made its first entry into the mainline Japanese military systems. Earlier, however, the U.S. Navy had a direct cipher channel to Pearl Harbor, with an extension to the commander, Seventh Fleet in Brisbane. Also, General Douglas MacArthur had his own cryptanalytic organization in Australia, which had special channels of communication to Arlington Hall Station and to GC & CS at Bletchley Park outside of London. Throughout the North African campaign, German military ULTRA, produced by Bletchley Park (not by Arlington Hall), was disseminated by British Special Liaison Units (SLUs) to key American officers in accord with British security practices. American intelligence officers in Washington did not receive this service until 1943.

The 1943 Anglo-American agreement on special intelligence stipulated that both governments would disseminate MAGIC and ULTRA secrets to their own operational commands. Thus, in the summer of 1943 the American Special Security Officer (SSO) system, patterned after the British SLU organization of 1940, was devised for the dissemination of communications intelligence to the commanders at the battle fronts.

SSOs—under the operational command of the assistant chief of staff, Intelligence (G-2) in Washington, D.C.—were carefully recruited. The first group of twenty officers began training in July and was sent overseas and attached to theater headquarters in September 1943. Each SSO carried his own set of cryptographic equipment for enciphering and deciphering. A special pouch service was instituted, and materials such as the MAGIC summaries were always sent in a Top Secret pouch. Both radio cipher and pouch communications were sent directly and only to the SSO. The SSO did actual deciphering himself and personally showed the messages to the theater commander and certain staff officers who were authorized and designated in Washington, D.C., for receipt of special intelligence. Security regulations did not permit theater commands to keep SSO messages; rather, the SSO was responsible for custody until the messages were destroyed. Although the SSO system was not perhaps as masterful as the more highly centralized British SLU organization, the system proved safe and generally quite effective. (In particular, SSOs often found work with MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific command extremely difficult, but Washington sometimes found it hard to influence MacArthur in other areas as well.) Much special cipher intelligence would have had little value were it not passed on safely to commanders who used it in action.
For the U.S. Navy fleets at sea, the SSO system was hardly practical; however, the navy collaborated with the British a year before the U.S. Army did. Secure communication channels were most often used to transmit operational intelligence directly to the fighting ships, especially from the field processing units at Pearl Harbor and Melbourne. The flow of naval cipher intelligence from these units was coordinated in Washington, D.C. By 1945 naval cipher intelligence centers at Washington and Pearl Harbor were transmitting up to a million words daily.

Special Intelligence Significance

The SRHs in this collection effectively abstract and help to focus on the important contributions of MAGIC and ULTRA secrets to the eventual Allied victory. Special intelligence was crucial to Anglo-American success in North Africa, to the defeat of German U-boats in the Atlantic, and to the elimination, particularly by U.S. submarines, of the Japanese merchant fleet in the Pacific. It doomed Axis blockade-running operations between Japan and Europe. It was valuable in the planning of strategic bombing operations and served as a barometer for measuring the effectiveness of strategic bombing, particularly in Europe. It revealed much information about V-2 rocket sites in Germany and German-occupied territory. MAGIC and ULTRA messages frequently addressed economic conditions inside Axis countries, and MAGIC frequently provided Anglo-American strategists with specific exhibits of conditions on the crucial German-Soviet front. Much of the importance of special intelligence also lay in revealing the whole picture of “the other side of the hill.” MAGIC, in particular, often disclosed the state of mind and the attitudes of Axis leadership, some of which was already partially reconstructed from the whole gamut of more traditional intelligence sources. But cipher intelligence tended to provide up-to-date information. For example, on the eve of the landings at Normandy, by far the largest and most complex amphibious operation ever undertaken, one question continued to haunt Eisenhower and his lieutenants: How would Adolph Hitler’s forces react to the invasion? MAGIC revealed that Allied deception operations to disguise the actual site of the forthcoming landings were effective among most members of Hitler’s upper military echelons, including Hitler himself. Thus, Eisenhower learned what attitudes and stubborn beliefs Hitler held about the coming invasion before it was too late to take advantage of the Führer’s errors.

The complete assessment of the importance of special cipher intelligence to the defeat of the Axis powers remains to be made by scholars of World War II. There are many variables to be considered, but there can be no doubt that the Allied “reading of the enemy’s mail” helped to shorten the war, reduce the loss of life, and make inevitable an Allied victory. The ready availability of this vast collection of SRHs holds the promise that new dimensions of the history of World War II will be forthcoming.

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Professor of History
Old Dominion University
SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

During World War II, the separate U.S. communications intelligence establishments cooperated and coordinated their efforts towards a common goal: the defeat of the Axis powers. The various U.S. communications intelligence establishments collated, compiled, and analyzed almost all communications intelligence produced by the various armed forces branches (principally the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence), the Signal Security Agency, and the diplomatic corps. The Cryptologic Documents Collection consists of the end products produced by the various U.S. Intelligence establishments during the war.

The Cryptologic Documents Collection is subdivided into various series. These series include translations of Japanese and German military, naval, and diplomatic communications; historical reports; historical records originated by various branches of the U.S. armed forces; technical documents; and summaries of German and Japanese intercepts.

At this time, UPA is publishing the historical reports (SRH series) from the Cryptologic Documents Collection. These historical reports highlight the advancement of U.S. communications intelligence. They also provide background information on the lessons learned and utilization of communications intelligence in operational, tactical, and strategic planning. The historical reports also consist of analyses and compilations of such information as enemy order of battle, disposition, losses, and foreign and diplomatic relations.

Part 2. The European Theater

Part 2 consists of those histories related to communications intelligence activities conducted by the Allies, particularly the United States, in the European theater of operations. There are a few histories on the Mediterranean theater of operations. These histories were compiled from information gleaned from both ULTRA and MAGIC sources. The MAGIC sources consisted of intercepts of Japanese military and diplomatic personnel reporting on the German war machine and its capabilities. These histories reflect the integral part played by communications intelligence (ULTRA) in the operation and planning of the U.S. war effort. There are a number of reports highlighting the use of ULTRA intercepts in the Anglo-American naval effort against German U-boats during the Battle of the Atlantic. There are also histories on the use of ULTRA intercepts, by ground and air commands, in strategic and tactical planning. These histories reflect the importance of ULTRA to the Allied war effort.
SOURCE NOTE

The reports included in this micropublication are from the Cryptologic Documents Collection in the Library of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

EDITORIAL NOTE

UPA's Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II consists of the Special Research Histories (SRHs) of the Cryptologic Documents Collection. The SRHs have been micropublished in three distinct parts. They are: Part 1. The Pacific Theater; Part 2. The European Theater; and Part 3. Organization and Administration. Documents in each part are arranged by the SRH number.

UPA has microfilmed, in their entirety, all of the SRH documents that have been received by the library as of November 10, 1989. These documents have been released to the library in various forms: declassified, sanitized, or unclassified. The missing document numbers signify items that are still classified and/or have not been received by the library.

Description of the Reel Index

The Reel Index details each microfilmed document in the micropublication. Included below is a sample entry from the Reel Index and a description of each of its elements:

0117 Notes on German Fuel Position by G-2 SHEAF. SRH-015.
G-2 SHEAF. January 31, 1945. 45pp. (NA. Declassified on 5/12/78.)
This report, based on estimates prepared by the intelligence section at SHEAF, concerns the effect of German fuel shortages during the latter stages of World War II. It points out the degree of immobility forced upon German military formations as a result of nonarrival of essential fuel. The material upon which these estimates are based comes primarily from ULTRA intelligence.

Index Items: SHAEF; Fuel shortages; ULTRA intelligence.

The first line of the entry contains (left) the frame number at which the document begins and (right) the title of the document, plus its identification (SRH) number. The following line contains (1) the author or originating division and/or department of the document, (2) the document's date, (3) its page count, and (4) in parentheses, the original security classification and the date the document was declassified or sanitized. The final lines consist of an abstract of the document and a listing of the major topics under the heading, Index Items. Index items have been used in the compilation of the Subject Index that follows the Reel Index.
Security Classifications

The following key identifies the abbreviated security classifications used in the reel index entries for previously classified documents.

R  Restricted
C  Confidential
S  Secret
MS Most Secret (British)
TS Top Secret

The notation “NA” indicates that a security classification is not available.
Also included in the reel index are the dates on which documents with abbreviated security classifications from above were declassified or sanitized.
**ABBREVIATIONS**

The following abbreviations are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVALANCHE</td>
<td>Allied code name for the invasion of Salerno, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAGOON</td>
<td>Allied code name for the invasion of Southern France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETOUSA</td>
<td>European theater of operations, United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Intelligence section</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUSKY</td>
<td>Allied code name for the invasion of Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPTUNE</td>
<td>Allied code name for the Normandy Invasion</td>
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<td>OP-20-G</td>
<td>Cryptography Section (also called Navy Code and Signal Section) of the Naval Communications Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHINGLE</td>
<td>Allied code name for the invasion of Anzio, Italy</td>
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<td>SID</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence Division</td>
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<td>SIS</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>SRH</td>
<td>Special Research History</td>
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<tr>
<td>TORCH</td>
<td>Allied code name for the invasion of North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULTRA</td>
<td>Allied code name for intelligence information derived from German radio traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAWC</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College</td>
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REEL INDEX

The following index is a guide to the documents in the collection. An explanation of the contents of each entry can be found on page xiii. Individual documents within an SRH are occasionally noted by indented frame numbers and a brief notation of the title, author when available, date of the document, and total page count.

*Index Items* have been included in the order in which they appear in the abstract. These items refer the researcher to corresponding entries in the Subject Index, where additional references for the same item may (if applicable) be located. Certain index items appear in the following form: “Navy, German—radio traffic.” This arrangement indicates that the subject following the dash (radio traffic) will be found under the entry “Navy, German.”

Reel 1

Frame #

0001  Use of (CX/MSS ULTRA) by the U.S. War Department (1943–1945). SRH-005.
[ U.S. War Department.] n.d. 107pp. (NA. Declassified on 12/19/78.)
This paper examines the use and operations of signals intelligence by the U.S. War Department during World War II. Particular emphasis is placed on the activities of Special Branch, MIS, which was charged with intelligence exploitation of intercept material and exercised a limited amount of guidance over U.S. Signal Corps intelligence activities. Special Branch, MIS, was set up to handle all signals intelligence and cooperated extensively with its British counterparts in this field after 1943. The primary use of CX/MSS ULTRA lay in its influence in the minds of high-ranking representatives in the strategic councils of this period.
*Index Items*: Signal intelligence; War Department, U.S.; Special Branch, MIS; Signal Corps, U.S.

0109  Synthesis of Experiences in the Use of ULTRA Intelligence by the U.S. Army Field Commands in the European Theater of Operations. SRH-006.
Author not available. n.d. 29pp. (NA. Declassified on 12/12/78.)
This report deals with regulations governing the receipt, evaluation, and distribution of messages containing or relating to German ULTRA intelligence by Special Liaison Units. After review and screening this intelligence material was forwarded for use by U.S. field commanders in the European theater.
*Index Items*: ULTRA intelligence; Special Liaison Units.

OP-20-G. n.d. 400pp. (NA. Declassified on 9/1/77.)
This report, part of a larger series on the Battle of the Atlantic, deals with the operations of German submarines (U-boats) in Atlantic waters during World War II and U.S. efforts to combat this menace. Emphasis is made on U-boat offenses against convoys, defensive activities by the U-boats, U.S. antisubmarine activities, and the activities of German blockade-runners in the closing days of the war.
*Index Items*: Atlantic, Battle of the; Submarines; Convoys, Allied; Antisubmarine activities; Blockade-runners.
0540  Battle of the Atlantic. Volume I, Allied Communications Intelligence. SRH-009.
OP-20-G. n.d. 233pp. (NA. Declassified on 1/12/89.)
This report presents an account of the U-boat war in the Atlantic from December 1942
to May 1945 as seen through and as influenced by the decryption of German naval
radio traffic by Allied intelligence units. Also dealt with are the organization and activi-
ties of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence section during this same period.
Index Items: Atlantic; Battle of the; Submarines; Navy, German—radio traffic; OP-20-G.

0774  ULTRA: History of U.S. Strategic Air Force Europe vs. German Air Forces.
SRH-013.
This report has been prepared in order to compile a record of ULTRA intelligence
reports related to U.S. Army Air Force operations in the European theater. ULTRA
messages are intercepts of German Wehrmacht (Army), Luftwaffe (Air Force), or Naval
signals which the Germans themselves considered important enough to transmit in
high-grade cipher. It is doubtful if any armed forces in history ever had such thorough
and timely knowledge of its enemy's capabilities, conditions, and intentions as ULTRA
provided the Allied forces in this theater of operations.
Index Items: ULTRA intelligence; Army Air Force, U.S.; Army, German; Air Force,
German.

Reel 2

0001  ULTRA: History of U.S. Strategic Air Force Europe vs. German Air Forces.

0117  Notes on German Fuel Position by G-2 SHAEF. SRH-015.
G-2 SHAEF. January 31, 1945. 45pp. (NA. Declassified on 5/12/78.)
This report, based on estimates prepared by the intelligence section at SHAEF, con-
cerns the effect of German fuel shortages during the latter stages of World War II. It
points out the degree of immobility forced upon German military formations as a result
of nonarrival of essential fuel. The material upon which these estimates are based
comes primarily from ULTRA intelligence.
Index Items: SHAEF; Fuel shortages; ULTRA intelligence.

0163  The Need for New Legislation Against Unauthorized Disclosures of
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Activities. SRH-016.
116pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/23/78.)
This report outlines the need for continued security precautions in handling the special
information derived from communication intelligence activities. It covers the modern
development of cryptography, cryptanalysis, and traffic analysis. Emphasis is also
made on the effect of publicity leaks on security operations during World War II and
earlier. Current legislation concerning the problem of security violations and proposals
for improving this legislation are also presented.
Index Items: Security legislation; Communication intelligence—activities; Cryptography;
Cryptanalysis.
Allied Strategic Air Force Target Planning. SRH-017.
Author not available. n.d. 66pp. (NA. Declassified on 5/19/78.)
This report deals with Allied decisions regarding the selection of target systems and individual bombing targets. Also included is information on the results of bombing operations such as descriptions of physical damage, effect of loss of production, or use of bombed installations, and the effect of Allied bombing missions on German military operations. The report also mentions the role of ULTRA intelligence in the target selection process.
Index Items: Target planning; Bombing operations, Allied; ULTRA intelligence.

Author not available. December 1, 1944. 34pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/27/79.)
This report describes the efforts by German submarines to break the Allied blockade of Europe in order to reach ports in the Far East. The report covers the rate of success for these blockade-runners, the length of time required for their voyages, and the type of cargo they generally carried. Also mentioned in this report are Allied efforts to prevent blockade-running and the amount of cargo destroyed by Allied vessels during the course of the war.
Index Items: Blockade-runners; Submarines.

ULTRA and the U.S. Seventh Army. SRH-022
Donald S. Bussey. May 12, 1945. 7pp. (NA. Declassified on 10/18, [Year not available].)
This report summarizes the experience of the U.S. Seventh Army in the use of ULTRA intelligence between August 1944 and May 8, 1945. It discusses the effect of ULTRA intelligence on the military operations and security situation of the Seventh Army during this period.
Index Items: Seventh Army, U.S.; ULTRA intelligence.

68pp. (NA. Declassified on 10/27/78.)
0397 Report on Use of ULTRA at Twelfth Army Group.
0410 Notes on Ultra Traffic, First U.S. Army.
0413 ULTRA and the Third Army.
0418 Use of ULTRA by Ninth U.S. Army.
0433 ULTRA Intelligence at Sixth U.S. Army Group.
0448 ULTRA at Sixth Army Group.
0450 ULTRA and the U.S. Seventh Army.
Donald S. Bussey. May 12, 1945. 7pp.
0457 ULTRA and the Fifteenth Army.
This report contains material from U.S. ULTRA intelligence representatives concerning field operations of the Twelfth Army Group, the U.S. First Army, the U.S. Third Army, the U.S. Ninth Army, the Sixth Army Group, the U.S. Seventh Army and the U.S. Fifteenth Army in the European theater. Also contained in these reports is material on
methods and recommendations for handling ULTRA intelligence at field commands and the effect of ULTRA intelligence on U.S. military operations.


Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Army Field Commands in the European Theater of Operations (Part II). SRH-023. 120pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/7/78.)

0459 Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Army Field Commands in the European Theater of Operations (Part II). SRH-023. 120pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/7/78.)


This report represents a continuation of the previous entry. It contains material from U.S. ULTRA intelligence representatives attached to SHAEF Air Intelligence, the First Allied Airborne Army, the Special Adviser on Tactical Air Force, the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), the Eighth Air Force, the Ninth Air Force, Ninth Tactical Air Command, Nineteenth Tactical Air Command, Twenty-ninth Tactical Air Command, ETOUSA, COM Z, SHAEF Rear G-2, and Ambassador Murphy. As shown above, these field reports show the effect of ULTRA intelligence on U.S. military operations.
**Battle of the Atlantic. Volume III, German Naval Communication Intelligence.**
SRH-024.
Author not available. n.d. 70pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/7/78.)
This report deals with the organization and workings of German naval communication intelligence. The material includes information on intelligence disseminated to German U-boats and German intelligence on Allied convoys in the Atlantic. Also covered is information on German fears regarding compromise of their naval cipher.
*Index Items:* Navy, German—communication intelligence; Submarines; Convoys, Allied; Navy, German—ciphers.

**Battle of the Atlantic. Volume IV, Technical Intelligence from Allied Communication Intelligence.**
SRH-025.
Author not available. n.d. 79pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/7/78.)
This report contains information on German search receivers and radar, antidetection devices, armament of German naval vessels and submarines, German-Japanese information exchanges, German naval fuel situation, and U-boat navigation. It also contains an appendix on German weather reporting activities.
*Index Items:* Search receivers; Radar; Antidetection devices; Armaments; Submarines; Information exchanges; Navy, German—fuel situation; Weather reporting activities.

SRH-026.
This letter reveals the importance of ULTRA intelligence to the Allies. It also sets forth the basis upon which German ULTRA intelligence was made available to American field commands.
*Index Items:* George C. Marshall; Dwight D. Eisenhower; ULTRA intelligence.

**Trip Reports Concerning Use of ULTRA in the Mediterranean Theatre, 1943–1944.**
SRH-031.
141pp. (NA. Declassified on 4/16/79.)

This material contains reports by U.S. ULTRA intelligence representatives regarding intelligence gathering activities and Anglo-American cooperation in the Mediterranean area of military operations.
*Index Items:* ULTRA intelligence; Anglo-American cooperation; Mediterranean theater.
Reports Received by U.S. War Department on Use of ULTRA in the European Theater, World War II. SRH-037.
35pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/3/79.)

Volume, Security, Use, and Dissemination of ULTRA.

The Use of “U” in the Mediterranean and Northwest African Theaters of War.

These reports by U.S. intelligence personnel deal with the volume, security, use, and dissemination of ULTRA intelligence and with the use of ULTRA in the Mediterranean and Northwest African theaters of war.

Index Items: ULTRA intelligence; Mediterranean theater; Northwest African theater.

Third Army Radio Intelligence History in Campaign of Western Europe. SRH-042.
Headquarters, Third U.S. Army. n.d. 82pp. (S. Declassified on 11/30/79.)

This report presents information regarding the operational organization and procedure of radio intelligence agencies. The material also includes technical and intelligence history of German and U.S. Third Army radio intelligence units. It presents criticisms and suggestions regarding U.S. Third Army radio intelligence operations. An annex contains a history of major German units involved in radio intelligence.

Index Items: Radio intelligence—agencies; Germany—radio intelligence units; Third Army, U.S.—radio intelligence activities.

Summary of Operational Activity of Signal Security Detachment “D,” 12th Army Group, European Theater of Operations, Covering the Period, September 1, 1944 to April 1, 1945. SRH-048
Author not available. n.d. 79pp. (S. Declassified on 3/5/80.)

This report summarizes the intelligence mission assigned to Signal Security Detachment “D.” The role of this unit was the procurement of signal intelligence from the solution of German medium and low grade tactical codes and ciphers for the Twelfth Army Group. It was also assigned to the coordination and technical supervision of the Signal Radio Intelligence Companies and Signal Service Companies operating under units attached to the Twelfth Army Group. The operational activities of this particular unit are covered in detail in this report.

Index Items: Signal Security Detachment “D”; Signal intelligence; Codes; Twelfth Army Group; Signal Radio Intelligence Companies; Signal Service Companies.

Technical Signal Intelligence Transmitted Directly to G-2, 12th Army Group, European Theater of Operations from August 14, 1944 to May 1945. SRH-049.
Author not available. n.d. 220pp. (S. Declassified on 3/5/80.)

This report contains signal intelligence data submitted to the G-2 (Intelligence) section of the Twelfth Army Group by Signal Security Detachment “D.” The material deals primarily with the movements of various German armored and infantry units in relation to Allied positions during the period indicated in the title. Brief descriptions and comments on engagements between Allied and German forces are included, as are German troop strengths and losses.

Index Items: Signal intelligence; Twelfth Army Group; Signal Security Detachment “D”; Armored units, German; Army, German.
Notes on the Crimea (Yalta) Conference. SRH-070.
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. March 23, 1945. 13pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)
This report contains highlights of the Yalta Conference between U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston S. Churchill, and Soviet premier Josef Stalin held between February 4 and February 11, 1945, in the Russian Crimea. The results of this controversial conference are said to have laid the roots for the cold war that followed. It was here at Yalta that the "Big Three" decided the fate of the postwar world, particularly in Europe. The stated purpose of the Yalta Conference was to settle the Polish question and exert pressure on the USSR to clarify its Far Eastern policy. This report also gives the reaction in Germany, Japan, France, and other nations to the activities at this conference.
Index Items: Yalta Conference; Franklin D. Roosevelt; Winston S. Churchill; Josef Stalin; Polish question; USSR—Far Eastern policy.

Report on Assignment with Third U.S. Army, August 15—September 18, 1944.
SRH-108.
Warrick Wallace. n.d. 8pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/17/80.)
This report contains Major Wallace's account of his assignment as ULTRA intelligence officer at the headquarters of the U.S. Third Army. Major Wallace includes information on the tactical use of ULTRA by the Third Army and the security precautions used to safeguard its use. Also mentioned in the report are comments made by General George S. Patton suggesting the broadening of the role of ULTRA.
Index Items: Warrick Wallace; ULTRA intelligence; Third Army, U.S.; Security precautions; George S. Patton, Jr.

MIS, War Department General Staff. July 2, 1945. 13pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/30/80.)
This report provides an indepth study of the mission of U.S. intelligence's German specialists. Their role was to produce usable military intelligence covering the entire German field. Included is material on personnel selection and training for this elite unit, intelligence functions, sources of information, and methods of procuring information which were used by this elite team of professionals.
Index Item: German specialists, U.S.

Operations of the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, London.
SRH-110.
F. H. Hilles. n.d. 58pp. (TS. Declassified on 1/7/81.)
MIS, War Department, London, was the American unit responsible for handling ULTRA intelligence in the European theater. This report examines the major functions of the MIS and provides material on special security operations in the European theater. Also included in this report is an account of the origin and development of the unit known as 3-US. 3-US was the American section in Hut 3 which was primarily concerned with providing liaison between the British intelligence agencies and G-2, Washington, D.C.
Index Items: MIS; ULTRA intelligence; European theater; Anglo-American cooperation.
Post Mortem Writings on Indications of Ardennes Offensive, December 1944.
SRH-112.
48pp. (Declassified on 1/19/81.)

Addendum to USAWC Military Research Program Paper: The Ultra Study (May 23, 1975)—“The Battle of the Bulge.”

Classified Annex to Addendum to USAWC Military Research Program Paper: The Ultra Study—“Communications Intelligence (COMINT) in the Prelude to the Battle of the Bulge.”

Project No. 1352-A: “Analysis of Situation on the Western Front.”

These reports deal with U.S. intelligence information which foreshadowed Hitler's last great gamble on the western front, the Ardennes Offensive (popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge). Included is material on Allied strategy and events leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. The German Ardennes offensive was a marked failure in Allied interpretation of the intelligence information available. Although a number of intelligence indicators of a major German military buildup existed, Allied intelligence allowed itself to believe that prevailing conditions precluded such an attack. One major reason for this intelligence failure was excessive Allied reliance on ULTRA for information, which due to Hitler's imposition of radio silence regarding the buildup, was not available to provide necessary data.

Index Items: Battle of the Bulge; ULTRA intelligence.

Selected Documents Concerning O.S.S. Operations in Lisbon, Spring 1943.
SRH-113. 29pp.

Intelligence Gathered by the Japanese Military Attaché in Lisbon.

These documents relate to various intelligence operations carried out by the OSS in Lisbon, the capital of neutral Portugal. Included is material on information gathered by OSS agents in Portugal regarding Japanese knowledge of Allied defenses and troop conditions and also material relating to Japanese fears of possible compromise of their cryptographic intercept system by American intelligence agents. Concern is expressed by the U.S. War Department over the possibility that OSS operations in Lisbon could alert the Japanese to the fact that their diplomatic code had been intercepted and broken. It was feared that this might lead the Japanese to change their codes for security reasons and cost the Allied war effort a valuable source of Japanese military intelligence.

Index Items: OSS; Portugal; Defenses, Allied; Cryptographic intercept system, Japanese.

SRH-124.

This report deals with the history of the 849th Signal Intelligence Service. Information is included on the unit's development, personnel, and organizational functions. Primary responsibilities of this unit included fulfilling signal intelligence commitments at U.S. Army corps headquarters, interception and analysis of German radio traffic, provision of intelligence information on German Luftwaffe activities to Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, analysis of ciphered European weather broadcasts emanating from within enemy-held territories, and providing the OSS with information from a study of clandestine radio traffic of enemy agents in Allied-controlled territory.

Index Items: 849th Signal Intelligence Service; Signal intelligence; Germany—radio traffic; Air Force, German; Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; Weather broadcasts; OSS.
ULTRA and the Campaigns Against the U-Boats in World War II. SRH-142.
This study paper deals with the extent to which the U.S. Navy used ULTRA, or Special Intelligence, in its campaign against the German U-boats. Included is information on U.S. defensive and offensive operations in the U-boat war in the Atlantic. An overview of German U-boat operations against U.S. coastal shipping in the Atlantic is also provided. Following the breaking of Germany's naval codes by the British, extensive information on German U-boat activities became available to the Allied cause. Despite some early reversals this enabled them to effectively monitor the movements of the German "wolf packs" and to combat their depredations against Allied merchant shipping. The Allies were eventually able to coordinate ULTRA intelligence information with their own antisubmarine efforts to bring an end to the U-boat menace in the Atlantic.

Index Items: Navy, U.S.; ULTRA intelligence; Submarines; Shipping, Allied; Navy, German—codes; Antisubmarine activities.

ULTRA in the Battle of Britain: The Real Key to Success? SRH-143.
Tommy J. Smith. May 18, 1980. 75pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/17/81.)
This study paper provides insight into the historical significance of the Battle of Britain both as the turning point of World War II and as a case study in the development of modern air defense techniques and the application of secret intelligence sources. The primary focus of this report is on the importance of information obtained through ULTRA to the outcome of this historic confrontation. The British were able to discover a great deal of information regarding Luftwaffe order of battle, stationing, and readiness status through use of ULTRA. It was also through ULTRA that the British discovered Hermann Goering's intentions to overwhelm British air defenses and the exact time and targets of the planned attack. This enabled the Royal Air Force (RAF) to place their slender resources in the optimum position to meet and repel the German attack and ultimately win the Battle of Britain, an event which proved to be the turning point in the fight against Hitler. Although ULTRA by itself was not responsible for the British success, it was a major contributing factor in the German defeat.

Index Items: Battle of Britain; ULTRA intelligence; Air Force, German; Hermann Goering; Air defenses; Royal Air Force.

Military Intelligence Service (MIS), War Department Liaison Activities in the United Kingdom, 1943–1945. SRH-153.
21pp. (TS. Declassified on 2/16/82.)

History of Special Counter-Intelligence War Room.

Memorandum Describing American Liaison.

These reports deal with U.S.-British cooperation in the intelligence field and the role of MIS as the liaison between the two countries. MIS was set up to coordinate and supply all high-level counterintelligence to all of the Allied armies and army groups in Europe. One of the most important roles of MIS was in the dissemination of ULTRA intelligence provided by the British for use by U.S. forces. The report provides information on principal MIS personnel and lists the principal objects of the liaison.

Index Items: Anglo-American cooperation; MIS; Counterintelligence; ULTRA intelligence.

William E. Purdue. October 25, 1945. 47pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/10/82.)
This report contains an annexed file with copies of all intelligence messages sent to and received from the U.S. military mission at Moscow by MIS during the period from August 2 to August 14, 1945. Most of the information contained in these messages is
from ULTRA sources. This exchange was authorized for the purpose of informing the U.S. mission of current developments in the Japanese situation and to assist in its exchange with the Soviet government. These messages deal primarily with Japanese troop strengths and positions.

*Index Items:* Moscow, USSR; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; Japan—troop strengths.

**0802**


OP-20-G. n.d. 210pp. (TS. Declassified on 9/10/82.)

These documents represent intercepted German naval communiqués sent to U-boat commanders operating in the Atlantic. They deal with Allied naval strengths and positions, descriptions of conditions off enemy coastlines, instructions to the U-boat commanders regarding their assignments, and discussions of U-boat losses. These messages also include admonitions to the U-boat commanders on matters such as the importance of navigation in undersea warfare and the importance of proper security precautions.

*Index Items:* Navy, German—communiqués; Submarines; Naval strengths, Allied; Security precautions—German.

**1013**


OP-20-G. n.d. 49pp. (S. Declassified on 10/21/82.)

Although not nearly as well-known as the famous German U-boat "wolf packs," the Italians also engaged in submarine warfare in the Mediterranean and Atlantic during World War II. These messages represent the only currently available U.S. intercepts and translations of Italian submarine radio traffic during that period. The messages deal with such items as aircraft warning signals, warnings to watch out for drifting mines, reports regarding Allied shipping, and reports regarding the assignments and positions of the Italian submarines.

*Index Items:* Italy—submarines; Aircraft warning signals; Shipping, Allied.

**Reel 4**

**0001**

SIS Activities of Captain Harrison and Captain Koerner, European Theater of Operations, 1944–1945. SRH-221.

Rodger S. Harrison. June 1, 1945. 21pp. (S. Declassified on 12/30/82.)

This report is a record of the activities of Captain Rodger Harrison and a Captain Koerner, both U.S. Signal Corps officers assigned to the Chief Signal Officer, European theater of operations, while on detached service to the Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups where they dealt with signal intelligence operations. The material focuses primarily on Captain Harrison, and deals with his mission and objectives while serving with the 137th and 129th Radio Intelligence Companies. The major mission of these officers was to arrange for cooperation and coordination between the units to which they were assigned and other signal intelligence agencies of the Ninth Army and Twelfth Army Group. Also included in this report is a concise study of signal intelligence operations within the Sixth Army Group.

*Index Items:* Rodger Harrison; Sixth Army Group, U.S.; Twelfth Army Group; Signal intelligence—operations; Radio Intelligence Companies; Ninth Army, U.S.
Histories of Radio Intelligence Units, European Theater, September 1944 to March 1945—Volume I. SRH-228.

0252 3254th Signal Service Company Operational History, April 1, 1944—April 30, 1945. 38pp.

This report contains descriptions of the activities of the following units: U.S. Third Army, 3250th and 3254th Signal Service Companies, and the 113th and 114th Signal Radio Intelligence Companies. These units were involved in U.S. radio intelligence operations in the European theater of operations. This material includes a wide variety of information on the operational organization and procedures of these radio intelligence agencies. Information regarding actual intelligence operations, movements of units, technical information regarding the setup and operation of radio equipment, and records of unit personnel are all covered in these histories. A history of major German units involved in radio intelligence is included as an annex to one of these reports. Many of these units were involved in radio intercept and intelligence operations associated with Operation Neptune, the Allied codename for the D-Day invasion of Normandy.

Index Items: Radio intelligence—units; Third Army, U.S.; Signal Service Companies; Signal Radio Intelligence Companies; European theater; Operation Neptune.

Histories of Radio Intelligence Units, European Theater, September 1944 to March 1945—Volume II. SRH-228.

0434 Third Army Signal Intelligence Service History, January 1, 1944 to September 30, 1944. 80pp.
0609 3255 Signal Service Company Unit Operational History, August 1944 to May 1945. 50pp.

These reports represent a continuation of the material in the previous entry. The radio intelligence units dealt with in this section are: Third Army SIS, 3325th Signal Information and Monitoring (SIAM) Company, and the 3251st, 3255th, 3259th and 3262nd Signal Service Companies. Once again detailed historical information regarding the history of each of these units is presented, as well as material on their intelligence activities and field operations. Included is information regarding these units' command posts in Europe, unit movements, locations of various U.S. army field units, training procedures, and technical information regarding radio equipment and interception techniques. All of these units were involved in the Allied drive into Germany following the D-Day invasion.

Index Items: Third Army, U.S.; SIS; Signal Information and Monitoring Company; Signal Service Companies; Operation Neptune.
These documents are records concerning suspected Axis blockade-runners. These blockade-runners were active not only in Europe, but in the Far East as well. Information is included on German, Italian, and to a lesser degree, Japanese shipping. The material takes the form of weekly summaries, reports and memoranda listing ship names, points of departure, probable destinations, and sightings and position reports. Also included is material regarding ship speeds, ship descriptions, shipwrecks, sinkings by Allied vessels, and occasionally cargo information. All material provided in these documents was obtained through U.S. naval cryptographic sources.

Index Items: Blockade-runners; Germany—shipping; Italy—shipping; Japan—shipping.

Cryptographic Division, German Word List. SRH-342.
Cryptographic Division. August 1942. 198pp. (R. Declassified on 10/27/81.)
This report contains information for use by Allied cryptographers regarding common German words and phrases. The material is arranged both alphabetically and according to word length. This material would be of major importance in obtaining correct translations and accurate information from coded German radio transmissions.
Index Item: German word list.

Cryptographic Division, Spanish Word List. SRH-343.
Cryptographic Division. August 1942. 52pp. (R. Declassified on 10/27/81.)
This report contains information for use by Allied cryptographers regarding common Spanish words and phrases. These materials are arranged according to word length, alphabetically, and by pattern. This material would be of great assistance in obtaining correct translations and accurate information from coded radio transmissions sent by German or Spanish agents operating out of Franco's Spain or Latin America.
Index Item: Spanish word list.

Reel 5

Cryptographic Division, Spanish Word List. SRH-343 cont.

Cryptographic Division, Italian Word List. SRH-347.
This report contains information for use by Allied cryptographers regarding common Italian words and phrases. These materials are arranged alphabetically according to word length and pattern length. This material would be of great assistance in obtaining correct translations and accurate information from coded radio transmissions sent by German or Italian agents operating around the world.
Index Item: Italian word list.

U.S. Navy. n.d. 31pp. (TS. Declassified on 1/3/85.)
These documents contain information relating to the U.S. Navy's radio intelligence operations in the European theater. Items discussed include special training in combating air attacks, activities of afloat radio intelligence teams, and assignment of radio intelligence personnel. The U.S. Navy's purpose in assigning mobile radio intelligence units was to allow theater commanders in the field to have rapid access to accurate intelligence information regarding enemy actions and movements. The primary function
of these units was the interception of German VHF [Very High Frequency] E-boat and aircraft transmissions.

*Index Items:* Navy, U.S.; Radio intelligence—mobile; E-boats, German; Aircraft transmissions.

**0289**


U.S. Navy. n.d. 87pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/19/88.)

These documents contain further information relating to the U.S. Navy's radio intelligence operations in the European theater. Items included in this material are requests for radio equipment for various U.S. naval vessels, information on the study and development of radio intelligence work by vessels at sea, especially in escort of convoy operations, assignment of radio intelligence personnel, radio intelligence training, reports on activities of U.S. Navy "Y" teams, "Y" team operations during Operation Dragoon (the Allied invasion of southern France), and radio intelligence operator's logbook entries. The primary purpose of these units was the interception of German radio transmissions and the collection of this material for use by Allied commanders.

*Index Items:* Navy, U.S.; Radio intelligence—mobile; Convoys, Allied; "Y" teams; Operation Dragoon.

**0377**

*History, Signal Intelligence Division (European Theater of Operations). SRH-357.*

N. Allen. n.d. 235pp. (S. Declassification date not available.)

This document, written in the form of a diary and covering the period June 1942 through January 1944, contains the history and development of the SID. Originally the SID provided liaison with the British MIS and Air Ministry; they also exchanged intelligence reports with the British "Y" service. This report covers the activities and operations of the SID from its inception until its emergence as the major U.S. intelligence agency in the European theater. Information is included on personnel, training, radio interception of German coded messages, the production and submission of intelligence information to G-2, and various intelligence operations conducted by SID.

*Index Items:* SID; MIS; Air Ministry; "Y" Service, British.

**0613**

*A Preliminary Analysis of the Role of Decryption Intelligence in the Operational Phase of the Battle of the Atlantic.* SRH-367.


This report, prepared at the request of OP-03D and 322Y, should be viewed as a preliminary example of the kind of information which can be obtained by a more extensive study of the data extracted from the decryptions by both the Germans and the Allies of radio communications pertaining to the operations of the German submarines against Allied shipping. While incomplete, enough work has been done to establish a number of conclusions of the widest general interest to all those concerned with the radio war in the Atlantic, and with the conduct of antisubmarine operations.

*Index Items:* OP-03D; Submarines; Shipping, Allied; Antisubmarine activities.

**0706**

*Evaluation of the Role of Decryption Intelligence in the Operational Phase of the Battle of the Atlantic.* SRH-368.

U.S. Navy Operations Evaluation Group. 1952. 113pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/7/87.)

This report contains the findings of research carried out with the general objective of determining in what manner and to what extent the availability of intelligence derived from the decryption of intercepted radio messages affected the conduct of the U-boat war against North Atlantic convoys on the part of the belligerents. It should be stressed that this report is in no sense a comprehensive evaluation of the part played by decrypt-
tion intelligence in the war against the U-boats. It is concerned only with the particular
effect which decryption had on the capability of the U-boats to contact and attack
convoys, and on the capability of the Allies to counter these operations.
Index Items: Decryption intelligence; Atlantic, Battle of the; Submarines; Convoys,
Allied; Antisubmarine activities.

American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe. SRH-391.
(S. Declassified on 3/24/88.)
This report centers on American production and use of tactical signal intelligence
(referred to in Allied code as "Y"), as accomplished in the western Mediterranean and
European theaters of operation, U.S. Army. It treats ULTRA marginally, as it had
tactical applications. A theater's SIS provided tactical intelligence information to field
commanders. Dissemination was subject to security regulations appropriate for a
product of high value and precarious availability. Enemy communications from which
tactical signal intelligence was derived were those passed between low and intermediate
levels of command in low-grade or medium-grade cryptographic systems. Included
is material concerning signal intelligence activities during Operations Torch (invasion of
North Africa), Husky (invasion of Sicily), Avalanche (invasion of Salerno, Italy), Shingle
(invasion of Anzio, Italy), Dragoon (invasion of southern France), and Neptune (D-Day
invasion of Normandy), and the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge).
Index Items: Signal intelligence; ULTRA intelligence; SIS; Security precautions;
Operation Torch; Operation Husky; Operation Avalanche; Operation Shingle; Operation
Dragoon; Operation Neptune; Battle of the Bulge.
The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first arabic number refers to the reel, and the four-digit number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular subject begins. Therefore, 2: 0737 directs the researcher to the subject that begins at Frame 0737 of Reel 2.

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