

*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

**World War II Research Collections**

**Top Secret Studies on  
U.S. Communications Intelligence  
during World War II**


**Part 1.**

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**The Pacific Theater**

**UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA**



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**Top Secret Studies on U.S.  
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**Part 1.  
The Pacific Theater**

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
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# INTRODUCTION

Soon after declassification of selected communications intelligence material from World War II was undertaken by the National Security Agency in the late 1970s, many valuable documents were made available to researchers in the National Archives. An early scholar of this material, the late Ronald Lewin, said to the press in Washington, D.C., in 1981, "If I were writing a Ph.D. [dissertation], I'd rush over to Archives this minute." Since then much more material has been declassified; some of the Top Secret Studies in this collection of microfilm were declassified only in the late 1980s.

## SRH Case Studies

Special Research Histories (SRHs), a series of studies, monographs, and reports principally concerning cryptographic operations in World War II, were compiled mostly from highly classified contemporary files by wartime participants. Each SRH addresses a specific topic. For example, SRH-090, compiled only in six copies in late August 1945 and classified Top Secret ULTRA, focuses on "Japan's Surrender Maneuvers" (45 pages); SRH-111 is titled "MAGIC Reports for the Attention of the President, 1943-1945" (32 pages); and SRH-142 is a 1980 U.S. Army War College Military Studies Program Paper on "ULTRA and the Campaigns against the U-boats in World War II" (38 pages).

The SRHs were designed as case studies originally for the purpose of promoting understanding within various government agencies of wartime intelligence operations. They sometimes include subtle suggestions and point to possible ways taken by subsequent American intelligence work pertaining first to Soviet-bloc countries in the immediate aftermath of World War II and later to several Third World countries. American success in breaking Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers during the war, for example, yielded unique information that afforded access to the inner chambers of every government with accredited Japanese diplomatic representatives, notably Berlin and Moscow. The insights acquired by communications intelligence were invaluable to victory in 1945, but their legacy extended well into the cold war. Thus, this collection of SRHs, a remarkable product of the most sophisticated intelligence operation before 1945, is a major contribution to the literature of World War II with broader implications beyond 1945.

In the long history of warfare never had so much information about the warring plans and capacity of the enemy been available to the ultimate victor during the conflict as the Anglo-American powers had about the Axis coalition in World War II. Allied traditional intelligence operations—commando forays, the work of resistance groups in enemy-occupied territory; spying activities by secret agents, and aerial reconnaissance, for example—were often remarkably sophisticated and successful during the war. Nevertheless, the *crème de la crème* of clandestine operations and achievements was in the field of signal communications—the solving of codes and ciphers (cryptography) and thereby "reading the enemy's mail." Never has an adversary had the opportunity to peruse so systematically and thoroughly the most secret communications of an enemy, sometimes before the rival addressee received the message.

## Background

The inception of U.S. government cryptographic and cryptanalytic work came in the summer of 1917, and significant work continued after World War I, in spite of budget restrictions and changing political administrations. The U.S. Navy emphasized the training of serving intelligence officers while the U.S. Army relied more heavily on civilian personnel for the difficult and expensive work of cryptography. Cooperation between the two services was intermittent and often difficult, but with signs of the coming of another war in which the United States would possibly be a belligerent, collaboration in communications intelligence overcame, if only partially, many of the suspicions and jealousies between the services. For example, in 1940 and 1941 the army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the navy's counterpart (OP-20-G) had a special agreement for work on Japanese diplomatic traffic. The army processed all messages of even date and the navy all of odd date, with full exchange of technical data and results. Several months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, the navy became so taxed by the demands for additional study of various Japanese navy cryptographic systems that it relinquished (in agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the army) its involvement with "Purple," the American name for what the Japanese called "Cipher Machine, Type B." In personal communication to this author, key wartime cryptanalyst Frank B. Rowlett, who later received U.S. congressional and presidential as well as British awards and declarations for his work, noted that the army

felt that the intelligence from the Japanese diplomatic messages, particularly those exchanged between Tokyo and Berlin, Rome, and Moscow, would be of vital importance in the prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the decision was made by the Army to expand its effort on the Japanese diplomatic messages, to insure that all Japanese diplomatic intercepts could be promptly processed and the resulting information provided to U.S. intelligence agencies. This arrangement continued until the Japanese surrendered.

## Purple and MAGIC

The army's SIS broke into Purple, by far the most difficult of Japanese cryptographic systems. Introduced in 1938, Purple remained largely secure until late 1940 when SIS head cryptanalyst William F. Friedman and Rowlett, who worked primarily on the Japanese diplomatic intercepts as one of the earliest members of the SIS staff, were largely responsible for the solution. In the 1930s Friedman often referred to his dedicated staff of cyptanalysts as "magicians," and it was probably his use of this appellation that later gave rise to the cover name MAGIC.

The term MAGIC was used by Americans to denote intelligence obtained from breaking the Japanese high-grade wireless enciphered diplomatic messages. It also came to be a cover name for all intelligence produced by the solution of foreign codes and ciphers. This broader definition is reflected in the change of the name of the chief daily summaries, made from vast numbers of intercepts, from "*MAGIC*" SUMMARY before July 1944 to "*MAGIC*"—*DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY* thereafter. Distinct nomenclature was not always adhered to during the war, however, especially after 1943 when American intelligence specialists were systematically given access to ULTRA, the name the British gave to information obtained from breaking German wireless traffic enciphered on the Enigma machine. In time, the term Japanese ULTRA was commonly used by Americans for information obtained from reading Japanese navy, army, and air systems.

The number of intercepted enemy cipher messages increased dramatically during the war. The enormous flood can be estimated by citing the number of messages in Purple sent personally by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo (excluding many more—some in Purple, some using other cipher systems—sent by the embassy's attachés and secretaries). In 1941 there were approximately 75 messages, 100 in 1942, 400 in 1943, 600 in 1944, and 300 during the first five months of 1945. Message length varied from the equivalent of one to thirty pages of typed, single-spaced text. Additionally, there were Tokyo's responses. Moreover, there were hundreds of

thousands of other enemy messages, often containing detailed operational and tactical information, and employing many different cipher systems. U.S. government cryptographic operations struggled to keep pace, but some intercepts were not deciphered and translated until months, sometimes even years, later.

## **Security**

The enormous volume of enemy intercepts increased the risk of leaks. There was great concern at the highest levels of the U.S. wartime government for the safeguarding of the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets. Nevertheless, the British sometimes felt that American security was not stringent enough. Thus, the two Allied governments were unable to "agree to exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by...the Axis powers" until the agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British Government Code and Cipher School (GC & CS) was concluded on 17 May 1943. The problem was how to edit special intelligence and then distribute it speedily to strategic managers of the war.

The War Department was primarily responsible for handling and disseminating special cipher intelligence directly to the president and to the heads of certain other executive departments. Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) compiled daily summaries in which the most important information was gleaned from each day's batch of messages, thus producing finished intelligence from raw information. This was the process of separating the wheat from the chaff, claimed U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as he sought to make the essential information readily available to those, mainly in Washington, D.C., who needed to know. At the same time, however, he sought not to overwhelm them with the tremendous mass of daily intercepts. Marshall himself usually saw only the summaries, although occasionally when pursuing special points he would have SIS send him the originals of particular intercepted messages. The summaries were not intended to offer editorial comment beyond the minimum necessary to identify a person, place, or situation with an appropriate backdrop or reference.

## **Summaries**

Creating the summaries was an involved process. Special Branch was in effect divided into sections concerned with either order of battle or diplomatic and related matters. There were several area desks in each section. Deciphered and translated messages from SIS, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, were screened initially as they arrived in the Pentagon. They were then channeled to the appropriate area desk. A former intelligence officer assigned to the desk concerned with Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and certain East Asian countries, Willis L. M. Reese, wrote recently to this author that

each message was accompanied by a notation: either 'write' or 'note.' Messages marked 'note' were read by the desk officer and then were placed in a file. Being aware of the content of these messages was extremely important because frequently the messages could only be understood in the light of previous messages. Messages marked 'write' were written up by the desk officer and then presented to the editors [of the summaries]. The writing could involve a good bit of work because obviously the messages translated in Arlington Hall would not be in the King's English and might well be ununderstandable. Also, of course, there was a problem of what part of the message could properly be omitted. The object was to write a passage that could be quickly read and also would be understandable.

Thus, such a digest was correlated with background information, earlier evaluations, and conclusions that intelligence specialists arrived at through systematic and coordinated study of vast quantities of intercepts.

By 1943 summaries were frequently taken to the White House (although Franklin D. Roosevelt was often given special cipher intelligence earlier on Marshall's initiative) and there handed directly to the president's naval aide. They were soon picked up by an MIS courier and destroyed after Roosevelt had a chance to review them. By the beginning of 1944, Marshall had summaries bound daily in a "Black Book" for convenience of reading and for greater security in handling. Sometimes two or three

Black Books were produced daily by Special Branch, MIS. They always received careful attention by members of the executive branch of the government, and were included, not surprisingly, in Marshall's daily morning meetings with his staff. There is no clear evidence that members of the other two branches of government knew in any appreciable detail about the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets during the war. Nevertheless, Marshall, on his private initiative, had Governor Thomas E. Dewey informed about MAGIC during the presidential campaign in September 1944. Marshall, however, feared revelation of the secret in campaign speeches and political debates. If that happened, it was likely that the Japanese would change their diplomatic code, still in use at the time, thus denying the Allies vital information that Marshall regarded as indispensable to the continued successful conduct of the war. Dewey agreed magnanimously that MAGIC should be kept out of the political campaign.

Knowledge of the MAGIC and ULTRA secrets was restricted to a very limited circle early in the war, and the extreme security measures required for handling these secrets necessarily kept many theater and field commanders in the dark at the outset about special cipher intelligence. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, did not learn about ULTRA until late June 1942, when Winston Churchill, very privately and with much personal delight (for the prime minister was a devotee of cipher intelligence and its enormous importance) informed the newly appointed U.S. Army commander of the European theater of operations. Getting the secrets into the hands of appropriate field commanders obviously increased the risk of compromise.

## **Dissemination Arrangements**

The need for dissemination of special cipher intelligence to U.S. Army field commands did not become acute until 1943. In March, SIS made its first entry into the mainline Japanese military systems. Earlier, however, the U.S. Navy had a direct cipher channel to Pearl Harbor, with an extension to the commander, Seventh Fleet in Brisbane. Also, General Douglas MacArthur had his own cryptanalytic organization in Australia, which had special channels of communication to Arlington Hall Station and to GC & CS at Bletchley Park outside of London. Throughout the North African campaign, German military ULTRA, produced by Bletchley Park (not by Arlington Hall), was disseminated by British Special Liaison Units (SLUs) to key American officers in accord with British security practices. American intelligence officers in Washington did not receive this service until 1943.

The 1943 Anglo-American agreement on special intelligence stipulated that both governments would disseminate MAGIC and ULTRA secrets to their own operational commands. Thus, in the summer of 1943 the American Special Security Officer (SSO) system, patterned after the British SLU organization of 1940, was devised for the dissemination of communications intelligence to the commanders at the battle fronts.

SSOs—under the operational command of the assistant chief of staff, Intelligence (G-2) in Washington, D.C.—were carefully recruited. The first group of twenty officers began training in July and was sent overseas and attached to theater headquarters in September 1943. Each SSO carried his own set of cryptographic equipment for enciphering and deciphering. A special pouch service was instituted, and materials such as the MAGIC summaries were always sent in a Top Secret pouch. Both radio cipher and pouch communications were sent directly and only to the SSO. The SSO did actual deciphering himself and personally showed the messages to the theater commander and certain staff officers who were authorized and designated in Washington, D.C., for receipt of special intelligence. Security regulations did not permit theater commands to keep SSO messages; rather, the SSO was responsible for custody until the messages were destroyed. Although the SSO system was not perhaps as masterful as the more highly centralized British SLU organization, the system proved safe and generally quite effective. (In particular, SSOs often found work with MacArthur's Southwest Pacific command extremely difficult, but Washington sometimes found it hard to influence MacArthur in other areas as well.) Much special cipher intelligence would have had little value were it not passed on safely to commanders who used it in action.


For the U.S. Navy fleets at sea, the SSO system was hardly practical; however, the navy collaborated with the British a year before the U.S. Army did. Secure communication channels were most often used to transmit operational intelligence directly to the fighting ships, especially from the field processing units at Pearl Harbor and Melbourne. The flow of naval cipher intelligence from these units was coordinated in Washington, D.C. By 1945 naval cipher intelligence centers at Washington and Pearl Harbor were transmitting up to a million words daily.

## **Special Intelligence Significance**

The SRHs in this collection effectively abstract and help to focus on the important contributions of MAGIC and ULTRA secrets to the eventual Allied victory. Special intelligence was crucial to Anglo-American success in North Africa, to the defeat of German U-boats in the Atlantic, and to the elimination, particularly by U.S. submarines, of the Japanese merchant fleet in the Pacific. It doomed Axis blockade-running operations between Japan and Europe. It was valuable in the planning of strategic bombing operations and served as a barometer for measuring the effectiveness of strategic bombing, particularly in Europe. It revealed much information about V-2 rocket sites in Germany and German-occupied territory. MAGIC and ULTRA messages frequently addressed economic conditions inside Axis countries, and MAGIC frequently provided Anglo-American strategists with specific exhibits of conditions on the crucial German-Soviet front. Much of the importance of special intelligence also lay in revealing the whole picture of "the other side of the hill." MAGIC, in particular, often disclosed the state of mind and the attitudes of Axis leadership, some of which was already partially reconstructed from the whole gamut of more traditional intelligence sources. But cipher intelligence tended to provide up-to-date information. For example, on the eve of the landings at Normandy, by far the largest and most complex amphibious operation ever undertaken, one question continued to haunt Eisenhower and his lieutenants: How would Adolph Hitler's forces react to the invasion? MAGIC revealed that Allied deception operations to disguise the actual site of the forthcoming landings were effective among most members of Hitler's upper military echelons, including Hitler himself. Thus, Eisenhower learned what attitudes and stubborn beliefs Hitler held about the coming invasion before it was too late to take advantage of the Führer's errors.

The complete assessment of the importance of special cipher intelligence to the defeat of the Axis powers remains to be made by scholars of World War II. There are many variables to be considered, but there can be no doubt that the Allied "reading of the enemy's mail" helped to shorten the war, reduce the loss of life, and make inevitable an Allied victory. The ready availability of this vast collection of SRHs holds the promise that new dimensions of the history of World War II will be forthcoming.

**Carl Boyd**  
**Professor of History**  
**Old Dominion University**



# SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

During World War II, the separate U.S. communications intelligence establishments cooperated and coordinated their efforts towards a common goal: the defeat of the Axis powers. The various U.S. communications intelligence establishments collated, compiled, and analyzed almost all communications intelligence produced by the various armed forces branches (principally the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence), the Signal Security Agency, and the diplomatic corps. The Cryptologic Documents Collection consists of the end products produced by the various U.S. Intelligence establishments during the war.

The Cryptologic Documents Collection is subdivided into various series. These series include translations of Japanese and German military, naval, and diplomatic communications; historical reports; historical records originated by various branches of the U.S. armed forces; technical documents; and summaries of German and Japanese intercepts.

At this time, UPA is publishing the historical reports (SRH series) from the Cryptologic Documents Collection. These historical reports highlight the advancement of U.S. communications intelligence. They also provide background information on the lessons learned and utilization of communications intelligence in operational, tactical, and strategic planning. The historical reports also consist of analyses and compilations of such information as enemy order of battle, disposition, losses, and foreign and diplomatic relations.

## ***Part 1. The Pacific Theater***

*Part 1* of this project covers the communications intelligence activities conducted by the United States in the Pacific theater of operations. This series consists of histories compiled from various intelligence sources, primarily MAGIC intercepts. These sources reported on military, political, and diplomatic activities of the Japanese worldwide. The reports in this series highlight the intelligence exploitation of intercepted, decoded, and analyzed communications. There are histories relating to such topics as enemy order of battle, enemy surface and air operations, losses, enemy intelligence activities, and activities of enemy merchant shipping. There are several histories related to the Pearl Harbor Investigation and pre-attack communications intelligence. There are also a number of histories on Japan's relations with China, French Indochina, Thailand, Germany, and the USSR. These histories examine the role of communications intelligence in the eventual defeat of Japan.

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# SOURCE NOTE

The reports included in this micropublication are from the Cryptologic Documents Collection in the Library of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

## EDITORIAL NOTE

UPA's *Top Secret Studies on U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II* consists of the Special Research Histories (SRHs) of the Cryptologic Documents Collection. The SRHs have been micropublished in three distinct parts. They are: *Part 1. The Pacific Theater*, *Part 2. The European Theater*, and *Part 3. Organization and Administration*. Documents in each part are arranged by the SRH number.

UPA has microfilmed, in their entirety, all of the SRH documents that have been received by the library as of November 10, 1989. These documents have been released to the library in various forms: declassified, sanitized, or unclassified. The missing document numbers signify items that are still classified and/or have not been received by the library.

### Description of the Reel Index

The Reel Index details each microfilmed document in the micropublication. Included below is a sample entry from the Reel Index and a description of each of its elements:

- 0279 **Locations of Principal Combat Ships (Japanese).** SRH-202.  
OP-20-G. September 22–December 29, 1944. 17pp. (TS. Declassified on 9/10/82.)  
This report consists of a series of maps showing the location of all principal Japanese combat vessels in the Pacific during the latter part of 1944. Most of these ships were to be found in a defensive arc extending from Japan in the north, south along the coast of China to Taiwan, then down through the Philippines and Indochina, to what is now Indonesia.  
*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Japan; China; Taiwan; Philippines; Indochina; Indonesia.

The first line of the entry contains (left) the frame number at which the document begins and (right) the title of the document, plus its identification (SRH) number. The following line contains (1) the author or originating division and/or department of the document, (2) the document's date, (3) its page count, and (4) in parentheses, the original security classification and the date the document was declassified or sanitized. The final lines consist of an abstract of the document and a listing of the major topics under the heading, *Index Items*. Index items have been used in the compilation of the Subject Index that follows the Reel Index.

## **Security Classifications**

The following key identifies the abbreviated security classifications used in the reel index entries for previously classified documents.

<b>R</b>	Restricted
<b>C</b>	Confidential
<b>S</b>	Secret
<b>MS</b>	Most Secret (British)
<b>TS</b>	Top Secret


The notation "NA" indicates that a security classification is not available.

Also included in the reel index are the dates on which documents with abbreviated security classifications from above were declassified or sanitized.

# ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

<b>CINCPAC</b>	Commander in Chief, Pacific
<b>CINCPOA</b>	Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area
<b>CNO</b>	Chief of Naval Operations
<b>COMINCH</b>	Commander in Chief
<b>COMINT</b>	Communications Intelligence
<b>G-2</b>	Intelligence section
<b>HDFD</b>	High Frequency Direction Finder
<b>JANAC</b>	Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
<b>MID</b>	Military Intelligence Division
<b>MIS</b>	Military Intelligence Service
<b>OCSIGO</b>	Office of the Chief Signal Officer
<b>OP-16</b>	Naval Intelligence Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations
<b>OP-20</b>	Naval Communications Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations
<b>OP-20-G</b>	Cryptography Section (also called Navy Code and Signal Section) of the Naval Communications Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations
<b>OP-23</b>	Fleet Maintenance Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (after October 1, 1945 designated Chief of Naval Intelligence)
<b>PACMIRS</b>	Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section
<b>SRH</b>	Special Research History
<b>SSA</b>	Signal Security Agency
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WDGS</b>	War Department General Staff



# REEL INDEX

The following index is a guide to the documents in the collection. An explanation of the contents of each entry can be found on page xiii. Individual documents within an SRH are occasionally noted by indented frame numbers and a brief notation of the title, author if available, date, and total page count.

Index items have been included in the order in which they appear in the abstract. They refer the researcher to corresponding entries in the Subject Index, where additional references for the same item may (if applicable) be located. Certain index items appear in the form of, for example, "Japan—air bases." This indicates that the subject following the dash (air bases) will be found under a more general entry (Japan).

## Reel 1

*File Folder*  
*Frame #*

0001 **The Role of Communication Intelligence in Submarine Warfare in the Pacific, (January 1943–October 1943). SRH-011.**

Author not available. (NA. Declassified on 2/9/78.)

0001 Volume I. OP-20-G-7. November 19, 1945. 211pp.

0214 Volume II. OP-20-G-7. November 26, 1945. 216pp.

0432 Volume III. OP-20-G-7. November 29, 1945. 276pp.

0709 Volume IV. OP-20-3-GA. December 10, 1945. 185pp.

0895 Volume V. OP-20-3-GA. December 1, 1945. 106pp.

These volumes deal with the contributions of communication intelligence to the operations of the commander of the U.S. Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. This material constitutes a historical study that attempts to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to U.S. submarine commanders in the Pacific Fleet. The year 1943 was selected for this study because it was the outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. These reports presented case studies regarding actual submarine operations and engagements with the enemy and the role that communications intelligence played in them. Volumes I and II deal with U.S. submarine operations in February 1943.

Volume III deals with operations in March 1943. Operations in April and May of 1943 are covered in Volume IV, and Volume V lists operations for June 1943.

*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.

## Reel 2

0001 **The Role of Communication Intelligence in Submarine Warfare in the Pacific, (January 1943–October 1943). SRH-011 cont.**

Author not available. (NA. Declassified on 2/9/78.)

0001 Volume V cont. OP-20-3-GA. December 1, 1945. 287pp.

0288 Volume VI. OP-20-3-GA. January 11, 1946. 372pp.

0661 Volume VII. OP-20-3-GA. January 15, 1946. 338pp.

These volumes deal with the contributions of communication intelligence to the operations of the commander of the U.S. Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. This material constitutes a historical study that attempts to determine the accuracy and reliability of

the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to U.S. submarine commanders in the Pacific Fleet. The year 1943 was selected for this study because it was the outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. These reports presented case studies regarding actual submarine operations and engagements with the enemy and the role that communications intelligence played in them. Volume V, which is continued from the previous reel, deals with U.S. submarine operations in June 1943. Operations in July of 1943 are covered in Volume VI, and Volume VII deals with operations during the period August through September 1943.  
*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.

## Reel 3

0001     **The Role of Communication Intelligence in Submarine Warfare in the Pacific, (January 1943–October 1943). SRH-011 cont.**

Author not available. (NA. Declassified on 2/9/78.)

0001             Volume VII cont. OP-20-3-GA. January 15, 1946. 116pp.

0119             Volume VIII. OP-20-3-GA. December 28, 1945. 322pp.

These volumes deal with the contributions of communication intelligence to the operations of the commander of the U.S. Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. This material constitutes a historical study that attempts to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to U.S. submarine commanders in the Pacific Fleet. The year 1943 was selected for this study because it was the outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. These reports presented case studies regarding actual submarine operations and engagements with the enemy and the role that communications intelligence played in them. Volume VII, which is continued from the previous reel, deals with U.S. submarine operations during August and September of 1943. Volume VIII, the last volume of this series, covers operations during the month of October 1943.

*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.

0442     **The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War (August 1941–June 1942). SRH-012.**

Author not available. (NA. Declassified on 5/26/78.)

0442             Volume I. September 1, 1942. 362pp.

0805             Volume II. April 5, 1943. 194pp.

These volumes present a brief history of the U.S. naval radio intelligence organization in the Pacific theater during World War II. Volume I focuses on radio intelligence operations during three outstanding events of the U.S.-Japanese naval war which had occurred up to June of 1942. These events were: (1) the Pearl Harbor disaster, (2) the Battle of the Coral Sea, and (3) the Battle of Midway. Volume II continues the story of the part played by U.S. naval communications intelligence units in the Pacific theater by elaborating on the radio intelligence operations during the Battle of Midway. The second volume delves into the Japanese preparations to invade the Aleutian Islands simultaneously with their assault against Midway. It also presents material on Japanese radio transmissions picked up by the United States during the actual Battle of Midway and U.S. problems with regard to publicity leaks concerning communications intelligence.

*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—operations; Radio intelligence—organization; Pearl Harbor attack; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Midway, Battle of; Navy, U.S.—communications intelligence units; Aleutian Islands; Radio transmissions—Japanese; Communication intelligence—publicity leaks.

## Reel 4

0001 **The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War (August 1941–June 1942).** SRH-012 cont.

Author not available. (NA. Declassified on 5/26/78.)

0001 Volume II cont. April 5, 1943. 121pp.

0122 Volume III. June 21, 1943. 668pp.

0791 Volume IV. December 1, 1944. 209pp.

These volumes present a brief history of the U.S. naval radio intelligence organization in the Pacific theater during World War II. Volume II, which is continued from the previous reel, discusses Japanese plans for the invasion of the Aleutian Islands during the Battle of Midway and U.S. security measures to protect the secrecy of their cryptanalytic breakthroughs. In Volume III the role of radio intelligence in the Solomon Islands campaign is covered, with particular emphasis on the landing at Guadalcanal and the Battle of Savo Island. Volume IV continues the story of the role of radio intelligence in the Solomon Islands campaign by going into the background of the Battle for the Eastern Solomons.

*Index Items:* Navy, U.S.; Radio intelligence; Japan; Aleutian Islands; Midway, Battle of; Cryptanalysis; Solomon Islands campaign; Guadalcanal, Battle of; Savo Island, Battle of.

## Reel 5

0001 **The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War (August 1941–June 1942).** SRH-012 cont.

Author not available. (NA. Declassified on 5/26/78.)

0001 Volume IV cont. December 1, 1944. 626pp.

These volumes present a brief history of the U.S. naval radio intelligence organization in the Pacific theater during World War II. Volume IV, which is continued from the previous reel, describes the role played by radio intelligence in the Battle for the Eastern Solomon Islands.

*Index Items:* Navy, U.S.; Radio intelligence; Solomon Islands campaign.

0627 **Accretion to SRH-012, Volume II.** SRH-012.

John V. Connorton. April 5, 1943. 133pp. (NA. Declassified on 4/29/87.)

This folder contains additional material left out of the original report entitled "The Role of Communication Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War, Volume II" due to security classifications that existed when the report was first released. This material consists of Chapter IV of that report, which relates to the effects of publicity leaks on U.S. naval communication intelligence activities.

*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Navy, U.S.

0761 **Collection of Japanese Diplomatic Messages, July 12, 1938–January 21, 1942.** SRH-018.

Department of the Army. n.d. 98pp. (NA. Declassified on 6/22/78.)

This report contains Japanese diplomatic radio transmissions intercepted by the United States from the years just prior to the beginning of World War II until over a month after the attack on Pearl Harbor. These documents cover such items as Japan's war against China, Japanese efforts to procure loans from the United States, discussions regarding the U.S. commitment to neutrality in the war in Europe in early 1941, reports regarding U.S. military aid to Nationalist China (this also includes information relating to the pilots of the American Volunteer Group, the famous "Flying Tigers"), reports on U.S.-Japanese relations, Japanese fears regarding interception of coded military messages

by Nationalist China, information on a joint Anglo-U.S. ultimatum to Japan dated August 15, 1941, threatening military action unless Japan abrogated its treaty with Thailand, information regarding Japan's relations with Germany, and information on the activities of the Japanese Communist party.

*Index Items:* Japan; Diplomatic communications, Japanese; Pearl Harbor attack; Sino-Japanese war; Loans; Neutrality—U.S. commitment to; Military aid, U.S.; Chinese Nationalists; Flying Tigers; U.S.—Japan; Japan—Anglo-U.S. ultimatum to; Thailand; Japan—Germany; Japan—Communist party in.

0860 **Narrative of the Combat Intelligence Center, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas.** SRH-020.

W. J. Holmes. November 8, 1945. 25pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/31/78.)

The Combat Intelligence Center was established for the purpose of plotting the movements of all vessels, whether Allied, Japanese, or German in the Pacific Ocean. Later in the war the Combat Intelligence Center became the general information section for radio intelligence. This report presents an overview of the history of the Combat Intelligence Center from the time of its establishment to the end of the war. Major operations and duties of the center are also covered in this report. Particular emphasis is placed on the center's operations at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor and during the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.

*Index Items:* Combat Intelligence Center; Pacific Ocean Area; Radio intelligence; Pearl Harbor attack; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Midway, Battle of.

0886 **The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor.** SRH-027.

Defense Department. n.d. (NA. Declassification date not available.)

0886 Volume I, (February 14, 1941—May 12, 1941). 105pp.

By the fall of 1940, U.S. cryptanalysts had solved some of the Japanese government's highest grade code systems and the interception, decryption, and translation of Japan's worldwide diplomatic communications was being undertaken by the U.S. government. These messages were known in American code as MAGIC. The information thus obtained was highly classified and closely guarded. It was available to only a few of the highest officials in the State Department. Included in MAGIC were dispatches between the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. Intelligence gained by the United States through those dispatches became especially important during the talks between U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull and Japanese ambassador Nomura, which lasted from February 1941 until the attack on Pearl Harbor. Through MAGIC the U.S. government was able to determine the Japanese position during these discussions and learn something of Japanese plans. These volumes represent the collected results of those U.S. intelligence activities and shed new light on the situation existing in the United States and Japan just prior to World War II.

*Index Items:* MAGIC intelligence; Japan—diplomatic code; State Department, U.S.; Foreign Office, Japanese; Cordell Hull; Kichisaburo Nomura.

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0001 **The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor.** SRH-027 cont.

Defense Department. n.d. (NA. Declassification date not available.)

0001 Volume I, (February 14, 1941—May 12, 1941). 38pp. cont.

0039 Volume II, (May 12, 1941—August 6, 1941). 113pp.

0152 Volume II, Appendix. 307pp.

0460 Volume III, (August 5, 1941—October 17, 1941). 181pp.

0640 Volume III, Appendix. 334pp.

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*Index Items:* MAGIC intelligence; Cryptanalysis; Diplomatic communications, Japanese; State Department, U.S.; Foreign Office, Japanese; Japan—embassy; Cordell Hull; Kichisaburo Nomura; Pearl Harbor attack; U.S.—Japan.

## Reel 7

- 0001 **The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor.** SRH-027 cont.  
Defense Department. n.d. (NA. Declassification date not available.)  
0001 Volume IV, (October 17, 1941–December 7, 1941). 151pp.  
0152 Volume IV, Appendix. 275pp.  
0427 Volume V. 77pp.

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*Index Items:* MAGIC intelligence; Cryptanalysis; Diplomatic communications, Japanese; State Department, U.S.; Foreign Office, Japanese; Japan—embassy; Cordell Hull; Kichisaburo Nomura; Pearl Harbor attack; U.S.—Japan.

- 0504 **Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Field Commands in the Southwest Pacific, Pacific Ocean, and China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations.** SRH-032.  
Author not available. 1944–1945. 89pp. (NA. Declassified on 5/17/79.)  
This study contains reports by U.S. Army Special Security Officers handling ULTRA intelligence for the following commands: Far East Air Force; Eighth Army; Sixth Army; naval liaison; CINCPAC; XXI Bomber Command; Tenth Army; XXIV Corps; Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area; and the Combat Intelligence Center. Also included is information on special security operations in the China-Burma-India theater and reports

by the special security representatives to the armed forces, Pacific, and to the Pacific Ocean Areas.

*Index Items:* Special security officers; ULTRA intelligence; Far East Air Force; Eighth Army; Sixth Army; Naval liaison; CINCPOA; XXI Bomber Command; Tenth Army; XXIV Corps; Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area; Combat Intelligence Center; China-Burma-India theater.

- 0594 **Marshall Letter to MacArthur on the Use of ULTRA Intelligence, May 23, 1944, and Related Correspondence.** SRH-034.  
George C. Marshall. May 23, 1944. 22pp. (NA. Declassified on 6/6/79.)  
This report consists of letters from General George Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief, Southwest Pacific, and to Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commanding general of the Alaskan Department, regarding the handling and use of ULTRA intelligence in their commands. Also included is a letter from Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, to Maj. Gen. Stewart G. Menzies, chairman of the Signal Intelligence Board in London, regarding security regulations for the use of ULTRA intelligence. A copy of these regulations is also included in this report.  
*Index Items:* George C. Marshall; Douglas MacArthur; Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr.; Clayton Bissell; Stewart G. Menzies; ULTRA intelligence.

- 0617 **Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, January 1943.** SRH-036.  
CINCPAC. January 1943. 381pp. (NA. Declassified on 6/14/79.)  
The purpose of this study is to display the role of radio intelligence in the military operations in the Pacific Ocean Area in World War II. The problem has been approached through the study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by CINCPAC to his subordinate commands. When available, the similar dispatches originated by these subordinate commands have been included. This particular volume deals with material from January 1943.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence; Tactical operations, U.S.; CINCPAC.

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- 0001 **Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, January 1943.** SRH-036 cont. 313pp.
- 0314 **"Magic" Diplomatic Extracts.** SRH-040.  
MIS, War Department. July 1945. 82pp. (TS. Declassified on September 13, 1979.)  
This report contains extracts of Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted by the U.S. government through the aid of the MAGIC system. The messages relate primarily to efforts by Japan to secure a negotiated peace with the Soviets before their entry into the Pacific war. Japanese efforts to negotiate a nonaggression and mutual assistance treaty with the Soviets in the closing months of World War II are included in this material, as is information on the Soviet reaction to these proposals in light of their commitments to the Allies and their previous calls for the unconditional surrender of both Germany and Japan.  
*Index Items:* Diplomatic communications, Japanese; MAGIC intelligence; Japan; USSR; Nonaggression treaties; Mutual assistance treaties; Japan—unconditional surrender; Germany.

- 0397 **Statement for Record of Participation of Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, GSC, in the Transmittal of Letters from General George C. Marshall to Governor Thomas E. Dewey.** SRH-043.  
Carter W. Clarke. September 1944. 15pp. (NA. Declassified on November 30, 1979.)  
This report consists of a record of testimony by General Clarke regarding letters from General Marshall, which he was asked to deliver to Governor Dewey, who was at that time running for president on the Republican ticket. These letters apparently dealt with certain information that Governor Dewey possessed regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor, which the U.S. Army did not want revealed. This information related to the fact that the U.S. Army was reading certain secret Japanese codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and knew in advance that it was going to occur. General Marshall wrote these letters in an attempt to prevent Governor Dewey from revealing that the U.S. government had the capability of reading the Japanese codes, which were still in use at that time, during the course of the presidential campaign. Despite certain reservations on his part Governor Dewey pledged not to divulge this information.  
*Index Items:* Carter W. Clarke; Thomas E. Dewey; George C. Marshall; Pearl Harbor attack; MAGIC intelligence; Japan—diplomatic code.
- 0414 **Reminiscences of Lieutenant Colonel Howard W. Brown.** SRH-045.  
SSA. August 4, 1945. 60pp. (TS. Declassified on December 18, 1979.)  
This report represents an account written by Lieutenant Colonel Brown, an officer of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, dealing with Lieutenant Colonel Brown's service in radio intelligence work in the Far East, both as an officer and as an enlisted man, during World War II. The memoir was written in July 1945 after Lieutenant Colonel Brown had been transferred to Arlington Hall.  
*Index Items:* Howard W. Brown; Radio intelligence; Far East; Arlington Hall Station.
- 0475 **Procedure Governing the Handling of ULTRA DEXTER Intelligence in the China-Burma-India Theater.** SRH-046.  
Vernon Evans. March 22, 1944. 13pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/17/79.)  
This report consists of lists of officers attached to the China-Burma-India theater and the Eastern Air Commands, which were regularly authorized to receive ULTRA DEXTER intelligence. Also included is information regarding the proper methods of handling this type of material.  
*Index Items:* China-Burma-India theater; Eastern Air Commands; ULTRA Intelligence—ULTRA DEXTER.
- 0489 **Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs.** SRH-051.  
Naval Security Group Command. January 13, 1977. 19pp. (NA. Declassified on March 11, 1980.)  
This interview was conducted by the historian of the Naval Security Group Command. The subject, Ralph Briggs, was a naval intercept operator assigned to the Naval Communications Station at Cheltenham, Maryland, from September 1941 to August 1942. The interview involves Mr. Briggs's experiences in World War II, especially as they relate to the communication intelligence intercept operations preceding Pearl Harbor. Particular emphasis is placed on the so-called "Winds Execute" message.  
*Index Items:* Naval Security Group Command; Ralph T. Briggs; Naval Communications Station, Cheltenham; Communication intelligence; Pearl Harbor attack; "Winds Execute" message.
- 0509 **Estimated Japanese Aircraft Locations.** SRH-052.  
U.S. Fleet. July 15, 1943–August 9, 1945. 406pp. (TS. Declassified on 3/18/80.)  
This report consists of tables containing the location of units of the Japanese air force compiled by the U.S. Pacific Fleet through information received as a result of radio

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intercepts. This information covers the period July 1943 to August 1945. Included is information on the location of Japanese air bases, various types of Japanese aircraft, and approximate totals of the number of aircraft of each type that were located at these bases.

*Index Items:* Air forces, Japanese; U.S. Fleet; Japan—air bases; Aircraft—Japanese.

- 0916 **Special Report by Joint Army-Navy Committee on the Japanese Air Forces Estimate of the Japanese Situation.** SRH-053.  
U.S. Fleet. June 23, 1945. 12pp. (TS. Declassified on 3/18/80.)  
This report on the Japanese air force by the U.S. Fleet shows the deterioration of the Japanese combat capability in the air by mid-1945. Included is information on the decline of Japanese aircraft production, the decrease in the size of the Japanese combat air fleet, the deployment of Japan's remaining air resources, the capabilities of these forces to engage in offensive operations, including suicide or kamikazi missions, and also speculations about Japanese intentions in the closing days of the war.  
*Index Items:* Air forces, Japanese; U.S. Fleet; Aircraft—Japanese; Kamikazi operations.
- 0929 **Effects of B-29 Operations in Support of Okinawa Campaign.** SRH-054.  
U.S. Fleet. March 18–June 22, 1945. 18pp. (TS. Declassified on 3/18/80.)  
This report was prepared by the U.S. Fleet to show the effect that bombing missions by U.S. B-29 Superfortress aircraft had on the U.S. military campaign on Okinawa. Included is information on action reports and admissions of damages incurred by Japanese commands on the island. Also included is material on losses and damages incurred by the Japanese air force during the course of the campaign. While incomplete, this report provides great insight into the role that aerial bombardments played in support of U.S. military movements on the ground.  
*Index Items:* B-29 operations; U.S. Fleet; Okinawa campaign; Air forces, Japanese.
- 0948 **Estimated Unit Locations of Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces.** SRH-055.  
U.S. Fleet. July 20, 1945. 42pp. (TS. Declassified on 3/18/80.)  
This report was prepared by the U.S. Fleet based on intelligence information obtained through radio intercepts. It contains information on the location and strengths of various air units of the Japanese navy and air force along with remarks by U.S. intelligence personnel regarding the activities of these units. Also included is material on unit headquarters and the type of aircraft located at the various Japanese bases.  
*Index Items:* U.S. Fleet; Navy, Japanese; Air forces, Japanese; Japan—air bases; Aircraft—Japanese.

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- 0001 **Preliminary Report to Pacific Order of Battle Conference.** SRH-056.  
Lieutenant Colonel Malony. August 15, 1945. 233pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/30/80.)  
This report, which was prepared by MIS personnel for use at the Pacific Order of Battle Conference, contains information on the disposition and strengths of Japanese ground forces, the expansion rate of the Japanese army, the Japanese army's replacement system, the strength and value of Japanese military forces stationed in occupied areas, estimates of Japanese naval ground units, the recording and distribution of War Department information on Japanese military personalities and Japanese order of battle publications in relation to theater requirements, and information on the organization and classification of Japanese military forces.  
*Index Items:* MIS; Pacific Order of Battle Conference; Japan—military personalities; Navy, Japanese; War Department, U.S.; Order of battle publications.

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- 0235 **Notes on Japanese Theatre Coordination Section.** SRH-060.  
SSA. November 16, 1943–February 25, 1944. 111pp. (S. Declassified on 7/2/80.)  
The purpose of these notes was to serve as a clearing house, within the limits of security, for material of intelligence and technical value so that the work of the various intelligence sections could be facilitated. The contents of the notes were derived from a number of intelligence sources and were distributed on a weekly basis to key personnel at Arlington Hall Station.  
*Index Item:* Arlington Hall Station.
- 0346 **Japanese Surface and Air Operations, January 1, 1942–January 31, 1942.** SRH-063.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. February 21, 1945. 49pp. (TS. Declassified on 9/29/80.)  
This report deals with the operations of the Japanese navy and air force in the opening days of World War II. Japanese naval operations at this time were primarily directed by the commanders in chief of the Japanese Fourth and Second Fleets. The former Japanese South Seas Force was engaged in the occupation of the Bismarck Archipelago while the Second Fleet's area of operations became known as the Southern Area and included the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. Information is included on the reorganization of the Japanese military establishment in the early days of the war and on the operations undertaken by these units.  
*Index Items:* Navy, Japanese; Air forces, Japanese; Navy, Japanese—operations; Fourth Fleet, Japanese; Second Fleet, Japanese; Bismarck Archipelago; Southern Area; Philippines; Malaya; Netherlands East Indies; Japan—military establishment.
- 0396 **Japanese Submarine Operations, January 23–March 25, 1942.** SRH-064.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. March 28, 1945. 34pp. (TS. Declassified on 9/29/80.)  
This report is based on information derived from Japanese communication intelligence intercepted by U.S. intelligence units. This material represents a summarization of Japanese submarine operations in the opening months of the Second World War. The operations of the Japanese submarines during the period under consideration were primarily defensive in nature, with relatively few reported sinkings of Allied vessels. The submarines also took part in increased reconnaissance activities, including investigation of invasion possibilities of American territories and island bases.  
*Index Items:* Submarines, Japanese; Japan—communication intelligence; Vessels, Allied; U.S. Territories.
- 0431 **Japanese Surface and Air Operations, February 1, 1942–March 31, 1942.** SRH-065.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. April 6, 1945. 58pp. (TS. Declassified on 9/29/80.)  
This report represents a continuation of SRH-063. It contains information on the movements and operations of Japanese naval and air force units for the time period covered. During this time the Japanese fleet organization remained substantially unchanged and the Japanese Second Fleet and South Seas Force continued to operate in the areas previously designated in SRH-063.  
*Index Items:* Navy, Japanese—units; Air forces, Japanese—units; Navy, Japanese—Fleet; Second Fleet, Japanese; South Seas Force, Japanese.
- 0490 **Japan as Mediator in Russo-German Conflict.** SRH-067.  
Pacific Strategic Defense Section. December 29, 1944. 20pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
The object of this study is to attempt to determine, through messages exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Office and its representatives in various countries, the reason why Japan had not only been in favor of a termination of hostilities between

Germany and the USSR, but had done its utmost, through diplomacy, to carry out this policy. Indeed, the only limit to Japan's activities in this direction was a desire to do nothing to damage relations with the USSR. To maintain the status quo in the matter of these relations seems to have been the enduring principle of Japanese foreign policy, and it is in the light of this principle that Japanese efforts to help Germany extricate itself from the war with the Soviet Union are examined in this report.

*Index Items:* Foreign Office, Japanese; Russo-German conflict; USSR—Japan; Japan—foreign policy.

- 0511 **Japanese Estimates of Germany's Ability to Continue the Struggle.** SRH-068. Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. January 22, 1945. 26pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)

Japan made the decision to enter World War II taking into account the possibility that Germany might be defeated and that the Japanese might have to face the combined might of the United States and Great Britain alone. Japan had prepared for that eventuality and believed itself, officially at least, capable of coping with it. After initial successes Japan became even more convinced of the ability to win through Japanese efforts alone. As the tide began to turn, however, Japan began to see the importance of keeping Germany in the war as long as possible. The Japanese Foreign Office began to gather intelligence regarding the chances of Germany's holding out and prolonging the war. The object of this study is to analyze the messages exchanged among the Japanese diplomatic corps between August and December of 1944 and to arrive at some conclusion regarding their views on the possibility of Germany's continuing the struggle and on the probable length of time that Germany would remain in the war.

*Index Items:* Japan; Germany; Foreign Office, Japanese; Diplomatic personnel, Japanese.

- 0538 **The Problem of the Prolongation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.** SRH-069. Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. February 12, 1945. 39pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)

The object of this study is to trace, by analyzing the messages exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Office and its representatives, the growing tension of the Japanese government over the problem of prolonging the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR that had been signed at Moscow on April 13, 1941. This pact would automatically be prolonged for five years unless it was denounced by either one of the signatories one year before the expiration of the term. The Japanese had not really bothered with the renewal of the pact while Russia was engaged in its struggle with Germany, but after Stalingrad the Japanese became increasingly anxious regarding a possible attack by Japan's traditional enemy to the north. At that time Japanese diplomatic messages reflected a fixed policy on maintaining good relations with the USSR at practically any cost.

*Index Items:* Foreign Office, Japanese; Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact; Germany; Stalingrad, Battle of; USSR—Japan.

- 0578 **Abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.** SRH-071. Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. April 23, 1945. 18pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)

This study represents a continuation of SRH-069 and is based on messages exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Office and its representatives. After the Yalta Conference the Japanese ambassador at Moscow arranged a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in an attempt to learn what had been agreed to at Yalta and to look carefully for any change in Soviet attitude toward Japan. If no change was observed the Japanese ambassador was to sound out Molotov about the possibility of continuing the neutrality pact of 1941 for another five years. This report goes into the

problems envisioned by Japan if the USSR insisted on placing conditions on the neutrality pact's renewal, and the ultimate Soviet refusal to renew the pact.

*Index Items:* Foreign Office, Japanese; Yalta Conference; Vyacheslav Molotov; USSR—Japan; Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

- 0597 **Recent Political Developments in Thailand (Siam).** SRH-072.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 1, 1945. 24pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This report is based on Japanese dispatches for the period July 21, 1944, to April 16, 1945. The material covers the political developments in Thailand that occurred from 1932 when the absolute monarchy of King Prajadhipak was overthrown, through a period of constitutional monarchy and a regency of a minor king, to the time of the Japanese-Thai alliance and Thailand's declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain. This material deals with Japan's concern over their deteriorating influence over the Thai government and the increasing dissatisfaction with Japan's ally, Thai prime minister Phibul Songgram.  
*Index Items:* Thailand; Prajadhipak, King of Thailand; Thailand—Japan; U.S.; Great Britain; Phibul Songgram.
- 0622 **White Russians in Manchukuo.** SRH-073.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 8, 1945. 11pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This study is concerned with the activities of White Russian emigrés in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo (formerly Manchuria). This issue had become a factor in Russo-Japanese relations. Japanese estimates made toward the end of 1944 reported as many as seventy thousand of these White Russians living in Manchukuo at that time. The White Russians had begun settling in the area in 1932 with Japanese assistance and organized anti-Communist movements with the full approval of the Japanese. The White Russians had supported the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the hopes for the end of the Communist regime which it engendered. After the decline in German and Japanese fortunes in 1944 many of the White Russians began to support the USSR and the Soviet government had moved to strengthen this support and achieve a rapprochement with the emigrés. The Japanese reaction to these changes in the White Russian viewpoint is shown in this report.  
*Index Items:* White Russians; Manchukuo; USSR—Japan; anti-Communist movements; Germany; USSR; Propaganda—Soviet.
- 0634 **Japanese-Burmese Relations.** SRH-074.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 9, 1945. 17pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This report covers the relations between Japan and Burma from the Japanese invasion in 1942 through the appointment of a pro-Japanese regime headed by Burmese premier U Ba Maw and the eventual granting of Burmese independence by Japan in August 1943. Following independence Japan had withdrawn its military administration and Burma had declared war on the United States and Great Britain. The material focuses on Japanese efforts to maintain control over the newly independent nation and its efforts to organize and train a Burmese army against the will of the people. Also included is information on the activities of the Communist party and Chinese fifth columnists in Burma, Japanese propaganda efforts, and the eventual Allied occupation of Burma.  
*Index Items:* Japan—Burma; U Ba Maw; Burma; U.S.; Great Britain; Burma—army; Communist activities—in Burma; Fifth columnists; Propaganda—Japanese.

- 0652 **Japanese Reaction to German Defeat.** SRH-075.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 21, 1945. 16pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This report concerns Japanese activities in April 1945 to ensure that Germany remained in the war and the reaction to Germany's actual defeat. Japanese diplomatic representatives, acting on instructions from Tokyo, met with Germany's grand admiral Karl Doenitz, field marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in an effort to persuade them to transfer the German naval forces to the Far East to operate under the control of the Japanese navy. This proposal was rejected by the German authorities. Japanese diplomatic representatives in Portugal reported details of the German collapse in late April in order to prepare Japan for the decisive battles ahead. After the fall of Germany the Japanese navy took control of the few German submarines that were active in the Far East and Japan began a major propaganda drive to de-emphasize the importance of the German surrender and to urge the Japanese people to greater efforts to prevent their own downfall.  
*Index Items:* Japan; Germany—defeat of; Karl Doenitz; Wilhelm Keitel; Joachim von Ribbentrop; Germany—naval forces; Navy, Japanese; Portugal; Submarines, German; Propaganda—Japanese.
- 0669 **Japanese-Portuguese Relations and the "Macao Problem."** SRH-076.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 23, 1945. 13pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This report concerns the effect of events in the Portuguese enclave of Macao in China on Japanese-Portuguese relations. The incident that created the diplomatic furor was an article in a Macao newspaper in January 1945 that contained derogatory remarks regarding the Japanese Imperial family. Japan made a protest of this article and asked that the paper be shut down. This was followed by the assassination of the Japanese consul in Macao, which the Japanese also protested vigorously; however, they decided that the maintenance of Portuguese neutrality was more important to their cause than the loss of one minor official. A further breakdown of Japanese-Portuguese relations occurred when a Japanese plane was forced to make an emergency landing on a racetrack in Macao and, despite a Japanese request, was refused time to make repairs. The Portuguese colonial government seized the plane, dismantled it, and placed the pilot under police supervision. These activities and others that occurred later pushed Japan to the limit on the question of Portuguese neutrality, and Japanese actions to cope with this situation are stressed in this study.  
*Index Items:* Japan—Portugal; Macao problem; Portugal—neutrality of.
- 0683 **Sino-Soviet Relations.** SRH-077.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. June 1, 1945. 11pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This study, based on intercepted radio traffic, shows that Sino-Soviet relations revolved around two main points: (1) The USSR's plans and intentions for territorial expansion and/or political control in Asia, particularly regarding territory to which China claimed sovereign rights, and (2) the USSR's plans and intentions for political control within the Chinese government. Practically all radio traffic dealing with Sino-Soviet relations touches on one or the other of these two points. Material relating to each of these two points is included in this report.  
*Index Items:* USSR—China; USSR—territorial expansion.

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- 0695 **Russo-Japanese Relations (April–May 1945).** SRH-078.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. June 18, 1945. 14pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This report presents the salient features of Soviet-Japanese relations during April and May of 1945, following the abrogation of the neutrality pact between the two nations. The Soviets turned aside Japanese efforts to enter discussions with regard to strengthening relations and Soviet diplomats began to press Japan for the settlement of several long-standing disputes. Among the issues under consideration were the return of Czarist Russian buildings in Northern China and Manchuria, the expropriation by Japanese military personnel in Shanghai of apartments occupied by Soviet citizens, alleged violation of the Mongolian frontier by Japanese planes, and the arrest of a Russian Orthodox Church official by Japanese police in Tokyo. These and many other incidents added to the deterioration of Japan's relations with the USSR in the immediate aftermath of the end of their neutrality agreement.  
*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact; China; Manchukuo; China—Shanghai; Mongolia; Russian Orthodox Church.
- 0705 **Russo-Japanese Relations (June 1945).** SRH-079.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. July 2, 1945. 21pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/14/80.)  
This report represents a continuation of SRH-078 and includes materials relating to Soviet-Japanese relations during the month of June 1945. It was during this time period that Japanese and Soviet foreign policies clashed over the issues of Manchuria and Korea. The material included here contains information on Japan and Soviet historical claims to these regions and the various clashes between them in the period before and during the Second World War. Particular attention is focused on the increasing deterioration of Japanese-Soviet relations during June of 1945, including Japanese fears of a Red Army invasion of their puppet state in Manchukuo. This information is derived from radio intercepts between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Japanese ambassador in Moscow.  
*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; Japan—foreign policy; USSR—foreign policy; Korea; Manchukuo; Foreign Office, Japanese.
- 0731 **Compilation of Intelligence Data on Japanese Submarine Forces.** SRH-080.  
W. R. Smedberg III. February 9, 1945. 3pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/23/80.)  
This report provides information on Japanese submarine order of battle, employment, and bases in the Pacific theater from 1941 to 1945 based on information obtained through Japanese radio intercepts.  
*Index Item:* Submarines, Japanese.
- 0735 **Information from Captain George W. Linn, USNR [United States Naval Reserve] (Retired).** SRH-081.  
George W. Linn. n.d. 15pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/13/80.)  
This report is a record of Captain Linn's experiences as a naval radioman and commissioned officer handling cryptanalytic messages from 1926 through the beginning of the Second World War. A great deal of information is given regarding a Captain Safford of OP-20-G who was the wartime head of the Code and Signal Section and his role in the development of cryptographic systems. Captain Safford was one of the first naval intelligence people to recognize the importance of the Japanese Purple code and he was present when the Japanese "Winds Execute" message regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor was intercepted. This intelligence information was suppressed and the

result was the apparent "sneak" attack. As a result of attempting to relay this information to the U.S. government, Captain Safford's career was severely damaged and he was assigned to duties far below his capabilities.

*Index Items:* George W. Linn; Laurence F. Safford; Cryptographic systems, U.S.; Purple code; "Winds Execute" message; Pearl Harbor attack.

- 0751 **Situation in Thailand (April-June 1945).** SRH-082.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. July 7, 1945. 10pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/3/80.)  
This report presents a picture of the effects of World War II and the international situation existing at that time on the political and social life of Thailand. The material focuses on the period between April and June of 1945. Included is information on the Japanese military occupation of French Indochina after March 1945, the attitude of the Thai people toward Japan, the participation of the Thai people in fifth column activities against Japan, the deterioration of the Thai economy, and changes in Japanese policy toward Thailand.  
*Index Items:* Thailand; Japan; French Indochina; Fifth columnists; Thailand—economy.
- 0762 **The Chungking-Yenan Controversy.** SRH-083.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 10, 1945. 19pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/3/80.)  
This report deals with the controversy that existed between the Chinese Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking and the Chinese Communist party headquartered in Yenan. The Communists had been struggling with Chiang Kai-shek for control of China since the 1920s. They had engaged in guerrilla warfare, conducted agrarian reforms at the expense of the large Chinese landowners, and engaged in indoctrination programs with the support of the USSR. Although the Nationalists and Communists had joined forces against the Japanese invasion, by the latter stages of World War II their fragile alliance was beginning to crumble and their old feuds were again coming to the forefront. This report contains materials relating to this power struggle as seen through the eyes of China's Allies.  
*Index Items:* Chinese Nationalists; Chiang Kai-shek; Chinese Communists; Guerrilla warfare; Agrarian reforms; Chinese Communists—propaganda.
- 0781 **Russo-Japanese Relations (July 1-12, 1945).** SRH-084.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. July 14, 1945. 11pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/3/80.)  
This report chronicles the continuing deterioration of Russo-Japanese relations during the first few weeks of July 1945. During the month of June 1945 the Japanese had tried to persuade the USSR to stay out of the Pacific war by offering major political and economic concessions to the Soviets. It was also suggested that the Soviet Red Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy was to be an irresistible combination that could rule the world. The Soviet Union rejected these overtures and prepared to carry out her obligations under her alliance with the United States and Great Britain as agreed upon at Yalta.  
*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; USSR—concessions; USSR—Red Army; Navy, Japanese; Yalta Conference.
- 0792 **Russo-Japanese Relations (July 13-20, 1945).** SRH-085.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. July 21, 1945. 24pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/3/80.)  
This report, which represents a continuation of SRH-084, marks the further decline in Russo-Japanese relations toward mid-July 1945. During this period the Japanese had continued their efforts to keep the USSR out of the war in the Pacific by means of major political and economic concessions, particularly with regard to the neutrality of Man-

chukuo. The Soviet government continued to play a cat and mouse game with the Japanese representatives by stringing them along with vague promises and by never openly rejecting the Japanese overtures. The USSR had no intentions of supporting the Japanese proposals but considered it in their best interests to keep the Japanese guessing until the Soviets had made up their minds as to their proper course of action in the Pacific.

*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; USSR—concessions; Manchukuo; Neutrality.

- 0817 **Russo-Japanese Relations (July 21–27, 1945).** SRH-086.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 2, 1945. 22pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/3/80.)  
This report represents a continuation of SRH-084 and SRH-085. It shows the deterioration of Russo-Japanese relations as it occurred in the last weeks of July 1945. By this time the Japanese had realized they could not keep the Soviet Union from entering the war against them. It was therefore decided to request that the USSR mediate on behalf of Japan to end the war by means of a negotiated peace on terms that would be favorable to the Japanese Empire. The Soviet Union, in keeping with its demands for the unconditional surrender of both Germany and Japan, had rejected this offer. At this point the Japanese ambassador in Moscow pointed out that further Japanese military resistance was hopeless and urged the Japanese government to sue for peace with the Allies solely on the basis of retaining the Japanese national structure in the form of the Imperial ruling house.  
*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; Peace efforts; USSR.
- 0842 **Mongolian Independence.** SRH-087.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 3, 1945. 14pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/4/80.)  
This report deals with the controversy involving China, the USSR, and Japan over the case for Mongolian independence. Included in this material is a historical overview of the Mongolian independence issue tracing the problem from its roots in the Fourth Century a.d. until the end of World War II. By the time the war ended Mongolia had become a Soviet Socialist Republic under Russian domination and the Soviet government had decided to grant independence to Mongolia as the Mongolian People's Republic.  
*Index Items:* Mongolia; USSR.
- 0857 **Russo-Japanese Relations (July 28–August 6, 1945).** SRH-088.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 7, 1945. 20pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/4/80.)  
This report represents a continuation of the materials contained in SRHs-084, 085, and 086. Included is material relating to the state of Russo-Japanese relations from the end of July 1945 until the end of the war in the Pacific. The Japanese had become increasingly worried about the Soviet position toward Japan, particularly with regard to the results of the Potsdam Conference. The Japanese government had not yet given up hopes that the USSR might be encouraged to help Japan mediate a negotiated peace with the Allies and with that in mind had been using every possible method to maintain good relations with the Soviets. The Japanese aim was to drive a wedge between the Russians and their American and British allies, and to further this aim Japan was prepared to again offer major concessions to the USSR in the Far East. Following the announcement of the results of the Potsdam Conference, all such Japanese hopes were shot down.  
*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; Potsdam Conference; Peace efforts; USSR—concessions.

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- 0878 **Military and Political Plans for the Southern Pacific Area Formulated by the Japanese Prior to August 14, 1945.** SRH-089.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 24, 1945. 14pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/4/80.)  
This report contains information on Japanese political and military plans for Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies that were formulated prior to the Japanese surrender. Included is material on the strength of Japanese military forces in these areas, plans for combating Allied invasions, and reports on political conditions existing in these nations in the wake of the Japanese surrender.  
*Index Items:* Japan—Southern Pacific Area; Burma; Thailand; French Indochina; Malaya; Netherlands East Indies; Japan—surrender of; Japan—military strength of.
- 0893 **Japan's Surrender Maneuvers.** SRH-090.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 29, 1945. 48pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/4/80.)  
This report represents a summary of available Japanese radio traffic regarding the termination of Japanese relations with the USSR, as well as events leading up to and immediately following the surrender of the Japanese Empire to the United States and its allies. Included is information on the final collapse of Japanese hopes for Russian mediation for a negotiated peace, the Japanese reactions to the dropping of the atomic bomb, the Soviet declaration of war against Japan on August 9, 1945, and the Japanese offer to surrender on terms based on those contained in the Potsdam declaration.  
*Index Items:* USSR—Japan; Japan—surrender of; Peace efforts; Atomic bomb; Potsdam Conference.
- 0942 **The Chungking-Yenan Controversy: Chronological Report.** SRH-091.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. September 8, 1945. 18pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/4/80.)  
This report represents a chronological overview of the Chinese Nationalist government's relations with the Chinese Communist party. Included is material on the infiltration and deployment of the Communist Chinese armies in potentially strategic areas along the coast of China in anticipation of Allied landings, the Chinese Communists' propaganda efforts toward the Islamic groups of northern China, and the Chinese Nationalists' concern over these activities and their efforts to stop them.  
*Index Items:* Chinese Nationalists; Chinese Communists; Chinese Communists—armies; Chinese Communists—propaganda.
- 0961 **Japan (Reaction to Defeat and Current Problems).** SRH-092.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. September 28, 1945. 38pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/4/80.)  
This report is based on military and diplomatic ULTRA traffic dealing with the Japanese attitude toward defeat and the problems faced by Japan as a conquered nation. The material deals with such issues as Japan's dismantling of its war-making capabilities, its occupation by the victorious Allies, Japanese fears regarding Allied interference in their way of life, and the deteriorating economic situation in Japan following the end of the war. Also included is information on the effects of the atomic bomb and world reaction to its use.  
*Index Items:* ULTRA intelligence; Japan—defeat; Japan—war-making capabilities; Japan—occupation of; Japan—economic situation in; Atomic bomb.

## Reel 10

- 0001 **Sino-Japanese Relations (Japan's China Policy).** SRH-093.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. October 2, 1945. 21pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/6/80.)  
This report, based on findings obtained through ULTRA intelligence, concerns Japan's relations with China and Japanese policy for that nation. Shortly after the Japanese invasion the Japanese tried to win over the Chinese people through propaganda, denouncing Western imperialism and portraying Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government as a dictatorial tool of Western interests. This policy was soon found to be a failure. As the Allied counterattack in the Pacific began to threaten Japanese interests, the Japanese government sought to free up millions of fighting men in China by making a separate peace with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. Although these overtures did not result in an end to the Sino-Japanese war it did pave the way for greater cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese Nationalists in dealing with the Chinese Communist problem. After the Japanese surrender many Japanese citizens and officials were ordered to remain in China to form a possible link for future Sino-Japanese cooperation. It was Japan's goal that China, as the sole remaining power in East Asia, should provide the means for the future restoration of the Japanese Empire and the reconstruction of East Asia.  
*Index Items:* China—Japan; ULTRA intelligence; Japan—foreign policy; Propaganda—Japanese; Imperialism; Chiang Kai-shek; Sino-Japanese War; Chinese Nationalists; Chinese Communists; Asia—East.
- 0023 **French Indo-china (Political Situation).** SRH-094.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. October 11, 1945. 25pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/6/80.)  
This report reviews the political situation in French Indochina from the fall of France in 1940 to the end of the war. Japan began to move military forces into French Indochina shortly after the fall of France despite the objections of French governor-general Jean De Coux. Their purpose, according to the Japanese, was to protect Indochina against the designs of foreign powers that might take advantage of France's plight to seize the colony in the Far East. After March 1945 this relatively benign Japanese policy began to change as it became obvious that the fortunes of war were going against Japan. The Japanese military forces attacked the French and Indochinese forces without warning and disarmed them. After establishing a military regime, the Japanese government sought to pacify the local populations by offering the prospect of immediate independence to the kingdoms of Cambodia, Laos, and Annam in exchange for their support of the Japanese against the Allies. Although partially successful, these native regimes, led by Emperor Bao Dai of Annam, eventually broke with the Japanese and sided with the Allies.  
*Index Items:* French Indochina; Jean De Coux; France; Japan—foreign policy; Cambodia; Laos; Annam; Bao Dai.
- 0049 **Recent Political Developments in French Indochina.** SRH-095.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. April 6, 1945. 20pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/19/80.)  
This report is based on Japanese dispatches for the period from November 9, 1944, to March 15, 1945. The material is essentially a continuation of SRH-094 and covers much of the same ground. It includes information on the Indochinese-Japanese defense agreement, Japan's military occupation of the region, the efforts of the French Indochina colonial government to establish communications with Charles de Gaulle's regime in France, and the determination of the Gaullist regime to wrest the colony from Japanese

control. The report also chronicles the beginnings of the long Indochinese struggle for independence that culminated in the Vietnam War.

*Index Items:* French Indochina; Japan—French Indochina; Charles de Gaulle; Vietnam War.

- 0070 **Japanese Relations with the Remaining "Listening Posts" in Europe (May–Mid July 1945).** SRH-096.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 1, 1945. 14pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/19/80.)  
This report contains information on the remaining Japanese intelligence gathering posts in Europe following the surrender of Italy and Germany. These posts were located in the neutral nations of Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland and in the Vatican. This report traces Japan's relations with the nations in the closing days of World War II on a country-by-country basis and examines the role played by these last Japanese outposts by presenting brief resumes of the radio traffic originating from these areas.  
*Index Items:* Japan—"listening posts"; Italy; Germany; Portugal, Sweden; Switzerland; Ireland; Vatican; Radio traffic, Japanese.
- 0085 **Proceedings of the Pacific Order of Battle Conference, July 3–19, 1944.** SRH-097.  
War Department. July 25, 1944. 143pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/25/80.)  
This report gives a comprehensive look at the proceedings, participants, activities, and results of the Pacific Order of Battle Conference. This conference was called by the War Department to review and agree on order of battle information on the Japanese army and Japanese naval ground forces, to exchange relevant information, to reconcile differences of interpretation arising out of the first Order of Battle Conference that had been held in June 1943, and to look at the future with reference to the strategy of Japan. Among the items discussed at this meeting were Japanese strategy, manpower, training facilities, army expansion rate, puppet regimes, military strengths and dispositions, casualties, code names, military personalities, and shipping.  
*Index Items:* Pacific Order of Battle Conference; War Department, U.S.; Army, Japanese; Navy, Japanese; Japan—strategy of; Japan—manpower; Japan—training facilities; Japan—puppet regimes of; Japan—military forces; Japan—casualties; Japan—code names used by; Japan—military personalities; Japan—shipping.
- 0229 **Report of the Pacific Order of Battle Conference (Ground Forces).** SRH-098.  
War Department. August 15–18, 1945. 378pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/2/80.)  
The reports contained in this study were prepared by MIS prior to August 15, 1945, and appear here as amended and adopted by the Pacific Order of Battle Conference. This material represents the status of order of battle intelligence on the Japanese armed forces at the time of the Japanese surrender. It also shows some of the plans that were under way for improving the dissemination of such intelligence, particularly for directing War Department services toward fulfilling theater requirements.  
*Index Items:* Pacific Order of Battle Conference; MIS; Japan—military forces; War Department, U.S.
- 0610 **The Aftermath of Japanese Occupation of French Indo-China (March–May 1945).** SRH-100.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. May 31, 1945. 12pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/11/80.)  
This report, which represents a continuation of SRH-094 and SRH-095, summarizes the military and political events in Indochina after the Japanese overthrow of French rule. Included is information on Japanese plans for control of Indochina, Japanese demands for the disarmament of French Indochinese troops, Japanese arrests of French officials, and attacks on French military positions in Indochina. Also included is information on

French-U.S. relations with regard to military operations in the Pacific and Japanese efforts to win over the native populations in Indochina through the promise of complete independence from their colonial rulers and proclamations of native rulers in Annam, Laos, and Cambodia.

*Index Items:* French Indochina; Japan; France; France-U.S.; Pacific Ocean Area; Annam; Cambodia; Laos.

0623 **Estimated Disposition of Japanese Fleet, Naval Aircraft and Merchant Shipping.** SRH-101.

Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center. August 13 and November 18, 1944. 22pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/18/80.)

The information contained in these reports deals with U.S. intelligence estimates regarding the strength, location, and dispositions of Japanese warships, merchant vessels, and naval aircraft. Also included are Allied theories regarding Japanese strategy and intentions in the Pacific.

*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Merchant vessels, Japanese; Navy, Japanese—aircraft; Japan—strategy of.

0646 **Identifications, Locations, and Command Functions of Significant Japanese Army/Navy Personnel.** SRH-102.

U.S. Pacific Fleet. February 15–August 1, 1945. 42pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/16/80.)

These reports were issued by CINCPAC/CINCPOA and contain information on important Japanese military commands, movements of high-ranking Japanese naval officers during April 1945, a list of Japanese naval flag officers who had died during World War II up to June 19, 1945, and a list of Japanese naval command and flag officers on active duty as of August 1, 1945.

*Index Items:* CINCPAC; CINCPOA; Japan—military commands; Navy, Japanese—flag officers.

0689 **Suicide Attack Squadron Organization.** SRH-103.

Author not available. July 1945. 24pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/3/80.)

This report contains information on the organization of Japanese suicide attack squadrons. This organizational information was obtained from Japanese radio traffic and collateral sources. In this last year of the war the Japanese resorted to the desperate measure of using suicide planes and boats, the famous kamikaze, in their attempts to destroy Allied vessels. Among the materials contained in this report is information on the headquarters of these squadrons, the units attached to them, and the location of these various units, if available.

*Index Items:* Radio traffic, Japanese; Kamikaze operations.

0714 **Enemy Combat Ship Losses.** SRH-104.

U.S. Pacific Fleet. August 1, 1945. 16pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/3/80.)

This report consists of lists of Japanese battleship, carrier, destroyer, and submarine losses during the course of World War II. Information is included on the name of the vessel sunk, the date of its sinking, the location of the vessel when it was attacked, and remarks regarding the damages sustained by the vessel and the method by which they were inflicted.

*Index Items:* Navy, Japanese—combat ships; Submarines, Japanese.

0731 **Japanese Swept Channels and Sunken Vessels as Indicated in ULTRA (Maps).** SRH-105.

U.S. Pacific Fleet. August 18, 1945. 25pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/3/80.)

This report was prepared to acquaint Allied commanders with the navigational situation in Japanese and Korean waters as known from ULTRA intelligence. The report is

divided into two parts; the first contains a list of ship channels that were known to have been swept clear of mines and other obstacles, while the second contains a list of the locations of Allied vessels that were sunk by mines. Much of this information is indicated on maps included in this report.

*Index Items:* Japan—navigational situation; ULTRA intelligence; Japan—ship channels; Vessels, Allied.

0756 **MAGIC Reports for the Attention of the President. SRH-111.**

Author not available. 1943–1944. 37pp. (S. Declassified on 1/14/80.)

This report contains a number of documents obtained by means of MAGIC that were felt to be important enough to be shown directly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Included in this material is information on German fortifications on the French coast, German air attacks on the railroads in Italy, German blockade-runners, German submarine operations, the German evacuation of the Crimea, the German military manpower shortage, German naval operations in the Aegean Sea, acts of terrorism in France, and the Japanese desire to avoid using chemical warfare. Many of these messages were relayed to the president by General George C. Marshall.

*Index Items:* MAGIC intelligence; Franklin D. Roosevelt; Germany—fortifications; Germany—air attacks on Italian railroads; Germany—blockade-runners; Germany—U-boat operations; Crimea; Germany—military manpower shortage; Germany—naval operations in Aegean Sea; Terrorism; France; Japan; Chemical warfare.

0794 **China's Position Today. SRH-114.**

Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. August 19, 1945. 26pp. (TS. Declassified on 10/1/80.)

This report contains information on the political and military situation in China in 1945. Included in this material is information on Chinese military defeats, the U.S. aid program for China, Chiang Kai-shek's attempted rapprochement with the Chinese Communist party, the effect of Allied victories in the Pacific and Burma on Chinese morale. Most of this material deals with the deterioration of relations between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, headquartered in Chungking and the Chinese Communist party in Yen-an. Also mentioned is the effectiveness of Chinese Communist propaganda in weakening the Nationalist position in China.

*Index Items:* China; China—military defeats; Aid programs, U.S.; Chiang Kai-shek; Chinese Communists; Burma; Chinese Communists—propaganda.

0821 **U.S. Army Investigations into the Handling of Certain Communications Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor. SRH-115.**

U.S. Army. September 1944. 179pp. (TS. Declassified on 2/19/81.)

This report deals with the U.S. Army's investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Included is testimony by a large number of witnesses regarding exactly what information the army had received through such secret intelligence sources as ULTRA and MAGIC that might have prevented the Pearl Harbor disaster. Several high-ranking officers gave testimony at these proceedings, including Major Generals Sherman Miles and L. T. Gerow and Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner. Also included are pertinent Japanese messages relating to this subject, especially the so-called "Winds Execute" message.

*Index Items:* Army, U.S.; Pearl Harbor attack; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence; Sherman Miles; L. T. Gerow; Hayes A. Kroner; "Winds Execute" message.

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- 0001 **U.S. Army Investigations into the Handling of Certain Communications Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor.** SRH-115 cont. 210pp.
- 0211 **Incidental Exhibits regarding the Pearl Harbor Investigation.** SRH-118.  
MIS WDGS. n.d. 484pp. (S. Declassified on 4/15/81.)  
This report consists of a number of documents used as exhibits in the investigation into the Pearl Harbor disaster. Much of this information points to the fact that U.S. authorities had advance warning regarding the Japanese intentions of declaring war and attacking Pearl Harbor, but that this information was deliberately suppressed to protect the knowledge that the United States had broken the Japanese code system. Among the messages contained here are dispatches from Generals Sherman Miles and Walter Short, rumors concerning a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, intelligence reports regarding the burning of the code books at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C., information on weather conditions in the area of Pearl Harbor, and U.S. intelligence information on Japan's war potential and intentions prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.  
*Index Items:* Pearl Harbor attack; Japan—U.S.; Cryptanalysis; Sherman Miles; Walter Short; Japan—embassy; Japan—war potential of.
- 0696 **Military Intelligence Service, War Department—Special Security Officer and Other Correspondence Relating to Special Intelligence in the Pacific Ocean Area.** SRH-119.  
MIS. n.d. 96pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/6/81.)  
This report consists of a series of documents and memoranda relating to the Special Security Officer system and U.S. intelligence operations in the Pacific region. Among the topics covered are special security personnel, liaison with air forces in the Central Pacific (CENPAC), enemy communications facilities, a list of special security officers and representatives in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas, ULTRA intelligence and personnel needs of XXI Bomber Command, low-level air developments, and declassification of target information. Correspondents include Colonels Carter W. Clarke and Alfred McCormack, W. J. Sebald, Generals George C. Marshall, Henry "Hap" Arnold, and Clayton Bissell, and Admiral Ernest J. King.  
*Index Items:* Special security officers, U.S.; Pacific Ocean Area; Japan—communications facilities; XXI Bomber Command; target information; Carter W. Clarke; Alfred McCormack; W. J. Sebald; George C. Marshall; Henry "Hap" Arnold; Clayton Bissell; Ernest J. King.
- 0793 **Utilization of American Indians as Communication Linguists.** SRH-120.  
Army Security Agency. October 26, 1950. 123pp. (NA. Declassified on 5/27/81.)  
This report consists of information prepared by the Army Security Agency regarding the feasibility and practicability of the use of American Indians as communications linguists. This action was prompted in response to a request from P. A. Bonney of the Indian Association of America to President Harry S Truman regarding the use of American Indians in this capacity. It was also felt that the use of some of the more obscure Indian dialects or languages might prove beneficial as a basis for a U.S. military code system with American Indians employed as translators. The Army Security Agency recommended that this action not be taken and declined to employ any American Indians in such a role at that time.  
*Index Items:* Army Security Agency; American Indians; P. A. Bonney; Indian Association of America; Harry S Truman; Cryptanalysis.

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- 0917 **Japanese Ship List: "Know Your Enemy."** SRH-121.  
Author not available. December 18, 1944. 44pp. (TS. Declassified 4/10/81.)  
This report was prepared as a part of the "Know Your Enemy" program and represents an attempt to produce a comprehensive list of Japanese naval vessels based on captured documents. This list includes the names of any ships that had been operational at any time since the beginning of World War II. Only Japanese fleet units, naval auxiliaries, and converted combative vessels are included in this summary. The list gives the names of the vessels, their tonnage, speed, crew complement, and the date (if any) that it was stricken from the Japanese naval list. This document was prepared to aid in the identification of Japanese war vessels by U.S. military personnel.  
*Index Items:* "Know Your Enemy" program; Japan—warships.
- 0962 **Japanese Messages concerning the *Hoshi Maru* and the *Awa Maru*.** SRH-122.  
War Department. December 1944—August 1945. 38pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/1/80.)  
This report contains Japanese diplomatic messages concerning the voyages of two relief ships: the *Hoshi Maru* and the *Awa Maru*. These relief vessels were sent as a result of a representation made to the Japanese government from the United States through Switzerland. The United States asked if Japan would provide vessels in which to ship relief goods and mail to U.S. prisoners of war and internees under Japanese jurisdiction. The Japanese approved this request and conducted negotiations to guarantee safe passage to any ship designated to carry such materials. These diplomatic messages concern the arrangements for these vessels, their itinerary, and some information regarding their cargoes. The messages cover the period from December 1944 until the end of the Second World War in August 1945.  
*Index Items:* Diplomatic communications, Japanese; *Hoshi Maru*; *Awa Maru*; Relief goods; Prisoners of war, U.S.

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- 0001 **Japanese Messages concerning the *Hoshi Maru* and the *Awa Maru*.** SRH-122  
cont. 110pp.
- 0111 **Certain Aspects of MAGIC in the Cryptological Background of the Various Official Investigations into the Pearl Harbor Attack.** SRH-125.  
William F. Friedman. 1955. 75pp. (S. Declassified on 5/22/81.)  
In this report William Friedman attempts to show the role that cryptanalysis, particularly that involving MAGIC, played in the Pearl Harbor attack. Friedman seeks to refute the charges made by such figures as Admirals Robert A. Theobald and Husband E. Kimmel, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had prior knowledge of Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor and that he deliberately withheld this information from his commanders in the field, thus inviting the disaster that occurred on December 7, 1941. It is the contention of Friedman that although the MAGIC code had indeed been broken prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, information regarding the exact time and place of the Japanese attack was not available. Friedman goes on to point out that the code that had been broken was the Japanese diplomatic code and that specific military and naval information was not obtainable through this particular code system.  
*Index Items:* MAGIC intelligence; William Friedman; Cryptanalysis; Pearl Harbor attack; Robert A. Theobald; Husband E. Kimmel; Franklin D. Roosevelt; Japan—diplomatic code.

- 0187     **History and Organization of PACMIRS (Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section).** SRH-126.  
MIS. September 6, 1944–August 14, 1945. 48pp. (C. Declassified on 6/15/81.)  
PACMIRS was developed in August of 1944 by MIS as a centralized translating agency that would coordinate the efforts and research of all theater document services and serve the War Department and other authorized federal and Allied agencies interested in long-range intelligence. PACMIRS was located in Washington, D.C. This report presents a detailed look at the history, mission, and organization of this intelligence agency.  
*Index Items:* PACMIRS; MIS; Theater document services; War Department, U.S.
- 0240     **Use and Dissemination of ULTRA in the Southwest Pacific Area.** SRH-127.  
War Department. 1943–1945. 197pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/10/81.)  
This report consists of memoranda describing the use of ULTRA intelligence and its dissemination in the Southwest Pacific Area. The proposed method for handling this material involved assigning special security officers to each theater and independent command to receive high-level ULTRA DEXTER intelligence as it arrived. These special security officers were under the direct control of the War Department. Included in this report is information on the training and selection of special security officers, opinions of commanding officers in the Southwest Pacific Area regarding the assignment of these officers to their commands, types of information provided by ULTRA, and the security of ULTRA intelligence.  
*Index Items:* ULTRA intelligence; Southwest Pacific Area; Special security officers, U.S.; War Department, U.S.
- 0438     **Study of Pearl Harbor Hearings.** SRH-128.  
MIS, WDGS. 1947. 40pp. (S. Declassified on 7/9/81.)  
This study was conducted by a committee composed of five military officers, ranging in rank from major to colonel, on the instructions of the deputy director of intelligence. The mission of this committee was to read the transcript of testimony and evidence presented before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, analyze this information from the broad intelligence viewpoint, and report the indications of failure and the lessons to be drawn therefrom. This committee began meeting on December 9, 1946, and this report represents its findings.  
*Index Items:* Pearl Harbor attack; Pearl Harbor Attack, Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the.
- 0479     **Japanese Order of Battle Bulletins.** SRH-129.  
MIS. March–June 1944. 173pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/16/81.)  
This report consists of a series of bulletins issued by MIS containing Japanese order of battle information. This information was obtained primarily from ULTRA sources and includes such material as the names of Japanese military units, their location, strength, and composition. These bulletins were issued to U.S. commanders in the Pacific theater in order to provide them with the most up-to-date information on Japanese plans and movements.  
*Index Items:* MIS; Japan—order of battle information; ULTRA intelligence; Japan—military forces; Pacific theater.
- 0653     **Report of the Mission to Hawaii and Marianas to Study Security of 21st Bomber Command Communications.** SRH-133.  
MIS, WDGS. March 1945. 54pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/7/81.)  
This material deals with the report of a group of Air Corps officers from Arlington Hall, acting on orders from the assistant chief of staff, G-2, whose mission was to study the communications of the 21st Bomber Command from the standpoint of security against

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enemy traffic analysis. This group also conferred with MIS special security officers on Guam and examined the organizations conducting ULTRA and low-level intercept and intelligence activities there.

*Index Items:* G-2; XXI Bomber Command; Traffic analysis; Special security officers; Guam; ULTRA intelligence.

0708 **Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, December 1942.** SRH-136.

Author not available. December 1942. 292pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/24/81.)

The purpose of this study was to show the role of radio intelligence in the military operations in the Pacific Ocean Area in World War II. The problem has been approached through a study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by CINCPAC to his subordinate commands. When available, the similar dispatches originated by those subordinate commands have been included. This material includes a great deal of information on the Battle of Guadalcanal.

*Index Items:* Radio intelligence; Pacific Ocean Area; CINCPAC; Guadalcanal, Battle of.

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0001 **Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.** SRH-136 cont. 426pp.

[Note: Frame Numbers 0425 and 0426 were inadvertently filmed twice.]

0425 **Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, February 1943.** SRH-144.

Author not available. February 1943. 574pp. (NA. Declassified on 1/12/82.)

0425 Part I. 331pp.

0757 Part II. 243pp.

The purpose of this study was to show the role of radio intelligence in the military operations in the Pacific Ocean Area in World War II. The problem has been approached through a study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by CINCPAC to his subordinate commands. When available, the similar dispatches originated by those subordinate commands have been included. Each volume of this history covers a period of one month and has three parts. The first section is a summary of the contributions of radio intelligence for the month as a whole. The second division contains a daily chapter outlining these contributions in greater detail. The third part is an appendix, which is the source for all statements made in the preceding two sections of the volume. Included is information on U.S. military, naval, and air operations in the Solomon Islands and against Rabaul during February of 1943.

*Index Items:* Radio intelligence; Pacific Ocean Area; CINCPAC; Solomon Islands campaign; Rabaul.

## Reel 14

0001 **Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, February 1943.** SRH-144 cont.

0001 Part II cont. 75pp.

0076 **Communication Intelligence Summaries.** SRH-147.

Commandant, 14th Naval District, U.S. Navy. November 1–December 7, 1941. 44pp. (S. Declassified on 2/1/82.)

The material presented in this report represents communication intelligence summaries produced by the 14th Naval District in Honolulu, Hawaii, during the period immediately

prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. This material was included as an exhibit for the U.S. Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Included is a day-by-day intelligence breakdown of all information received by the U.S. Pacific Fleet regarding the activities and movements of the Japanese fleet and air force in the month just before Pearl Harbor.

*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Fourteenth Naval District; Pearl Harbor attack, Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the; Pacific Fleet, U.S.; Navy, Japanese—fleet; Air force, Japanese; Pearl Harbor attack.

0121 **General Information on Local ULTRA Picture as Background for Signal Intelligence Conference. SRH-148.**

John F. B. Runnalls. March 6, 1944. 11pp. (S. Declassified on 2/1/82.)

This report was sent to Colonels Carter W. Clarke and Alfred McCormack to provide them with background information on the arrangements for the distribution of ULTRA intelligence in the Pacific theater for use at the Signal Intelligence Conference. Included is information on how distribution procedures differed between the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters, opposition to direct War Department control over the use of ULTRA intelligence in the Pacific theater, information on channels that were authorized for the use of ULTRA intelligence at that time and the channels to be used in the future, and information on ULTRA intelligence work in Delhi, India.

*Index Items:* Carter W. Clarke; Alfred McCormack; ULTRA intelligence; Signal Intelligence Conference; Pacific theater; Mediterranean theater; War Department, U.S.; India—Delhi.

0133 **Signal Intelligence Disclosures in the Pearl Harbor Investigation. SRH-154.**

Chief of Communications Research, Army Security Agency. July 1, 1947. 48pp. (NA. Declassified on 2/22/82.)

The purpose of this study is to determine to what extent the activities of the Army Security Agency were compromised in the hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee for the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. That much information about the cryptanalytic activities of the United States, previously held secret, was made public in the hearings had become evident from items published in newspapers and periodicals during and following the sessions. The Army Security Agency therefore decided in December 1946 to appoint Lt. Robert Bar to examine the forty volumes of transcripts and exhibits published by the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee to look for possible signal intelligence disclosures. This study represents his report on his findings.

*Index Items:* Army Security Agency; Pearl Harbor Attack, Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of; Cryptanalysis; Robert Bar; signal intelligence.

0182 **Intelligence Summaries: Japanese Shipping. SRH-155.**

Author not available. January–February 1943. 61pp. (S. Declassified on 3/1/82.)

This report contains information on Japanese merchant shipping in January and February of 1943. Included is material on the names of Japanese merchant vessels, their type, gross tonnage, speed, type of fuel used, and movements. Also included is information on U.S. submarine and air attacks on Japanese shipping and reports on the damage caused by these attacks.

*Index Items:* Merchant vessels, Japanese; Submarine operations, U.S.; Air attacks, U.S.

0244 **Weekly Listing of Merchant Vessels Sunk in Far Eastern Waters. SRH-156.**

Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. December 14, 1944–March 14, 1945. 99pp. (S. Declassified on 3/2/82.)

This report contains weekly listings prepared by the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section of Japanese merchant vessels sunk by the United States in the Far East

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between December 14, 1944, and March 14, 1945. Among the information provided in these listings are the name of the vessel, the radio call letters, the tonnage, the type of vessel, the date and location of the sinking, and the effective agent of its sinking (i.e. U.S. submarine, aircraft, or surface vessel).

*Index Items:* Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section; Merchant vessels, Japanese.

- 0344 **Monthly Listing of Sinkings of Japanese Ships. SRH-157.**  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. April–September 1945. 68pp. (S. Declassified on 3/3/82.)  
This report contains a monthly listing, prepared by the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, of Japanese merchant vessels sunk by the United States in the Far East between April and September of 1945. Among the information provided in these listings are the name of the vessel, radio call letters, tonnage, type of vessel, date and location of the sinking, and the effective agent of its sinking (i.e., U.S. submarine, aircraft, or surface vessel).  
*Index Items:* Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section; Merchant vessels, Japanese.
- 0413 **A List of Japanese Merchant Ships (Second Edition). SRH-158.**  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. February 1, 1945. 586pp. (S. Declassified on 3/10/82 and 3/15/82.)  
0413 Part I. 339pp.  
0753 Part II. 247pp.  
This report consists of an alphabetical listing of all known Japanese merchant vessels as of January 1945. Information is provided on the ship's name, international call sign, vessel type, gross tonnage, maximum speed, draft, and beam. Also included is information on whether or not the vessel was armed and information on the sinking of or damage to these Japanese vessels. This information was obtained by the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section from published sources.  
*Index Items:* Merchant vessels, Japanese; Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section.

## Reel 15

- 0001 **A List of Japanese Merchant Ships (Second Edition). SRH-158 cont.**  
0001 Part II cont. 117pp.
- 0118 **Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC): Miscellaneous Memoranda. SRH-163.**  
JANAC. 1943–1947. 111pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/3/82.)  
JANAC was established with the purpose of assessing loss or damage to enemy naval and merchant vessels and aircraft. The memoranda in this report trace the development of JANAC from its formation in 1943 through World War II and beyond. Information is provided regarding attacks by U.S. aircraft on Japanese shipping, secret intelligence source material, information on the effectiveness of U.S. and Japanese aircraft, lists of Japanese vessels reported sunk by the U.S. Army Air Corps, appointment of members to JANAC, reports on Japanese naval losses during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, information on JANAC's method of assessing damage to enemy vessels, and reports of damage to enemy shipping inflicted by U.S. submarines.  
*Index Items:* JANAC; Navy, Japanese—vessels; Merchant vessels, Japanese; Aircraft—Japanese; Aircraft—U.S.; Japan—shipping; Intelligence—secret source material; Army Air Corps, U.S.; Bismarck Sea, Battle of the; Submarine operations, U.S.

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- 0229 **Memoranda from COMINCH (F-20) to Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC). SRH-164.**  
COMINCH. 1944-1945. 165pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/30/82.)  
This report consists of memoranda reporting on Japanese ship losses and damage assessments forwarded by COMINCH to JANAC. These memoranda list the name of the enemy vessel, type of damage it sustained, whether it was sunk or not, its last known position, date of the attack, and gross tonnage, if known. The memoranda cover the years 1944 and 1945.  
*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; COMINCH; JANAC.
- 0395 **Memoranda from Office of Naval Communications to Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC). SRH-165.**  
Office of Naval Communications. 604pp.  
0395 Part I. 1943-1945. 245pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)  
0641 Part II. 1945. 359pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/25/82.)  
This report contains memoranda reporting on Japanese ship losses and damage assessments forwarded by the Office of Naval Communications to JANAC. These memoranda list the name and type of enemy vessel, type of damage it sustained, date of the attack, whether it was sunk or not, its last reported position, and detailed information regarding the attack and the events leading up to it. The material in Part I covers the years 1943 and 1944, while information concerning 1945 is contained in Part II.  
*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Office of Naval Communications; JANAC.

## Reel 16

- 0001 **Memoranda from Office of Naval Communications to Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC). SRH-165 cont.**  
Office of Naval Communications. 252pp.  
0001 Part II cont. 1945. 46pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/25/82.)  
0047 Part III. 1946. 206pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/19/82.)  
This report contains memoranda reporting on Japanese ship losses and damage assessments forwarded by the Office of Naval Communications to JANAC. These memoranda list the name and type of enemy vessel, the type of damage it sustained, the date of the attack, whether it was sunk or not, its last reported position, and detailed information regarding the attack and the events leading up to it. The material in Part II covers the year 1945, while information concerning 1946 is contained in Part III. The material for 1946 consists primarily of information correcting or amending previous reported sinkings.  
*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Office of Naval Communications; JANAC
- 0254 **Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) Memoranda to Office of Naval Communications. SRH-166.**  
JANAC. 647pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/30/82.)  
0254 Part I. September 1944-May 1946. 331pp.  
0586 Part II. April 1946-January 1947. 316pp.  
This report contains memoranda regarding Japanese ship losses provided by JANAC to the Office of Naval Communications. These memoranda take the form of detailed reports on the loss of specific Japanese ships and lists of ships reported sunk or damaged during specific engagements or battles. Among the campaigns mentioned are the U.S. assaults on Truk, Rabaul, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Philippines. Most of these reports are confirmations of ships previously reported as sunk. In addition to the date on which the sinking occurred, a great deal of information is given regarding the Japanese vessels in question. In many cases the name of the U.S.

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vessel that made the attack is provided. Part I contains information on sinkings occurring between September 1944 and May 1946, while Part II contains information dated between April 1946 and January 1947.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; JANAC; Office of Naval Communications; Truk; Rabaul; Gilbert Islands; Marshall Islands; Philippines.

0903 **Memoranda from Army Signal Corps to Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC). SRH-167.**

Army Signal Corps. 1945–1946. 34pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)

This report consists of memoranda confirming reports of Japanese ship losses and damage assessments forwarded by the Army Signal Corps to JANAC. These memoranda list the name of the enemy vessel, type of damage it sustained, whether it was sunk or not, its last known position, date of the attack, and gross tonnage, if known. The memoranda cover the years 1945 and 1946.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Signal Corps, U.S. Army; JANAC.

0938 **Agenda Minutes/Assessments: Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC). SRH-168.**

JANAC. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)

0938 Part I, Meetings 1–12. February 15–December 23, 1943. 62pp.

This report consists of the agendas of JANAC meetings and reports of sinkings and damage assessments of specific enemy vessels presented during the course of these meetings. The assessment reports provide the name of the vessel under discussion, date and time of the attack, ship's location at the time of the attack, total number of Japanese forces in the engagement, U.S. forces involved in the attack, detailed information regarding the fight, damage to the enemy ship, prisoner of war reports, information on whether or not the vessel was sunk, and any remarks deemed appropriate regarding the attack.

*Index Items:* JANAC; Japan—shipping.

## Reel 17

0001 **Agenda Minutes/Assessments: Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC). SRH-168 cont.**

JANAC. 997pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)

0001 Part I, Meetings 1–12 cont. February 15–December 23, 1943. 210pp.

0211 Part II, Meetings 13–20. February 18–August 11, 1944. 303pp.

0515 Part III, Meetings 21–28. August 24–December 15, 1944. 354pp.

0870 Part IV, Meetings 29–36. January 5–April 13, 1945. 130pp.

This report consists of the agendas of JANAC meetings and reports of sinkings and damage assessments of specific enemy vessels presented during the course of these meetings. The assessment reports provide the name of the vessel under discussion, date and time of the attack, ship's location at the time of the attack, total number of Japanese forces in the engagement, U.S. forces involved in the attack, detailed information regarding the fight, damage to the enemy ship, prisoner of war reports, information on whether or not the vessel was sunk, and any remarks deemed appropriate regarding the attack.

*Index Items:* JANAC; Japan—shipping.

## Reel 18

0001 **Agenda Minutes/Assessments: Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC).** SRH-168 cont.

JANAC. 997pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)

- 0001 Part IV, Meetings 29-36 cont. January 5-April 13, 1945. 204pp.
- 0205 Part V, Meetings 37-44. April 20-November 9, 1945. 373pp.
- 0579 Part VI, Meetings 45-47. November 30, 1945-January 17, 1946. 311pp.
- 0891 Part VII, Meetings 48-51. February 25-May 21, 1946. 109pp.

This report consists of the agendas of JANAC meetings and reports of sinkings and damage assessments of specific enemy vessels presented during the course of these meetings. The assessment reports provide the name of the vessel under discussion, date and time of the attack, ship's location at the time of the attack, total number of Japanese forces in the engagement, U.S. forces involved in the attack, detailed information regarding the fight, damage to the enemy ship, prisoner of war reports, information on whether or not the vessel was sunk, and any remarks deemed appropriate regarding the attack.

*Index Items:* JANAC; Japan—shipping.

## Reel 19

0001 **Agenda Minutes/Assessments: Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC).** SRH-168 cont.

JANAC. 776pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/28/82.)

- 0001 Part VII, Meetings 48-51 cont. February 25-May 21, 1946 189pp.
- 0190 Part VIII, Meetings 52-55. June 11-July 25, 1946. 292pp.
- 0483 Part IX, Meetings 56-66. August 6, 1946-January 23, 1947. 295pp.

This report consists of the agendas of JANAC meetings and reports of sinkings and damage assessments of specific enemy vessels presented during the course of these meetings. The assessment reports provide the name of the vessel under discussion, date and time of the attack, ship's location at the time of the attack, total number of Japanese forces in the engagement, U.S. forces involved in the attack, detailed information regarding the fight, damage to the enemy ship, prisoner of war reports, information on whether or not the vessel was sunk, and any remarks deemed appropriate regarding the attack.

*Index Items:* JANAC; Japan—shipping.

0779 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.** SRH-170.

MIS. 220pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

- 0779 Part I, Indices. October 8, 1945. 84pp.
- 0864 Part II. October 18, 1944-January 15, 1945. 136pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. Part I consists of a comprehensive index to the remaining twelve sections of this report. Included is material on the Japanese tanker position; the increased emphasis on Japanese escort strength in the Kurile Islands; protection of Japanese convoys; reports on small boats and submarine transport craft in the Southern Area; information on the transportation of prisoners; Japanese commodity shortages; Japan's long-range plans for the self-sufficiency of the Marshall Islands; the establishment of a Japanese shipping base on Moena Island; Japanese military stockpiling; the supply schedule for the Japanese army in South

China; a list of Japanese tankers; Japanese oil transport difficulties; reports on Japanese ship repairs in Singapore, Manila, and Takao; Japanese plans for the production of aircraft lubricants; charts of Japanese ports; Japanese plans for the restoration of an oil refinery in Java; Japanese efforts to protect military supplies from Allied bombing; U.S. submarine attacks on Japanese fishing boats; ethanol shipments from Java; shipping from Japanese home ports; and Japanese use of improvised antitank mines.  
*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence; Merchant vessels, Japanese; Kurile Islands; Japan—convoys; Prisoners of war; Japan—commodity shortages in; Marshall Islands; Moena Island; Japan—military stockpiling; Army, Japanese; Singapore; Manila; Takao; Japan—aircraft; Java; Submarine operations, U.S.

## Reel 20

0001 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.**  
SRH-170 cont.

MIS. 988pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

0001 Part II cont. October 18, 1944—January 15, 1945. 342pp.

0343 Part III, January 22—March 26, 1945. 437pp.

0781 Part IV, April 1—16, 1945. 209pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. A comprehensive index to all twelve sections of this report can be found in Part I of this report, located on Reel 19 beginning on Frame 0779.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence.

## Reel 21

0001 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.**  
SRH-170 cont.

MIS. 998pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

0001 Part IV, April 1—16, 1945 cont. 261pp.

0262 Part V, April 20—May 1, 1945. 453pp.

0716 Part VI, May 2—15, 1945. 284pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. A comprehensive index to all twelve sections of this report can be found in Part I of this report, located on Reel 19 beginning on Frame 0779.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence.

## Reel 22

0001 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.**  
SRH-170 cont.

MIS. 998pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

0001 Part VI, May 2—15, 1945 cont. 209pp.

0210 Part VII, May 18—30, 1945. 459pp.

0670 Part VIII, June 2—16, 1945. 330pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. A comprehensive index to all twelve sections of this report can be found in Part I of this report, located on Reel 19 beginning on Frame 0779.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence.

## Reel 23

0001 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.**  
SRH-170 cont.

MIS. 1,005pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

0001 Part VIII, June 2–16, 1945 cont. 96pp.

0097 Part IX, June 19–July 2, 1945. 461pp.

0559 Part X, July 4–18, 1945. 448pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. A comprehensive index to all twelve sections of this report can be found in Part I of this report, located on Reel 19 beginning on Frame 0779.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence.

## Reel 24

0001 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.**  
SRH-170 cont.

MIS. 998pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

0001 Part XI, July 19–August 4, 1945. 501pp.

0503 Part XII, August 8–10, 1945. 497pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. A comprehensive index to all twelve sections of this report can be found in Part I of this report, located on Reel 19 beginning on Frame 0779.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence.

## Reel 25

0001 **Shipping and Economic Notes: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.**  
SRH-170 cont.

MIS. 373pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)

0001 Part XII, August 8–10, 1945 cont. 83pp.

0084 Part XIII, August 28–September 28, 1945. 290pp.

These reports contain information relating to Japanese shipping and the Japanese and Far Eastern economic situation. This material was compiled by MIS through various sources including ULTRA and MAGIC. A comprehensive index to all twelve sections can be found in Part I of this report, located on Reel 19 beginning on Frame 0779.

*Index Items:* Japan—shipping; Japan—economic situation in; Far East—economic situation in; MIS; ULTRA intelligence; MAGIC intelligence.

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- 0375 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle Information. SRH-172.**  
SSA. 624pp. (S. Declassified on 6/4/82.)  
0375 Part I, October 5–December 7, 1943. 410pp.  
0786 Part II, December 8, 1943–January 25, 1944. 214pp.  
These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.

## Reel 26

- 0001 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle Information.**  
SRH-172 cont.  
SSA. 946pp. (S. Declassified on 6/4/82.)  
0001 Part II, December 8, 1943–January 25, 1944 cont. 175pp.  
0176 Part III, January 26–March 25, 1944. 391pp.  
0568 Part IV, March 27–May 31, 1944. 380pp.  
These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.
- 0949 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (First Edition).**  
SRH-173.  
SSA. (S. Declassified on 5/26/82.)  
0949 Part I, March 15, 1944. 51pp.  
These reports provide an in-depth look at Japanese order of battle information in the last year of World War II. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.

## Reel 27

- 0001 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (First Edition).**  
SRH-173 cont.  
SSA. March 15, 1944. 730pp. (S. Declassified on 5/26/82.)  
0001 Part I cont. 291pp.  
0292 Part II. 439pp.  
These reports provide an in-depth look at Japanese order of battle information in the last year of World War II. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.

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0732     **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (Second Edition).**  
          SRH-174.  
          SSA. May 15, 1944. (S. Declassified on 5/25/82.)  
          0732         Part I. 268pp.  
          These reports provide an in-depth look at Japanese order of battle information in the  
          last year of World War II. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and disposi-  
          tions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese  
          military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of  
          radio intercepts.  
          *Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units;  
          SSA.

## Reel 28

0001     **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (Second Edition).**  
          SRH-174 cont.  
          SSA. May 15, 1944. 582pp. (S. Declassified on 5/25/82.)  
          0001         Part I cont. 138pp.  
          0139         Part II. 444pp.  
          These reports provide an in-depth look at Japanese order of battle information in the  
          last year of World War II. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and disposi-  
          tions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese  
          military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of  
          radio intercepts.  
          *Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units;  
          SSA.

0584     **Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle. SRH-175.**  
          SSA. (S. Declassified on 6/8/82.)  
          0584         Part I, May 26–November 17, 1944. 416pp.  
          These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is  
          material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military  
          bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was ob-  
          tained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
          *Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units;  
          SSA.

## Reel 29

0001     **Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle. SRH-175 cont.**  
          SSA. 535pp. (S. Declassified on 6/8/82.)  
          0001         Part I, May 26–November 17, 1944 cont. 61pp.  
          0062         Part II, November 18, 1944–March 31, 1945. 474pp.  
          These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is  
          material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military  
          bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was ob-  
          tained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
          *Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units;  
          SSA.

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- 0537 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (Fifth Edition).**  
SRH-176.  
SSA. January 12, 1945. 463pp. (S. Declassified on 6/10/82.)  
0537 Part I. 361pp.  
0899 Part II. 101pp.  
These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.

## Reel 30

- 0001 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (Fifth Edition).**  
SRH-176 cont.  
SSA. January 12, 1945. 472pp. (S. Declassified on 6/10/82.)  
0001 Part II cont. 156pp.  
0157 Part III. 316pp.  
These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.
- 0474 **Interrogation of Japanese concerning Possible Broadcast of the "Winds Execute" Messages.** SRH-177.  
Arlington Hall. October–November 1945. 16pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/16/82.)  
This report contains information regarding the U.S. interrogation of Japanese military and civil officials on the subject of the "Winds Execute" message, which triggered the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The Japanese diplomatic representatives in the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR were to inform the Japanese Foreign Office of a break in relations with their host country by means of a false weather report. These diplomatic personnel were then to destroy their code books. The United States was attempting to determine if any of these coded messages were in fact sent prior to December 7, 1941.  
*Index Items:* "Winds Execute" message; Pearl Harbor attack; Diplomatic personnel, Japanese; U.S.; Great Britain; USSR; Foreign Office, Japanese.
- 0491 **U.S. Naval Pre-World War II Radio Intelligence Activities in the Philippine Islands.**  
SRH-180.  
U.S. Navy. July 10, 1981. 102pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/13/82.)  
This report deals with radio intelligence activities conducted by the U.S. Navy in the Philippine Islands in the years prior to World War II. The material covers the time period from 1924 to 1942. The U.S. Navy set up radio intercept stations in the islands to monitor Japanese targets and to supplement stations already in operation on shipboard in the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and in Shanghai and Peiping, China. This radio intercept station was originally located at Olongapo, but was later moved, first to Cavite, and later to Corregidor, where it remained until the Japanese capture of the Philippines in late 1941.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence; Navy, U.S.; Philippines; Asiatic Fleet, U.S.; China—Shanghai; China—Peiping; Philippines—Olongapo; Philippines—Cavite; Philippines—Corregidor.

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- 0594 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (Fourth Edition).**  
SRH-181.  
SSA. October 10, 1944. 405pp. (S. Declassified on 6/23/82.)  
0594 Part I. 272pp.  
0867 Part II. 133pp.  
These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.

## Reel 31

- 0001 **OCSIGO, Signal Security Agency, Japanese Order of Battle (Fourth Edition).**  
SRH-181 cont.  
SSA. October 10, 1944. 405pp. (S. Declassified on 6/23/82.)  
0001 Part II cont. 160pp.  
These reports contain information relating to the Japanese order of battle. Included is material on Japanese troop strengths and dispositions, locations of Japanese military bases, and movements of specific Japanese military units. This information was obtained and compiled by the SSA by means of radio intercepts.  
*Index Items:* Japan—military dispositions; Japan—military bases; Japan—military units; SSA.
- 0161 **U.S. Naval Communications Supplementary Activity, Vaitogi, Samoa, 1939–1947.**  
SRH-182.  
U.S. Navy. November 4, 1980. 31pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/13/82.)  
This report contains a history of U.S. Naval communications in American Samoa during the World War II era. Included is information on the station's personnel, equipment, and operations. The Samoan station was a part of the Mid-Pacific Group and its mission was the tracking of Japanese naval and merchant vessels. This station was involved in tracking operations in some of the major Pacific theater engagements, including the Battles of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal.  
*Index Items:* American Samoa; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Navy, Japanese—vessels; Merchant vessels, Japanese; Coral Sea, Battle of; Guadalcanal, Battle of.
- 0193 **OCSIGO Signal Security Agency, Location of Japanese Military Installations.**  
SRH-183.  
SSA. December 14, 1944. 33pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/25/82.)  
The report was prepared by the SSA and represents a list of Japanese military installations and their locations at the end of 1944. In general, only permanent military installations in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria that did not have operational code numbers were listed in this report.  
*Index Items:* SSA; Japan—military installations; Japan; Taiwan; Korea; Manchukuo.
- 0227 **CNO Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Allied Claims and Enemy Confirmation of Damage to Japanese Ships. SRH-184.**  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. 772pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/21/82.)  
0227 Part I, January–September 1943. 298pp.  
0526 Part II, October–December 1943. 317pp.  
0844 Part III, January–February 1944. 157pp.

These reports represent a chronological compilation, beginning in January 1943, of Allied claims of damage inflicted on Japanese warships and merchant vessels. The claims are entered on the left side of the report, while any evidence confirming the damage report, from all sources including the Japanese themselves, has been entered on the right side. Information confirming damage reports was obtained from the findings of JANAC, decrypted intelligence information, information gained from captured Japanese documents and personnel diaries, and information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war. Also included in these reports is information on the U.S. attacking units, the date of the attack, and the position where the attack occurred.

*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Merchant vessels, Japanese; JANAC; Decryption intelligence; Japan—documents; Prisoners of war, Japanese.

## Reel 32

0001 **CNO Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Allied Claims and Enemy Confirmation of Damage to Japanese Ships. SRH-184 cont.**

Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. 997pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/21/82.)

0001 Part III, January–February 1944 cont. 49pp.

0050 Part IV, March–May 1944. 287pp.

0338 Part V, June–July 1944. 221pp.

0560 Part VI, August–October 1944. 440pp.

These reports represent a chronological compilation, beginning in January 1943, of Allied claims of damage inflicted on Japanese warships and merchant vessels. The claims are entered on the left side of the report, while any evidence confirming the damage report, from all sources including the Japanese themselves, has been entered on the right side. Information confirming damage reports was obtained from the findings of JANAC, decrypted intelligence information, information gained from captured Japanese documents and personnel diaries, and information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war. Also included in these reports is information on the U.S. attacking units, the date of the attack, and the position where the attack occurred.

*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Merchant vessels, Japanese; JANAC; Decryption intelligence; Japan—documents; Prisoners of war, Japanese.

## Reel 33

0001 **CNO Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Allied Claims and Enemy Confirmation of Damage to Japanese Ships. SRH-184 cont.**

Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. 996pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/21/82.)

0001 Part VI, August–October 1944 cont. 27pp.

0028 Part VII, November–December 1944. 261pp.

0290 Part VIII, January–February 1945. 202pp.

0493 Part IX, March–April 1945. 348pp.

0842 Part X, May–August 1945. 158pp.

These reports represent a chronological compilation, beginning in January 1943, of Allied claims of damage inflicted on Japanese warships and merchant vessels. The claims are entered on the left side of the report, while any evidence confirming the damage report, from all sources including the Japanese themselves, has been entered on the right side. Information confirming damage reports was obtained from the findings of JANAC, decrypted intelligence information, information gained from captured Japanese documents and personnel diaries, and information obtained from Japanese

prisoners of war. Also included in these reports is information on the U.S. attacking units, the date of the attack, and the position where the attack occurred.  
*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Merchant vessels, Japanese; JANAC; Decryption intelligence; Japan—documents; Prisoners of war, Japanese.

## Reel 34

- 0001 **CNO Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Allied Claims and Enemy Confirmation of Damage to Japanese Ships.** SRH-184 cont.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. (TS. Declassified on 7/21/82.)  
0001 Part X, May–August 1945 cont. 167pp.  
These reports represent a chronological compilation, beginning in January 1943, of Allied claims of damage inflicted on Japanese warships and merchant vessels. The claims are entered on the left side of the report, while any evidence confirming the damage report, from all sources including the Japanese themselves, has been entered on the right side. Information confirming damage reports was obtained from the findings of JANAC, decrypted intelligence information, information gained from captured Japanese documents and personnel diaries, and information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war. Also included in these reports is information on the U.S. attacking units, the date of the attack, and the position where the attack occurred.  
*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Merchant vessels, Japanese; JANAC; Decryption intelligence; Japan—documents; Prisoners of war, Japanese.
- 0168 **U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Iwo Jima (March–December 1945).** SRH-186.  
U.S. Navy. January 3, 1980. 34pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
This report represents a brief history of the U.S. Naval radio station established on Iwo Jima after the conquest of the island by the U.S. Marine Corps in February and early March of 1945. This station was under the control of the Mid-Pacific Direction Finder Net and initially consisted of direction finder units only. Later the station was equipped with radio intercept equipment to monitor Japanese naval transmissions. Included in this report is information on the station's equipment, personnel, and operations. This station was discontinued in December 1945.  
*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Iwo Jima; Marine Corps, U.S.; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Navy, Japanese.
- 0203 **U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Palmyra Island, Territory of Hawaii (April 28, 1942–January 16, 1946).** SRH-187.  
U.S. Navy. March 10, 1977. 9pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
The U.S. Naval radio station at Palmyra Island was established in April 1942 as a high-frequency direction finder station. This station was part of the Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction Finder Net. The mission of this station was to obtain bearings on enemy radio transmissions in order to determine the position of enemy ships, aircraft, and shore stations. This report provides information on the station's operations, facilities, equipment, and personnel. Also included is material on some of the problems associated with this station. This radio station ceased operations in January 1946.  
*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Palmyra Island; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net.

- 0213 **U.S. Navy Strategic Direction Finder Station, Guadalcanal (November 1942–December 4, 1944).** SRH-188.  
U.S. Navy. 1980. 7pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
The U.S. Navy strategic direction finder station on Guadalcanal was established in November 1942 as an intercept and HFDF facility. Information is included on the station's equipment, personnel, and operations. Also included is material on various problems experienced by this station during the course of its operations. The station was decommissioned in December 1944.  
*Index Item:* Naval Strategic Direction Finder Stations, U.S.—Guadalcanal.
- 0221 **U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Johnston Island (December 1, 1942–January 1, 1946).** SRH-189.  
U.S. Navy. March 3, 1980. 20pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
The U.S. Naval radio station on Johnston Island was established in December 1942 as part of the Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction Finder Net. The purpose of this station was to provide better coverage of the high and intermediate frequencies in the Marshall and Gilbert Island areas. The station's primary mission was the tracking of enemy units in the Pacific. In addition the Johnston Island station was authorized to provide navigational assistance to lost Allied aircraft. This report contains information on the station's equipment, personnel, and operations. The station was closed on January 1, 1946.  
*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Johnston Island; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Marshall Islands; Gilbert Islands; Aircraft—Allied.
- 0242 **U.S. Navy Strategic Direction Finder Station, Tarawa Atoll (December 13–19, 1943–November 27, 1944).** SRH-190.  
U.S. Navy. n.d. 7pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
The U.S. Naval strategic direction finder station was established on Tarawa shortly after the area was conquered by the U.S. Marines in November 1942. The sole mission of this station was direction finding operations. The Tarawa station operated as part of the Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction Finder Net. This report contains information on the station's operations, equipment, problems, and personnel. This station was decommissioned on November 27, 1944.  
*Index Items:* Naval Strategic Direction Finder Stations, U.S.—Tarawa Atoll; Marine Corps, U.S.; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net.
- 0250 **U.S. Navy Supplementary Radio Station, Kwajalein (February 29, 1944–December 8, 1945).** SRH-191.  
U.S. Navy. 1980. 8pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
The U.S. Naval radio station on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands was established following the conquest of the area by the Fourth Marine Division and the U.S. Army's Seventh Infantry Division in February 1944. This station provided direction finder information to the Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net, as well as radio intercept information, which was forwarded to the Pacific Fleet Radio Unit. This report contains information on the station's operations, equipment, and personnel. The Kwajalein station ceased operations in December 1945.  
*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Kwajalein Atoll; Marshall Islands; Fourth Marine Division; Seventh Infantry Division, U.S.; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Pacific Fleet—Radio Unit.
- 0259 **U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Manus Island (June 17, 1944–October 10, 1945).** SRH-192.  
U.S. Navy. 1980. 32pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/15/82.)  
The U.S. Naval radio station on Manus Island was established in May 1944 to perform direction finder operations for both the Mid-Pacific and Southwestern Pacific HFDF

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Nets. This report provides information on the station's operations, equipment, and personnel. The station was decommissioned in October 1945.  
*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Manus Island; Direction finding operations; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Southwestern Pacific HFDF Net.

0292 **U.S. Naval Radio Direction Finder Station, Morotai Island (January 24–February 3, 1945).** SRH-193.

U.S. Navy. n.d. 20pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/20/82.)

The U.S. Navy established a radio direction finder station on Morotai Island in the Molucca Group of what is now Indonesia. This station enjoyed the shortest operational span of any such station established during the Second World War, being in commission just ten days. The Morotai station was part of the Pacific HFDF Net. The location of this station was particularly dangerous due to the fact that although the island had been captured by the Allies in 1944, the last Japanese defenders did not surrender until the end of the war. This report gives details on the station's operations, equipment, and personnel during its brief period of activity.

*Index Items:* Naval Strategic Direction Finder Stations, U.S.—Morotai Island; Pacific Strategic HFDF Net.

0313 **U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Leyte, Philippine Islands (July 16, 1945–September 17, 1945).** SRH-194.

U.S. Navy. 1980. 6pp. (NA. Declassified on 7/22/82.)

The U.S. Naval radio station at Leyte was another of the more short-lived radio direction finder stations established during World War II. Commissioned in July 1945, it was decommissioned in September 1945 when the collapse of the Japanese Empire ended the operational requirement for this station. This report provides information on the station's operations, equipment, and personnel. The Leyte station was part of the Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net.

*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Leyte; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net.

0320 **War Department (MID), Military Intelligence Service, Japanese Ground Forces Order of Battle Bulletins.** SRH-195.

War Department MID. 679pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/20/82.)

0320 Part I, April 7–June 2, 1945. 409pp.

0730 Part II, June 9–August 11, 1945. 270pp.

This report consists of bulletins prepared by MIS with reference to information pertaining to the order of battle of Japanese ground forces. Included is information on the location, movements, and strengths of Japanese military units. This information was obtained primarily by means of ULTRA intelligence.

*Index Items:* MIS; Japan—order of battle information; Japan—military forces; ULTRA intelligence.

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0001 **War Department (MID), Military Intelligence Service, Japanese Ground Forces Order of Battle Bulletins.** SRH-195 cont.

War Department MID. (TS. Declassified on 7/20/82.)

0001 Part II, June 9–August 11, 1945 cont. 129pp.

This report consists of bulletins prepared by MIS with reference to information pertaining to the order of battle of Japanese ground forces. Included is information on the

location, movements, and strengths of Japanese military units. This information was obtained primarily by means of ULTRA intelligence.

*Index Items:* MIS; Japan—order of battle information; Japan—military forces; ULTRA intelligence.

- 0130 **Reports on the Activities of Dr. Marshall Stone in the China, Burma, and India Theaters.** SRH-196.  
Marshall H. Stone. January 29–March 31, 1945. 25pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/22/82.)  
These reports contain information on Dr. Marshall Stone's visits to the Allied Signal Intelligence Units in the China-Burma-India theater. The purpose of Dr. Stone's mission was to find out about the processes of obtaining and exploiting signals intelligence under field conditions. The doctor records his impressions of these installations and their personnel in his reports to Gen. Carter W. Clarke and Col. Alfred McCormack.  
*Index Items:* Marshall H. Stone; Signal Intelligence units, Allied; China-Burma-India theater; Signal intelligence; Carter W. Clarke; Alfred McCormack.
- 0156 **Japanese Army Shipping Organization.** SRH-199.  
MIS, War Department. March 1, 1945. 122pp. (TS. Declassified on 8/16/82.)  
This report was prepared by MIS and deals with the organization of Japanese shipping operations during World War II. The Japanese Shipping Organization carried on all Japanese army shipping, including both long and short haul transportation of troops and supplies in rear and forward areas. It also maintained and assisted in the defense of harbors, and operated, repaired, and defended ships. The organization had its own communications systems and codes, and was responsible in large measure for supplying its own units and controlling the movements of hospital ships.  
*Index Items:* MIS; Japan—shipping; Japanese Shipping Organization; Army, Japanese; Harbor defenses; Hospital ships.
- 0279 **Locations of Principal Combat Ships (Japanese).** SRH-202.  
OP-20-G. September 22–December 29, 1944. 17pp. (TS. Declassified on 9/10/82.)  
This report consists of a series of maps showing the location of all principal Japanese combat vessels in the Pacific during the latter part of 1944. Most of these ships were to be found in a defensive arc extending from Japan in the north, south along the coast of China to Taiwan, then down through the Philippines and Indochina, to what is now Indonesia.  
*Index Items:* Japan—warships; Japan; China; Taiwan; Philippines; Indochina; Indonesia.
- 0297 **General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Special Intelligence Bulletins.** SRH-203.  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. 702pp. (TS. Declassified 9/14/82.)  
0297 Part I, Numbers 1–209. May 2–November 30, 1943. 380pp.  
0678 Part II, Numbers 210–329. December 3, 1943–March 31, 1944. 322pp.  
These bulletins were issued by the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area to provide special intelligence information on Japanese military activities and movements to Allied army, naval, and air force personnel. Included is material on Japanese military strengths in various areas, Japanese supply operations, locations of principal Japanese military units and commands, and information on Allied military operations against Japanese-held positions.  
*Index Items:* Southwest Pacific Area—General Headquarters; Japan—military activities; Japan—military strengths; Japan—supply operations; Japan—military units; Military operations, Allied.

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- 0001 **General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Special Intelligence Bulletins. SRH-203 cont.**  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. 997pp.
- 0001 Part II, Numbers 210–329 cont. December 3, 1943–March 31, 1944. 37pp.  
(TS. Declassified 9/14/82.)
- 0038 Part III, Numbers 330–390. April 1–May 31, 1944. 192pp.  
(TS. Declassified on 9/14/82.)
- 0231 Part IV, Numbers 391–510. June 1–September 30, 1944. 469pp.  
(TS. Declassified on 5/20/86.)
- 0701 Part V, Numbers 511–599. October 1–December 28, 1944. 299pp.  
(TS. Declassified on 5/20/86.)

These bulletins were issued by the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area to provide special intelligence information on Japanese military activities and movements to Allied army, navy, and air force personnel. Included is material on Japanese military strengths in various areas, Japanese supply operations, locations of principal Japanese military units and commands, and information on Allied military operations against Japanese-held positions.

*Index Items:* Southwest Pacific Area—General Headquarters; Japan—military activities; Japan—military strengths; Japan—supply operations; Japan—military units; Military operations, Allied.

## Reel 37

- 0001 **General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Special Intelligence Bulletins. SRH-203 cont.**  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. 706pp.
- 0001 Part V, Numbers 511–599 cont. October 1–December 28, 1944. 130pp.  
(TS. Declassified on 5/20/86.)
- [Note: Although the following section is listed as Part VI of this series of reports, the title differs somewhat from the other five sections. This section is entitled "General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, G-2 ULTRA Intelligence Summaries." This difference accounts for the starting over of the numbering sequence.]
- 0131 Part VI, Numbers 1–137. April 15–August 29, 1945. 576pp.  
(TS. Declassified on 5/20/86.)
- 0708 **A List of Japanese Merchant Ships, First Edition—July 1944 and First Supplement—August 1944. SRH-204.**  
OP-20-G. July–August 1944. 287pp. (S. Declassified on 9/30/82.)

These bulletins were issued by the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area to provide special intelligence information on Japanese military activities and movements to Allied army, navy, and air force personnel. Included is material on Japanese military strengths in various areas, Japanese supply operations, locations of principal Japanese military units and commands, and information on Allied military operations against Japanese-held positions.

This report contains a list of all major Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Pacific theater during World War II. Included is information on the ship's name, international call letters, gross tonnage, speed, ship type and specifications, the source of

information about the vessel, and any pertinent remarks relating to the vessel in question. This material was collected by OP-20-G from ULTRA and other sources.  
*Index Items:* Merchant vessels, Japanese; OP-20-G; ULTRA intelligence.

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- 0001 **A List of Japanese Merchant Ships, First Edition—July 1944 and First Supplement—August 1944.** SRH-204 cont. 312pp.
- 0313 **Evacuation of U.S. Navy COMINT Personnel from Corregidor in World War II.** SRH-207.  
U.S. Navy. circa 1965. 104pp. (S. Declassified on 11/18/82.)  
This report chronicles the U.S. Navy's efforts to evacuate the sixty-one U.S. Navy officers and enlisted personnel engaged in communications intelligence operations on Corregidor before the capture of the island by the Japanese. These sixty-one people represented a large part of the U.S. Navy's entire communications intelligence system as it existed in 1941. The loss of that many trained personnel so early in the war might have been disastrous. Also it was feared that if these people were captured by the Japanese and tortured they might reveal vital information relating to the U.S. defenses and intelligence operations. For these reasons the U.S. Navy spared no effort to remove these men before the island fell.  
*Index Items:* Navy, U.S.; Communication intelligence; Philippines—Corregidor.
- 0418 **Collection of Papers Related to the "Winds Execute" Message.** SRH-210.  
U.S. Navy. 1945. 84pp. (S. Declassified on 11/22/82.)  
The documents in this report represent an effort by the U.S. Navy to collect all material relating to the Japanese "Winds Execute" message, which preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor, for use in the congressional investigation of the disaster. This message had been intercepted by U.S. intelligence personnel and might have been used to prevent the Pearl Harbor disaster, or at least lessen its impact. Most of this material consists of reports on testimony before the congressional investigating committee and the U.S. Navy's reaction to the statements made.  
*Index Items:* Navy, U.S.; "Winds Execute" message; Pearl Harbor attack.
- 0503 **Japanese Radio Communications and Radio Intelligence.** SRH-211.  
CINCPAC. January 1, 1945. 36pp. (C. Declassified on 12/20/82.)  
This report was one of a series published by CINCPAC and CINCPAC, entitled "Know Your Enemy." The article is based on captured enemy documents, with some information added from prisoner of war interrogations. The object of this report was to provide U.S. Navy personnel with a basic knowledge of Japanese naval radio communications as they existed at the end of 1944.  
*Index Items:* Japan—radio communications; Japan—radio intelligence; CINCPAC; CINCPAC; "Know Your Enemy" program; Prisoners of war, Japanese.
- 0540 **ULTRA Material in the Blamey Papers.** SRH-219.  
Thomas Blamey. n.d. 66pp. (MS. Declassified on 12/1/82.)  
This report contains all material relating to ULTRA that was found in the papers of Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey, who was the commander in chief of the Australian army during World War II and the commander of Allied land forces under Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. Information is provided on the strengths and dispositions of Japanese military units in the Bismarck Archipelago, Rabaul, and New Ireland; the positions of Japanese submarines; Japanese air force activities around Truk; reports on the

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Japanese plans to attack Tarokina; and Japanese reports on Allied attacks on oil tankers.

*Index Items:* ULTRA intelligence; Sir Thomas Blamey; Douglas MacArthur; Japan—military units; Bismarck Archipelago; Rabaul; New Ireland; Submarines, Japanese; Air forces, Japanese—activities of; Truk; Tarokina; Japan—oil tankers.

0607 **Messages between U.S./Philippine Guerrilla Forces and Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. SRH-220.**

War Department, MIS. December 1942–November 1943. 381pp. (S. Declassified on 1/7/83.)

0607 Part I. 67pp.

0675 Part II. 314pp.

This report consists of clandestine messages transmitted from American-led Filipino guerrillas operating behind Japanese lines in the Philippine Islands. These guerrillas operated what was known as the Philippine Island Monitoring Mission. This mission transmitted intelligence information relating to Japanese operations and movements to the headquarters of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Also included is a complete list of Philippine radio stations and their locations. The guerrillas also reported on their own activities against the Japanese occupation forces.

*Index Items:* Philippines—Allied guerrilla forces in; Philippines; Philippine Island Monitoring Mission; Japan—Philippines; Douglas MacArthur; Philippines—Allied radio stations in.

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0001 **Messages between U.S./Philippine Guerrilla Forces and Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. SRH-220 cont.**

War Department, MIS. December 1942–November 1943. 998pp. (S. Declassified on 1/7/83.)

0001 Part II cont. 222pp.

0223 Part III. 544pp.

0768 Part IV. 232pp.

This report consists of clandestine messages transmitted from American-led Filipino guerrillas operating behind Japanese lines in the Philippine Islands. These guerrillas operated what was known as the Philippine Island Monitoring Mission. This mission transmitted intelligence information relating to Japanese operations and movements to the headquarters of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Also included is a complete list of Philippine radio stations and their locations. The guerrillas also reported on their own activities against the Japanese occupation forces.

*Index Items:* Philippines—Allied guerrilla forces in; Philippines; Philippine Island Monitoring Mission; Japan—Philippines; Douglas MacArthur; Philippines—Allied radio stations in.

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0001 **Messages between U.S./Philippine Guerrilla Forces and Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. SRH-220 cont.**

War Department, MIS. December 1942–November 1943. 802pp. (S. Declassified on 1/7/83.)

0001 Part IV cont. 96pp.

0097 Part V. 519pp.

0617 Part VI. 187pp.

This report consists of clandestine messages transmitted from American-led Filipino guerrillas operating behind Japanese lines in the Philippine Islands. These guerrillas operated what was known as the Philippine Island Monitoring Mission. This mission transmitted intelligence information relating to Japanese operations and movements to the headquarters of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Also included is a complete list of Philippine radio stations and their locations. The guerrillas also reported on their own activities against the Japanese occupation forces.

*Index Items:* Philippines—Allied guerrilla forces in; Philippines; Philippine Island Monitoring Mission; Japan—Philippines; Douglas MacArthur; Philippines—Allied radio stations in.

- 0805 **Japanese Naval Reserve Communications Intelligence Specialists.** SRH-226. National Security Agency. 1941–1945. 17pp. (C. Declassified on 1/18/83.) This report contains a register of Japanese naval reserve officers on active duty during World War II who were communications specialists. The list gives the officer's name both in English and Japanese characters, signal number, station to which he was assigned, and date of commission.  
*Index Item:* Navy, Japanese—Reserve officers.
- 0823 **The Role of COMINT in the Battle of Midway.** SRH-230. Henry F. Schorrack. 1975. 11pp. (S. Declassified on 2/4/83.) This article chronicles the role of U.S. communications intelligence in the "miracle of Midway." The Japanese had launched their attack at Midway in the hopes of destroying the U.S. aircraft carriers that had escaped the Pearl Harbor disaster. The Midway attack plan also called for assaults on Port Moresby, New Guinea, and the Aleutian Islands. American COMINT operations were able to intercept and decode Japanese radio traffic and ascertain where and when the Japanese planned their strike. This timely information proved to be the key not only to the Battle of Midway itself, but also to the Battle of the Coral Sea, which preceded it. By this means the U.S. Pacific Fleet was able to concentrate its forces at the right place and the right time to defeat the Japanese threat.  
*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Midway, Battle of; Aircraft carriers, U.S.; Pearl Harbor attack; New Guinea; Aleutian Islands; Radio traffic, Japanese; Coral Sea, Battle of the.
- 0835 **Japanese Reports on Monitoring of Allied Wireless Communications in the Philippines (January–December 1943).** SRH-231. Sidney F. Mashbir. March 29, 1945. 115pp. (S. Declassified on 2/14/83.) This report is a translation of Japanese documents that recorded communications intelligence efforts against the U.S. and Filipino guerrilla forces operating in the Philippine Islands during World War II. The report provides U.S. documentation and messages from these guerrilla forces. The Japanese reports are not completely uniform in organization, but they generally give data on the following: organization and activity of the Philippine guerrilla wireless station systems; liaison between these systems and Australia and the United States; the extent and character of communication; the appearance of new stations and new call signs; and Japanese monitoring, plotting, and cryptanalysis activities and punitive operations.  
*Index Items:* Japan—communications intelligence; Philippines—Allied guerrilla forces in; Philippines.

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- 0951 **U.S. Navy COMINCH Radio Intelligence Appreciations concerning German U-Boat Activity in the Far East.** SRH-232.  
U.S. Navy. January–April 1945. (S. Declassified on 3/2/83.)  
These reports contain information from the commander in chief, U.S. Fleet, regarding the movements and activities of German U-boats in Far Eastern waters during the first four months of 1945. Information has been provided by radio intercepts on the operations of these U-boats, their condition and cargoes, and Allied efforts to neutralize them.  
*Index Items:* U.S. Fleet—commander in chief; Submarines, German.
- 0962 **United States Navy Director of Naval Communications Memoranda on the Congressional Investigations of the Attack on Pearl Harbor.** SRH-233.  
Director of Naval Communications. October–December 1946. 46pp. (C. Declassified on 3/23/83.)  
This report consists of four memoranda regarding the report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. The memoranda deal primarily with the U.S. Navy's reaction to the communications aspects of the congressional report and their concern over possible security leaks stemming from the release of this information.  
*Index Items:* Pearl Harbor Attack, Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the; Navy, U.S.

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- 0001 **COMINT Contributions, Submarine Warfare in World War II.** SRH-235.  
C. A. Lockwood. June 17, 1947. 6pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/1/83.)  
This report concerns the role of communication intelligence in the success of U.S. submarine operations against the Japanese in World War II. Through intercept, cryptanalysis, and translation of Japanese messages, communication intelligence supplied the U.S. submarine force with a continuous flow of information on Japanese naval and merchant shipping, convoy routing and composition, damage sustained from submarine attacks, antisubmarine measures employed by the Japanese, the effectiveness of U.S. torpedoes, and a wealth of other pertinent intelligence. It was this type of information that allowed the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific to sink two-thirds of the entire Japanese merchant fleet and numerous warships during the course of the war.  
*Index Items:* Communication intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.; Radio intercepts; Cryptanalysis; Japan—shipping; Merchant vessels, Japanese; Japan—convoys; Antisubmarine measures; Torpedoes.
- 0008 **MIS/SSA Axis Analysis of Over-the-Hump U.S. Air Transport Traffic.** SRH-238.  
MIS/SSA. June 15, 1945. 24pp. (Declassified on 4/27/83.)  
This report contains information on German and Japanese radio interception of reports on the movements of Allied transport aircraft flying "over the hump" between India and China. The evidence indicates that these enemy signal intercept stations derived their information from reading plain text messages and conducting traffic analysis of cryptographed messages sent between airfields in India and China. For the most part these Axis intelligence reports were fairly accurate. Although this information was of little tactical value to the Japanese, who had only limited air strength in that region, the knowledge of air movements "over the hump" proved to be an important factor in assessing Allied success in supplying forces in China.  
*Index Items:* Germany—radio interception operations; Japan—radio interception operations; Aircraft—Allied transport; India; China; Japan—signal intercept stations; Intelligence reports, Axis.

- 0033 **War Department, MIS, Japanese Army Signal Centers and Officer Lists.** SRH-239. War Department, MIS. September 1, 1945. 28pp. (TS. Declassified on 5/6/83.)  
The Japanese army signal intelligence service conducted extensive traffic analysis on U.S. air and naval communications and achieved limited success in reading American cryptographic systems, notably air movement codes employed by the Army Airways Communications Service and the Fourteenth Air Force. The list included in this report briefly summarizes the type of activities conducted at each Japanese signal intelligence center as revealed by ULTRA intelligence. A list of Japanese army officers known to be engaged in signal intelligence activities is also included.  
*Index Items:* Signal Intelligence Service, Japanese; Signal intelligence, Japanese; Army Air Corps, U.S.—communications; Navy, U.S.—communications; Cryptographic systems, U.S.; Air movement codes, U.S.; Army Airways Communications Service, U.S.; Fourteenth Air Force, U.S.; ULTRA intelligence; Army, Japanese—officers.
- 0062 **A Version of the Japanese Problem in the Signal Intelligence Service (Later Signal Security Agency), 1930–1945.** SRH-252. John B. Hurt. 1930–1945. 219pp. (S. Declassified on 9/27/83.)  
This report contains recollections of an American member of the Signal Intelligence Service and his reflections on the growing threat posed by Japan in the days immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. These memoirs focus specifically on the U.S. interception of coded Japanese diplomatic messages in early December 1941 indicating that a state of war between the United States and Japan was imminent. Also included is the reaction of these men to the Pearl Harbor disaster, for although they knew of the Japanese intentions to attack an American military target, they believed that target would be Manila in the Philippines. The report also contains information on the organization and operations of the Signal Intelligence Service between 1930 and 1945.  
*Index Items:* Signal Intelligence Service; Pearl Harbor attack; Diplomatic communications, Japanese; Philippines—Manila.
- 0282 **The Japanese Intelligence System.** SRH-254. MIS, WDGS. September 4, 1945. 173pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/21/83.)  
This project is a comprehensive study of Japanese intelligence during World War II. All information that was available to the MIS was used in its preparation. The organization, methods, and effectiveness of Japanese intelligence have been stressed, and the operations of Japanese intelligence in all areas where it was active have been outlined. The subjects that this report treats in detail are especially important or are illustrative of Japanese intelligence as a whole.  
*Index Items:* Japan—intelligence operations; MIS.
- 0456 **Oral History Interview with Mr. Robert D. Ogg.** SRH-255. Naval Security Group Command. May 1983. 85pp. (NA. Declassified on 11/17/83.)  
In the Spring of 1983, the commander, Naval Security Group Command, was made aware that Mr. Robert D. Ogg, who had been portrayed under the pseudonym "Seaman Z" in John Toland's recent book, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath*, was now willing to shed his anonymity and participate in an oral history interview. Recognizing this as a potential opportunity to add to the store of historical knowledge surrounding the events of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the commander, Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU), directed Commander I. G. Newman, U.S. Navy (retired), to conduct the interview. This transcript represents the results of three and a half hours of interviews conducted with Ogg concerning his experiences at the Twelfth Naval District Intelligence Office during November and December 1941.  
*Index Items:* Naval Security Group Command; Robert D. Ogg; John Toland; Pearl Harbor attack; I. G. Newman; Twelfth Naval District Intelligence Office.

- 0542 **Analysis of Japanese Air Operations during Okinawa Campaign.** SRH-257.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. October 1, 1945. 331pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/10/83.)  
This report represents exhaustive research into ULTRA sources that uncovered much material not available during the Okinawa campaign concerning the offensive operations of the Japanese naval air forces, and to a lesser extent, the Japanese army air forces. Included is information on the operation plans and action reports of Japanese air activities in the Okinawa campaign. Also included is a summary of Allied reports on Japanese air strikes during that campaign.  
*Index Items:* ULTRA intelligence; Okinawa campaign; Navy, Japanese—Air forces; Army, Japanese—Air forces.
- 0874 **Japanese Army Air Forces Order of Battle.** SRH-258.  
Author not available. 1945. 126pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/30/83.)  
This report provides order of battle information on units of the Japanese army air forces. Included is material on Japanese tactical air units, training units, transport and ferrying units, airfield units, air depots, and other miscellaneous units attached or related to the Japanese army air forces. Appendices to this report discuss the engines and ammunition carried on Japanese aircraft, operational special designations and code numbers, home depots for these air units, and an alphabetical list of commanding officers and chiefs of staff of Japanese army air forces tactical units.  
*Index Items:* Army, Japanese—Air forces; Aircraft—Japanese.

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- 0001 **Japanese Army Air Forces Order of Battle.** SRH-258 cont. 236pp.
- 0237 **OP-20-G File of Reports on Japanese Naval Air Order of Battle (World War II).** SRH-259.  
OP-20-G. n.d. 101pp. (C. Declassified on 11/10/83.)  
This series of reports contains order of battle information relating to the Japanese naval air forces. Included is a brief historical overview of the Japanese naval air forces, information on Japanese army headquarters, the organization of the Japanese naval air forces, Japanese naval air arsenals, nomenclature of Japanese navy and army airplanes, information relating to Japanese naval aircraft, and the Japanese aircraft industry.  
*Index Items:* Navy, Japanese—Air forces; Army, Japanese—headquarters; Aircraft—Japanese.
- 0339 **Japanese Minor Combatant Vessels Used for Deep-Sea Escort.** SRH-262.  
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section. June 1, 1945. 44pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/29/83.)  
The following report is a resume of deep-sea escort vessels appearing in Japanese radio traffic in mid-1945. During the previous six months the Japanese had been able to maintain, if not increase, the number of minor combat craft available for deep-sea escort duty. The number of such vessels had increased from 284 on December 15, 1944, to 287 on June 1, 1945. This report provides the names of vessels engaged in such escort duties, the date they were last seen and where, the condition they were in at the time of the last sighting, and notes by the U.S. Navy giving other information pertinent to that vessel.  
*Index Items:* Navy, Japanese—combat ships; Radio traffic, Japanese; Navy, U.S.

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- 0384 **Japanese Submarine Sinkings during World War II. SRH-263.**  
OP-23. 1945. 21pp. (TS. Declassified on 11/30/83.)  
This report provides a list of Japanese submarines reported sunk by Allied forces during World War II. Included is information giving the submarine's name and the reported date and location of the sinking. Also included are memoranda on reported discrepancies between U.S. and Japanese reports as to the date and location that these vessels were sunk and the U.S. Navy response to these discrepancies.  
*Index Items:* Submarines, Japanese; Navy, U.S.
- 0406 **Status of Japanese Naval Vessels as of November 1945. SRH-265.**  
CINCPAC/CINCPOA. November 7, 1945. 93pp. (TS. Declassified on 12/6/83.)  
The following tables list, chronologically, the Japanese battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, coast defense vessels, seaplane carriers/tenders, submarine tenders, and minelayers reported sunk during World War II, with details of the sinkings where known. Also included are alphabetical lists of those vessels reported afloat at the end of the war.  
*Index Item:* Navy, Japanese—vessels.
- 0500 **Japanese Signal Intelligence Service (Third Edition). SRH-266.**  
SSA. November 1, 1944. 67pp. (TS. Declassified on 1/10/84.)  
This report contains information on the Japanese Signal Intelligence Service during World War II. The report includes material on the organization of the Japanese intelligence service, the major personalities involved in this work, Japanese collaboration with her allies and neutral nations, the two major types of Japanese intelligence operations—diplomatic and military—and the successes achieved by the Japanese in traffic analysis, direction finding, and cryptanalysis.  
*Index Items:* Signal Intelligence Service, Japanese; Japan—intelligence operations; Signal intelligence—Japanese; Direction finding operations; Cryptanalysis.
- 0568 **CINCPAC Enemy Activities File, April–May 1942. SRH-272.**  
CINCPAC. April–May 1942. 124pp. (S. Declassified on 3/7/84.)  
This report provides information on Japanese naval and military forces and their locations. Also included are brief overviews of enemy activities, both feasible and probable, particularly military campaigns. Among the campaigns mentioned in these reports are the New Guinea campaign, the Timor-Northwest Australia campaign, and the Indian Ocean Trade Route campaign.  
*Index Items:* Navy, Japanese; Japan—military forces; New Guinea—campaign; Timor-Northwest Australia campaign; Indian Ocean Trade Route campaign.
- 0693 **OP-20-G File of Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (FRUMEL). SRH-275.**  
OP-20-G. June 28, 1943–September 2, 1945. 159pp. (TS. Declassified on 4/20/84.)  
This report consists of a series of memoranda relating to the Fleet Radio Unit at Melbourne, Australia. These memos address such issues as administration, space and security, correspondence, communications, equipment, personnel, operations and planning, research, intercept and direction finding, and traffic analysis.  
*Index Items:* Fleet Radio Units; Australia—Melbourne.
- 0853 **War Diary, Combat Intelligence Unit (Pacific-1942). SRH-278.**  
Combat Intelligence Unit. 1942. 147pp. (S. Declassified on 4/30/84.)  
The Combat Intelligence Unit supplied general enemy intelligence information, analyzed Japanese radio traffic, and worked on code breaking operations. In addition, it produced and disseminated daily such information as new calls and changes of calls of enemy parties, units, and vessels; identification of calls and addresses; estimated location and strength of enemy land and sea forces; estimation of projected enemy

movements and campaigns; bearings and positions of enemy vessels and units by direction finder; and translations of enemy dispatches containing pertinent intelligence information. Among the information provided in this diary are intelligence materials on the Allied campaigns in New Guinea, New Britain, the Marshalls, Manus Island, Bougainville, New Ireland, and Guadalcanal.

*Index Items:* Combat Intelligence Center; Radio traffic, Japanese; Code breaking operations; Navy, Japanese—vessels; New Guinea; New Britain campaign; Marshall Islands; Manus Island; Bougainville campaign; New Ireland; Guadalcanal.

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- 0001 **War Diary, Combat Intelligence Unit (Pacific-1942).** SRH-278 cont. 48pp.
- 0049 **An Exhibit of the Important Types of Intelligence Recovered through Reading Japanese Cryptograms.** SRH-280.  
SSA. August 1944. 242pp. (TS. Declassified in May 1984.)  
This report consists of a collection of translated messages and other data illustrating the types of intelligence available to the Allies through the interception, cryptanalysis, decryption, translation, and publication of Japanese messages. This exhibit represents the work of several sections of the "B" Branch of the SSA. Three principal types of Japanese intelligence information are presented here: (1) Japanese army communications; (2) Japanese diplomatic communications; and (3) the correspondence of Japanese military attachés.  
*Index Items:* Japan—cryptograms; Cryptanalysis; SSA; Army, Japanese—communications; Diplomatic communications, Japanese; Military attachés.
- 0292 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Submarine Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, November 1943.** SRH-284.  
OP-20-G. November 1943. 539pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/2/84.)  
The purpose of this study was to display the role of radio intelligence in the U.S. submarine operations of the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. This problem has been approached through a study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by the commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, to the submarines under his command. This volume deals specifically with the month of November 1943, which stands as the high water mark from the beginning of the war until July 1944 as regards tonnage sunk and damaged by U.S. submarines.  
*Index Items:* OP-20-G; Radio intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.; Pacific Fleet, U.S.—commander, Submarine Force.
- 0832 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Submarine Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, December 1943.** SRH-285.  
OP-20-G. December 1943. 146pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/21/84.)  
The purpose of this study was to display the role of radio intelligence in the U.S. submarine operations of the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. This problem has been approached through a study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by the commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, to the submarines under his command. This volume deals specifically with the month of December 1943, which marks a major decline from the record set the previous month. During this period U.S. submarines sunk only thirty-two Japanese vessels and damaged only twenty.  
*Index Items:* OP-20-G; Radio intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.; Pacific Fleet, U.S.—commander, Submarine Force.

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- 0979 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Submarine Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, January–February 1943 (In Part).** SRH-286.  
OP-20-G. January–February 1943. 21pp. (TS. Declassified on 6/21/84.)  
The purpose of this study was to display the role of radio intelligence in the U.S. submarine operations of the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. This problem has been approached through a study of the dispatches based on radio intelligence sent out by the commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, to the submarines under his command. This volume gives in detail the report of sixty-three messages based on radio intelligence sent out during the months of January and February 1943. These reports deal primarily with Japanese ship movements and Allied contacts with Japanese vessels. The American forces claimed only nineteen ships sunk and two damaged during this period.  
*Index Items:* OP-20-G; Radio intelligence; Submarine operations, U.S.; Pacific Fleet, U.S.—commander, Submarine Force; Japan—shipping.

## Reel 44

- 0001 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Submarine Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, January–February 1943 (In Part).** SRH-286 cont. 226pp.
- 0227 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, March 1943 (Appendix Only).** SRH-287.  
OP-20-G. March 1943. 447pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/2/84.)  
The purpose of this study was to display the role of radio intelligence in the U.S. tactical operations of the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. This problem has been approached through a study of the bulletins based on radio intelligence sent out by CINCPAC. This volume deals specifically with the month of March 1943. This report contains only the appendix of this particular study. It has been determined that the title page, table of contents, preface, summary, and chapters of this study were not received for review. An exhaustive search by OP-20-G for the missing portions of this report has not been successful.  
*Index Items:* OP-20-G; Radio intelligence; Tactical operations, U.S.; CINCPAC.
- 0675 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, April 1943.** SRH-288.  
OP-20-G. April 1943. 325pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/2/84.)  
The purpose of this study was to display the role of radio intelligence in the U.S. tactical operations of the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. This volume deals with the month of April 1943. The major enemy operation during that month was the series of Japanese attacks on American positions in the Solomons. This study discusses the warnings the U.S. forces received regarding these attacks based on information gathered by radio intelligence.  
*Index Items:* OP-20-G; Radio intelligence; Tactical operations, U.S.; Solomon Islands campaign.

## Reel 45

- 0001 **OP-20-G Radio Intelligence in World War II: Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, April 1943.** SRH-288 cont. 196pp.
- 0197 **The Employment of Mobile Radio Intelligence Units by Commands Afloat during World War II.** SRH-289.  
William W. Burd. n.d. 153pp. (TS. Declassified on 7/11/84.)  
The use of shipboard radio intelligence units by operating commands afloat was a new venture during World War II. From a small beginning in 1942, radio intelligence units afloat developed and proved their worth until, by the peak of naval air warfare in the spring of 1945, they had become almost indispensable. The great value of radio intelligence units afloat lay in the fact that although in many cases shore-based radio intelligence activities could furnish identical information, they could not furnish it to the fleet quickly enough to be employed in modern fast-moving aerial warfare. This report tells the story of these units and the important service they rendered during the Second World War.  
*Index Item:* Radio intelligence—mobile units.
- 0351 **The Undeclared War, "History of Radio Intelligence."** SRH-305.  
L. F. Safford. November 15, 1943. 31pp. (S. Declassified on 7/19/84.)  
This report presents the history of U.S. radio intelligence activities from around 1917 through World War II. Among the topics covered is the existence of a "slush fund" maintained in local banks used by the director of naval intelligence for the benefit of the Research Desk of the Code and Signal Section of Naval Communications; the breaking of the Japanese naval operations codes, known in U.S. Naval intelligence circles as the "Red Book" (for the edition of 1918) and the "Blue Book" (for the edition of 1930); the Orange Grand Maneuvers of 1930 and 1933, which were, in effect, the dress rehearsal of the Japanese navy war plans; and the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic code on the eve of World War II.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence; Naval Intelligence, director of; Naval communications—Code and Signal Section; Navy, Japanese—operations codes; "Red Book"; "Blue Book"; Orange Grand Maneuvers; Navy, Japanese—war plans; Japan—diplomatic code.
- 0383 **General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Special Intelligence Precisis.** SRH-307.  
G-2, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. n.d. 67pp. (S. Declassified on 7/25/84.)  
This report consists of a series of intelligence briefs sent from General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, to the chief of staff. These briefs contain information obtained on Japanese activities in the Southwest Pacific and their knowledge of Allied operations. Among the areas included in these briefs are Australia, Timor, Thailand, Indochina, and India. Also included is information on Japanese material shortages, inter-Axis cooperation, Japanese plans with regard to the USSR, Japanese shipping, and the activities of neutral nations in the area.  
*Index Items:* Southwest Pacific Area—General Headquarters; Southwest Pacific Area; Southwest Pacific Area—Allied operations in; Australia; Timor; Thailand; Indochina; India; Japan—material shortages; Axis nations; USSR; Japan—shipping; Southwest Pacific Area—neutral nations in.

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- 0451 **Fleet Radio Unit Detachment, Cooktown, Australia.** SRH-308.  
U.S. Navy. March 28, 1980. 26pp. (NA. Declassified on 8/6/84.)  
This report presents a history of the establishment, equipment, and operations of the Fleet Radio Unit Detachment at Cooktown, Australia. The station was established in August 1943 to cover the Solomon and Gilbert islands intermediate frequency traffic. Included is a description of the buildings and grounds on which the station was located and a list of the U.S. naval personnel that manned the station during the course of the war. The intercept station at Cooktown was closed in October 1944 after operations against the Japanese moved further north.  
*Index Items:* Fleet Radio Units—Cooktown; Solomon Islands campaign; Gilbert Islands.
- 0478 **Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports, 1945.** SRH-309.  
U.S. Naval Security Group Command. 1945. 420pp. (S. Declassified on 8/22/84.)  
0478 Part I. 263pp.  
0742 Part II. 157pp.  
These reports consist of memoranda on radio intelligence operations in the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. Included are reports from radio intelligence units attached to the USS *Yorktown*, the USS *Enterprise*, and the carrier divisions of the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets. These reports describe U.S. military and naval operations in the Pacific from January to August 1945.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—mobile units; USS *Yorktown*; USS *Enterprise*; Sixth Fleet, U.S.; Seventh Fleet, U.S.

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- 0001 **Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports, 1945.** SRH-309 cont.  
U.S. Naval Security Group Command. 1945. 504pp. (S. Declassified on 8/22/84.)  
0001 Part II cont. 125pp.  
0126 Part III. 379pp.  
These reports consist of memoranda on radio intelligence operations in the Pacific Ocean Area during World War II. Included are reports from radio intelligence units attached to the USS *Yorktown*, the USS *Enterprise*, the USS *Hornet*, the USS *Bennington*, the carrier divisions of the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Air Force, and other major naval units in the Pacific theater. These reports describe U.S. military and naval operations in the Pacific from January to August 1945.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—mobile units; Pacific Ocean Area—U.S. intelligence operations; USS *Yorktown*; USS *Enterprise*; USS *Hornet*; USS *Bennington*; Sixth Fleet, U.S.; Seventh Fleet, U.S.; Pacific Fleet Air Force, U.S.
- 0506 **U.S. Naval HFDF Station, Exmouth Gulf, Australia (May 1943–November 1944).** SRH-312.  
U.S. Navy. May 18, 1980. 29pp. (NA. Declassified on 8/23/84.)  
The U.S. naval direction finder station at Exmouth Gulf, Australia, was established in May 1943 to provide additional coverage of the Indian Ocean–China Sea Area, as well as furnishing fixes with bearings from Darwin and/or Freemantle, Australia. This report presents information on the station's equipment, personnel, and operations. The station's operations were apparently discontinued in November of 1944.  
*Index Items:* Naval Strategic Direction Finder Stations, U.S.—Exmouth Gulf; Indian Ocean Area; China Sea Area; Australia—Darwin; Australia—Freemantle.

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- 0536 **Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports, 1942.** SRH-313.  
U.S. Naval Security Group Command. 1942. 42pp. (S. Declassified on 8/23/84.)  
This report consists of a series of memoranda concerning radio intelligence activities with U.S. Task Force Sixteen (with USS *Enterprise* as flag ship) and aboard the USS *Yorktown* from February to June 1942. Included is information on the role of radio intelligence in the Battle of Midway, operations of Task Force Sixteen in the attack on Wake Island, the USS *Yorktown's* operations off New Guinea, and the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, which took off from the USS *Hornet*.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—mobile units; Radio intelligence—role of; Task Force Sixteen, U.S.; USS *Enterprise*; USS *Yorktown*; Midway, Battle of; Wake Island; New Guinea; Doolittle raid; USS *Hornet*.
- 0579 **Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports, 1944.** SRH-314.  
U.S. Naval Security Group Command. 1944. 120pp. (S. Declassified on 8/23/84.)  
This report consists of a series of documents containing reports from mobile radio intelligence units aboard the USS *Essex*, the USS *Saratoga*, the USS *Yorktown*, the USS *Hornet*, and other U.S. naval units in the Pacific. Included are descriptions of task force radio intelligence units, instructions for dissemination of information to task force radio intelligence units, reports on the Palau raid and FORAGER operation, and operations of the FRUPAC unit. These reports cover the period from February to November 1944.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—mobile units; USS *Essex*; USS *Saratoga*; USS *Yorktown*; USS *Hornet*; Palau raid; FORAGER operation; Fleet Radio Units—operations of.
- 0700 **U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station, Adelaide River, Northern Territory, Australia (March 23, 1943–September 21, 1945).** SRH-316.  
U.S. Navy. n.d. 33pp. (NA. Declassified on 8/24/84.)  
The U.S. naval radio station located on the Adelaide River in the Northern Territory of Australia was established in March 1943 to cover Japanese shore-based and afloat communications in the islands north of Australia, particularly in the South China Sea and South Pacific Area. The station also had direction finder capabilities and was part of the Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net. This report provides a description of the Northern Territory and its capital at Darwin and provides information on the station's personnel, equipment, and operations. The Adelaide River station was decommissioned on September 21, 1945.  
*Index Items:* Naval Supplementary Radio Stations, U.S.—Adelaide River; South China Sea Area; South Pacific Area; Mid-Pacific Strategic HFDF Net; Australia—Darwin.
- 0734 **Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports, 1943.** SRH-317.  
U.S. Naval Security Group Command. 1943. 266pp. (S. Declassified on 8/24/84.)  
This report consists of a series of documents containing reports from mobile radio intelligence units attached to U.S. Task Force Fifteen, the USS *Enterprise*, the USS *Yorktown*, the USS *Princeton*, the USS *Essex*, the USS *Lexington*, U.S. Task Force Sixteen, and the USS *Indianapolis*. Included is information on radio transmitting equipment, the Marcus Island raid, radio frequencies for the Marshall and Gilbert islands, the U.S. raid on Wake Island, and the U.S. occupation of the Gilbert Islands.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—mobile units; Task Force Fifteen, U.S.; USS *Enterprise*; USS *Yorktown*; USS *Princeton*; USS *Essex*; USS *Lexington*; Task Force Sixteen, U.S.; USS *Indianapolis*; Radio transmitting equipment; Marcus Island raid; Marshall Islands; Gilbert Islands; Wake Island.

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- 0001     **Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports, 1943.** SRH-317 cont. 30pp.
- 0031     **COMINCH Combat Intelligence Division File on Hospital Ships.** SRH-323.  
U.S. Navy. January 12, 1943–April 30, 1945. 646pp. (S. Declassified on 10/15/84.)  
0031         Part I, General File on Hospital Ships. 193pp.  
0225         Part II, Submarine Patrol Reports Pertaining to Hospital Ships. 307pp.  
0533         Part III, File on Misuse of Hospital Ships by the Japanese Navy. 146pp.  
This report was prepared by the Combat Intelligence Division. Part I contains information on attacks on hospital ships and includes material on the name of the vessel, date and place that the attack occurred, and the nature of the attack and its result. Information is also provided on the movements and activities of hospital ships of all nationalities. Part II contains reports from U.S. submarine patrols regarding the movements and activities of hospital ships of all nations. Part III includes U.S. reports on the improper use of hospital ships by the Japanese navy. Among the charges made are that the Japanese were sending out armed vessels under Red Cross designation, the painting of tankers and freighters with hospital ship colors, the transport of armed Japanese troops aboard hospital ships, and the use of hospital ships to transport vital war materials.  
*Index Items:* COMINCH; Hospital ships; Submarine operations, U.S.—patrol reports; Navy, Japanese.
- 0680     **U.S. Navy Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Units, Related Correspondence, 1943–1945.** SRH-324.  
U.S. Navy. 1943–1945. 284pp. (S. Declassified on 10/15/84.)  
This report consists of material relating to the operations and activities of U.S. naval mobile radio intelligence units in the Pacific theater during World War II. Included is information on equipment, training, morale, operational planning, research, interception activities, direction finder activities, and radio traffic analysis. Also included are lists of advantages and disadvantages to having mobile radio intelligence units. Documents of many different types and from various sources are included in this study.  
*Index Items:* Radio intelligence—mobile units; Direction finding operations.
- 0965     **U.S. Naval Radio Station, Libugon, Guam.** SRH-326.  
U.S. Naval Security Group Detachment. May 6, 1981. 60pp. (C. Declassified on 10/18/84.)  
The U.S. naval radio station at Libugon, Guam, was established in 1926 to intercept Japanese communications. This station intercepted and reported Japanese communications regarding the Japanese naval maneuvers in the Marianas Islands in May and June 1930. The station also served as a strategic tracking station under the Sixteenth Naval District. This report deals with the station's personnel, equipment, and operations from the time of its establishment until its capture by the Japanese on December 8, 1941. The station managed to destroy all its records and cryptographic materials prior to the fall of the island.  
*Index Items:* Guam—Libugon; Navy, Japanese—maneuvers; Marianas Island; Sixteenth Naval District.

# SUBJECT INDEX

The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first arabic number refers to the reel, and the arabic number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular subject begins. Therefore, 47: 0965 directs the researcher to the subject that begins at Frame 0965 of Reel 47.

Names of ships and other vessels can be found under their given name. For example, the USS *Enterprise* is alphabetized in the E entries.

## **Aegean Sea**

German naval operations in 10: 0756

## **Agrarian reforms**

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## **Aid programs, U.S.**

for China 10: 0794

## **Air attacks, U.S.**

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0344; 15: 0118

## **Aircraft**

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
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
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
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